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Abstract
In this thesis I propose a practical framework for a feminist science by seeking to
ground feminist theories about science in an understanding of the practice of science.
There are three inter-linking aims. The first aim is to develop an understanding of how
the practice of science is gendered. The second aim is to relate feminist
epistemologies of science to this understanding of gender and science, and to suggest
a 'best version' of a feminist science. This is then built upon in the third aim, namely,
to suggest feminist strategies for changing science. These issues are explored further
in two empirical studies which investigate experiences and perceptions of the next
generation of scientists (undergraduate science students) and of women who have
practiced, or are practicing, science, and who are sympathetic to feminism.
Part 1 reviews feminist literature that addresses the position of women in science, the
relationship between gender and science, and feminist epistemologies of science. I
identify, and explore empirically in Part 2, limitations in the various theories. These
fall under two main headings. First, the relationship between male domination of
science and masculinity, focusing in particular, on the social construction of
masculinity within science and differences in scientific practice. Second, I investigate
the gap between theory and practice in feminist epistemologies of science, covering
four main issues: the role of the individual feminist scientist within the scientific
community; the tension between relativism and objectivism in a feminist methodology;
the organisation of a feminist science; and the relationship between a feminist
scientific community and the wider society.
I argue that science is a male domain. Shared masculine values and characteristics
amongst scientists preserve a sense of community and cooperation. Women are
variously isolated and marginalised from the core male scientific communities. The
gendering of science cannot be solely attributed to male psychological needs, but is
related to the role of science in the political economy. Methodological practice is also
dictated by the interests of those who fund and regulate science, and by scientists'
professional interests.
This suggests that any practical framework for a feminist science must recognise that
societal, organisational and methodological change are interdependent. Bringing
women into science, and challenging the male networks of power within and outwith
science, is fundamental to establishing a feminist scientific community and promoting
methodologies compatible with feminist politics. Finally, I argue that the tension
between objectivism and relativism might be viewed as creative when empirical
investigations are tempered with community reflexivity.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Androcentrism and Sexism in Science
In the UK and USA scientists are predominantly male, particularly in the so-
called, 'hard sciences' of physics and chemistry.1 Despite recent government efforts to
encourage more women into science, the association of science with masculinity
prevails. The majority of women tend to feel ignorant, even frightened, of science.
Those that do try to become scientists often encounter sexism from teachers and
peers, or find it difficult to cope with the culture of science, and leave. This leads to a
progressive decline in the number of women scientists towards the top of the
employment hierarchy.
Sexism of these kinds are not the only problems with science. The topics
studied in science have also be criticised for being part of a masculine agenda. In this
sense scientists can be accused of androcentrism. Science has been criticised, for
example, for failing to adequately research subjects important to women's lives.
Furthermore, scientists have contributed some notorious theories in support of sexist
ideology, notably women's alleged biological need to 'home make' and remain
uneducated. Such theories are not confined to history, but have reemerged, albeit in a
different guise, in the new science of sociobiology.
1
Throughout this study I am focusing on science in the UK and USA. Science in
Anglo Saxon countries does seem to be more male dominated than in other countries.
By 'science' I therefore mean modern Western industrialised natural science. This
does not imply that I consider other cultures' knowledge, or the social sciences, non-
scientific - but that I am limiting my exploration of science to the most problematic
area- natural sciences - and wish to avoid global generalisations about women and
science. I am also focusing on the scientific investigation of the natural world. This
tends to excludes engineering and technology, although I recognise that there is not
always a clear distinction between science and technology, and at times my critique of
science brings in engineering.
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A further problem with science is the historical association between the
characteristics of scientific investigation - rationality, objectivity, intervention - and
those of masculinity. There is a corresponding association between femininity and
emotionality, subjectivity and passivity. Feminist critics of science have argued that
the methods of science reflect masculine values.
1.2 A Feminist Science
Constructing a feminist critique of science is not the end point of feminists'
involvement in science. A new agenda follows from such criticism. Science, after all,
is too important to be left to men. Feminists have therefore asked, first, how do we
eradicate sexism in science? There is clearly a need to challenge the male domination
of science. The most basic principle of feminism is equality. However, getting more
women into science does not necessarily mean that the topics and questions of
science, or the guiding principles of investigation, will change. These may well remain
androcentric. A second question for feminists therefore arises. How can
androcentrism in science be exposed and combated? A third, and perhaps most
important, question is what kind of science would emerge?
The answer to these questions concerns the nature of a feminist science, or
what I have chosen to call the feminisation of science. I have deliberately chosen the
term feminisation, because it combines what I see as the three main issues involved
with the notion of moving towards a feminist science: getting more females into
science; making science more feminine', and making science more feminist. There is
no simple strategy for meeting each of these goals. Nor is it clear how these three
aspects of feminising science might interact.
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1.3 Problems in the Feminist Critique and Theories of Science
I share feminists' concern with the male domination and androcentrism of
science. I also recognise the need to combat sexism and to think about a feminist
science. Nevertheless, I have several concerns about the current feminist critique and
theories of science which have led me to conduct this study.
There are a number of problems in the feminist analysis of science. The first is
the alienation of women scientists from many of the feminist arguments. There is a
divide between women in science, including many of those who are active in
encouraging more women into science, and feminist critics of androcentrism in
science, many of whom now come from outside of science.2 The former group are
hostile to the suggestion that science is an intrinsically masculine pursuit. Women
scientists often argue that science is neutral and unbiased and are at pains to stress
that their approach to science is no different from men's. Many feel that feminists do
not understand how science is practiced. Some perceive an overemphasis on the life
sciences in the feminist critique, and argue that the physical sciences are not
androcentric because they deal with inanimate objects. The hostility is understandable
given that the argument that science is masculine has often been used to exclude
women. For their part, the feminist critics are frustrated by women scientists' failure to
recognise the fundamentally political nature of science. Feminist critics argue that
there is no neutral position in science and strive to show how masculine values
permeate scientists' approach. Women scientists are seen to be 'taken in' by the
philosophy of objectivity which maintains scientists' powerful position as generators
of truth and fact in today's society.
2 The original feminist critics of science were mainly biologists. Now some of these
critics have moved into the social sciences. Other critics and theorists come from a
social science or philosophical background.
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I find myself caught between the two 'sides' of this divide. On the one hand, as
a physics graduate, I appreciate women scientists' hostility to the notion that science is
masculine. Of course women can do science 'just as well' as men. Just because the
values of science have been labelled as masculine in the past, there is not necessarily
any literal association in the practice of science. I am uncomfortable with critics' use
of psychoanalysis to explain men's 'need' for control, for example. The essentialist
overtones in claims that science is masculine are undoubtedly problematic. For me too
there is the problem of relativism when treating science as socially constructed. What
is the role of nature in such a science? Surely science reflects nature to different
degrees of accuracy? On the other hand, I agree with feminist critics when they note
the pervasive association of masculinity with science. I also agree that the methods of
science are never neutral, and may well show a masculine bias. Scientists' claim to the
truth of nature must also be understood in the context of their prestigious role as
experts in society, a role which they are likely to be unwilling to give up.
Whilst the initial theorists were feminist scientists, feminist theorists of science
are no longer drawn solely from the scientific community. A new type of theory has
now emerged - feminist epistemology of science,3 the roots of which are in
mainstream philosophy and epistemology. This has resulted in a highly abstract
theoretical approach to the question of a feminist science which women in science
(and many others outside of philosophy) tend to find difficult to relate to the practice
of science. In my view there are two main issues behind this gulf between theory and
practice: first, there is a lack of clarity about the meaning and nature of a feminist
science; and second, the theory of a feminist science is too abstract and without
sufficient consideration about how to operationalise a feminist science in practice.
3
At its most basic epistemology means theory of knowledge. Feminists, and others,
have argued that this should extend beyond the narrow confines of philosophical
discussion of logic, and include social criteria forjudging valid claims to knowledge.
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In relation to the first problem of lack of clarity, it is unclear whether a
feminist science would require more women scientists, and if non-feminist women and
men would be able to practice such a science. It is also unclear what values such a
science would embody. Would a feminist science involve so called feminine principles
of emotion and connectedness, the opposite of the supposedly masculine values of
rationality and separation, or would feminists seek to challenge these distinctions and
move towards a gender-neutral science? Are there various feminist sciences, with
different feminist methodologies, and if so, which ones are the 'best'? Furthermore,
what criteria do we use for selecting the 'best' feminist methodologies?
In relation to the second issue of operationalisation, the question of whether
the notion of a feminist science is purely abstract also arises. Is there a feminist
science in practice today? Could it be extended? In my view feminist theory is also
ambiguous about the relationship between a feminist science and mainstream science.
I argue that clarity about the role of a feminist science in changing science from within
the existing scientific institutions is essential.
In my view these uncertainties are a feature of the problem of translation -
both across disciplinary boundaries, and between theory and practice. This is captured
in, what is at this stage, my deliberate ambiguity in choosing the term feminising
science which highlights the role of women, the feminine gender and the nature of
feminism in a feminist science, in addition to the processes of moving towards a
feminist science.
These disciplinary divisions, in addition to the gap between theory and
practice, are reflected in the literature about women, gender, feminism and science.
Those women scientists concerned with encouraging more women into science, and
with improving women's position in science, are associated with what I call the
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'women in science' literature. This deals with studies of women's place in science,
many of which are statistical, and strategies for combating sexism. The second body
of literature concerns gender and science. This was originally developed by feminists
in the biological sciences, and is concerned with understanding how the
methodologies and content of science are androcentric. Although initially strongly
anti-essentialist, more recently psychoanalytic theories, some of which adopt an
essentialist position, have been adopted to explain why certain methodologies in
science are masculine. The third literature concerns feminist epistemology and is
produced largely by feminist philosophers. Psychoanalytical theories have also been
adopted in some of these theories, notably in the Marxist standpoint theories.
Postmodernist concerns arise here too, which for me raises questions about the social
construction of scientific knowledge, and the place of nature therein.
Although the concerns in these literatures clearly overlap, they address
different agendas, and are relatively distinct. Thus the potential for feminising science
is seriously reduced. It appears that women scientists, feminist critics of science, and
feminist philosophers, are not sufficiently united to achieve meaningful change in
science. The danger is that women will continue to be encouraged into science but
will not question the content of scientific knowledge, or challenge the methodologies
of science. If this happens science is likely to remain androcentric.
1.4 Linking Theory and Practice
My overriding concern in this thesis is to develop a practical framework within
which it is possible to start building a feminist science, that is I seek to clarify the
features involved in feminising science. I believe that this requires feminist criticisms
and theories of science to be grounded in the practice of science. I hope to take a
fresh approach to women, gender, feminism and science, by starting from the
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perspective of scientists' practice: how is this gendered, and what does a feminist
science mean in practice? Answers to these questions require a deeper understanding
of how gender relations affect scientific practice, and how particular methodologies
come to be associated with masculinity. And we need to think in practical terms about
what a feminist science might look like. I would argue that the epistemological basis
of theories about a feminist science must also be challenged in order to promote more
practical, and less Utopian, strategies for change. Moreover, the agenda of women in
science must be recognised by feminist critics and theorists and their alienation from
the feminist critiques and theories addressed.
I therefore have three main aims:
1. The first is to develop a better understanding of how gender relations shape the
practice of science by synthesising the feminist critiques of science and women in
science literature with the experiences and perspectives of current and past
feminist practitioners of science, in addition to those of the next generation of
scientists: today's science students. This will in turn provide a practical basis for
change.
2. My second aim is to explore what a feminist science might look like by combining
this first step in my analysis with the feminist epistemologies of science and the
experiences and perspectives of feminist practitioners and students. This is with the
intention of identifying the 'best version' of a feminist science. My criteria for
'best' are based on my commitment to a workable version of a feminist science
which can be promoted from within the existing scientific institutions, that is one
which links theory and practice. At the same time, practicality must not be at the
expense of radicalism.
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3. My third and final aim is to provide pointers to practical strategies for change,
building on these first two aims. This concerns changes in science education as well
as wider changes to the organisation and practice of science.
1.5 Research Design and Outline
There are three main strands to the research design I adopt to meet the aims
outlined above.
The foundation of this thesis is an analysis of the feminist critique of science
and alternative feminist theories of science, with reference to the practice of science.
In Part 1 I examine the three bodies of literatures outlined above, in accordance with
my first research objective. Chapter 2 deals with the (largely) liberal feminist analysis
of women in science. The implicit understanding of scientific practice in the laboratory
as neutral and objective, and so distinct from social relations within science, is
challenged in Chapter 3, where I explore the feminist critique of the effect of gender
on the aims and objectives, methodology and discourse of science. In Chapter 4, I
investigate the feminist epistemologies, focusing in particular on standpoint theories,
postmodernist criticisms, and feminist empiricism. In Chapter 5 I draw together the
main themes in my treatment of these three literatures, to develop a clear assessment
of the main areas of difficulty in translating these theories into the practice of a
feminist science.
Second, in Part 2, I tackle these obstacles empirically. This is based on
interviews with two groups of respondents. First, I interviewed women scientists
sympathetic to feminist aims. I include feminist critics of science with a science
background in this group. These respondents share experience in science and an
interest in a variety of aspects of feminism: from promoting women in science to
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developing a feminist science. I argue that these women have a privileged insight into
feminism, gender and science, not only because they are women in a male dominated
environment, but because they are feminists involved in a pursuit commonly
associated with masculinity. I sought a thorough understanding of how science works,
women's place in science, and how science is gendered. I also wanted to know how
these women wanted science to change, and their assessment of the feminist
epistemologies. Second, I interviewed science students, partly in order to understand
more about how science education might change to meet the aims of feminism, and
partly because I felt they might have a different perspective from that of the
practitioners, on the issue of how science is gendered and on the nature of a feminist
science, which might nonetheless prove useful.
Finally, in Part 3,1 synthesise my preliminary analysis of the literature with my
empirical findings and address the three aims outlined above. I attempt to clarify the
gendered nature of science, plus the processes of feminising science and the nature of
a feminist science, by linking theory and practice.
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Chapter 2 Women in Science
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter I consider briefly women's status in scientific institutions.4 I
address women's position in the formal structures of science, in particular the
employment hierarchy and disciplinary boundaries. In addition, I consider social
relations in science more broadly, including informal criteria which operate to limit
acceptable practice and interaction within the community of scientists. Finally I
explore the reasons for women's lack of power in science, and strategies adopted by
women and feminist scientists to remedy the situation. What insight does this gives to
how the practice of science is gendered and how might it contribute to a practical
framework for the feminisation of science?
I use material from two resources in this review. First, I use statistical
quantitative material provided by government commissioned research. For example, in
the USA the National Science Foundation carries out research into the position of
women in science every two years (NSF, 1990). It is important to note that, in the
past decade or so, governments' concern about women in science, both in the UK and
USA, is motivated by concern about falling numbers of scientists in general (NRC,
1994; Office of Science and Technology Working Paper, 1993, 1994). This implies
that women are seen as an untapped resource only when the number of potential male
scientists is significantly depleted. Governments' attention to women in science is not,
therefore, a sign of any substantial increase in concern about equality and should be
treated with skepticism. As recent history following WorldWar 2 shows, women's co-
option into male occupations tends to end when the male labour force is replenished.
Other material on women in science comes from feminist scientists themselves,
some of whom have been involved in government sponsored equal opportunities
4 Note that this short review only gives a snapshot of the issues in the large literature
on women in science.
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initiatives such as the UK's Women into Science and Engineering (WISE). This was
set up in 1984 by the Equal Opportunities Commission and The Engineering Council
to encourage women and girls into science and technology. Other research networks
also exist, such as Gender And Science And Technology (GASAT), which draws on
academia and public sector research from the Equal Opportunities Commission and
includes scientists and social scientists amongst its membership.
2.2 Women's Employment in Science
Women are under-represented in the hierarchy of science, and particularly in
the physical sciences. There is a wealth of information on this topic, although
information is often subject-specific (eg physics) and difficult to compare (Billard,
1992). More comprehensive information is available from the USA than the UK. Note
that comparison between sets of statistics is not always possible given their format by
subject and country. I therefore use what statistics are available, selectively, to
illustrate my point.
The main concerns around women's place in the employment hierarchy are the
vertical and horizontal segregation of women in scientific professions, both in industry
and in universities (Hornig, 1984). This covers subject area, position, salaries, and
promotion rates. Publication rates and funding success of women in science are also
of relevance. I will concentrate on the employment of women in science as more
information is available. I also include a brief discussion of the numbers of men and
women taking science qualifications at various stages in education.
The numbers of girls doing science at school is low (see Kelly, 1981, 1987;
Harding, 1986). The proportion of girls studying science decreases as they get older,
dropping dramatically around adolescence. This is particularly acute in the so-called
'hard sciences' of physics and chemistry. The main explanation for this, put forward by
women writing in this area, is gender socialisation (see Kelly, 1987). They argue that
from births girls are discouraged from being assertive and inquisitive about their
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environment. The toys girls are given are intended to socialise them for housework
and child care, whereas boys are given toys that involve building and working with
their hands. Once in school there is evidence available indicating that teachers do not
direct science or math's education at girls; they use examples more familiar to boys
and interact more with boys in the class. Text books have also been shown to contain
mostly male scientists and only a few women. Although many of these issues are now
well known, and steps have been taken in education to encourage more girls into
science, and reduce the blatant sexism of textbooks, there are still a minority of girls
in science classrooms.
Because of this some argue that the problem is deep rooted in society. Perhaps
gender socialisation is not the only explanation for why girls do not do science. There
is some evidence to suggest that girls approach problems differently and have different
attitudes to what counts as important questions in science (see Kelly, 1987). Although
this may also be socially shaped there is the possibility that psychological differences
between boys and girls are also involved. This will be explored further in Chapter 3.
Whatever the reason for girls' alienation from science, the numbers decrease
as girls go into further education, particularly in physics. As girls progress through
university a significant number drop out, or do not take science jobs on graduating.
Very few go on to do postgraduate work or to become researchers and lecturers in
academia. Over all fields in the UK the proportion of university staff members who
are women is less than 50% and decreases further up the employment hierarchy. For
example, in the academic year 1992-93 women university staff members were 42% of
the total, compromising 26% of all lecturers, 11% of all readers and 5% of all
professors (Powney, 1994). The situation is even worse for women in science: for
example, in 1990 the total number of women in university science posts was 2106
which is approximately 15% of the total university science staff (Department of
Employment, 1990). Inequalities in the hierarchical distribution are also evidently
more marked in physics: eg only two women hold Chairs of Physics in the UK (Rose,
1994, Irwin, 1994).
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There is also horizontal segregation, with more women in the life sciences than
the physical sciences: 24% of the membership of the Institute of Biology were women
in 1992, compared with a 13% membership of the Institute of Chemistry in 1991 and
a mere 4% in the Institute of Physics in 1990 (Packer, 1993).
More detailed statistics are not yet available for the UK, unlike the US,
although the EC has recently commissioned research into the position of women in
science in the Community (SPSG, 1994). The National Science Foundation in the US
produced the following information about women in science in the US (NSF, 1990).
They found that, despite rapid growth in the numbers of women in science between
1978 and 1988, women are still a minority in science and engineering employment,
especially in the physical science fields as opposed to the life sciences. For example, in
1987, 33% of women in science were in life sciences as opposed to 8% in physical
sciences. (The remaining 59% were in the social sciences.) Women are also less likely
to hold tenure (permanent posts in the USA) than men, or to hold full time
Professorships. For example, in 1987 approximately 36% of women with science
PhDs were tenured, compared to almost 60% of men with science PhDs. The NSF
also found that women have higher rates of unemployment and earn lower salaries at
all levels of professional experience (NSF, 1990, pvii). The median annual salaries
reported by women with science PhDs in 1987 averaged 79% of those reported by
men with science PhDs. Finally, women experience more underemployment than men
(ie working involuntarily in part-time as opposed to full-time employment or outside
of science and engineering).
I would argue that the male domination of science is an important feature of
the wider relationship between gender and science. It prompts questions about how
this male domination impacts on the content of scientific knowledge, and the
methodologies adopted in science. For example, do men have different priorities in
research? These questions will be considered further in Chapter 3.1 now address ways
in which the male domination of science has been challenged. This is clearly important
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when discussing how to develop a practical framework for a feminist science since, as
I have already argued, getting more women into science is one of the three issues in
the feminisation of science.
The main policy recommendations for how to combat this situation seem to
involve encouraging girls and women to study science at school and college;
encouraging employers to recruit women; and establishing better child care facilities
or even job-sharing arrangements (MacRae et al, 1991). Others have argued for more
career development courses for women and the placing of responsibility and
accountability for Equal Opportunities Policies at senior management levels
(Skidmore, 1992). In addition it has been argued that women should be better
represented on interview panels, committees and at conferences (MacRae et al, 1991).
However such programmes and initiatives have had limited success. In one
study MacRae et al (1991) examined the policies and practices of ten major UK
companies renowned for their good record in equal opportunities for women
scientists and engineers. There were several steps in companies' policies: schools
liaison, graduate recruitment, career progression and retaining women scientists and
engineers. I will focus here on the successes and failures of graduate recruitment and
career progression as the information is most relevant to my interest in women in
science. In the case of graduate recruitment the authors found:
despite the efforts which companies put into the development and
implementation of equal opportunities policies, success in this area could be
undermined by the attitudes of individuals in positions with the power to
influence recruitment decisions. Reports of bias and prejudice amongst
personnel with recruitment responsibilities were made by employees in all of
the companies we studied ... The position was justified by reference to
women's traditional responsibility for the care of their families and to the
potential conflicts between work and family commitments (MacRae et al,
1991, plOO).
14
The authors go on to demonstrate that women are not seen to be as committed to the
company as men, and that those in charge of recruitment, including women, based
their decisions on this perception when deciding on whom to employ (ibid).
Women's responsibility for child care also reduce their promotion success
within organisations, because it is seen by employers to mean that women will be
unable to meet the high level of commitment expected (MacRae et al, 1991, p75). In
other words, it was found that women were disadvantaged by the requirement that
they 'put their career first'. There is little evidence, the authors argue, of any trend
towards more flexible employment patterns such as job sharing and home work, and
nurseries and creches have a low priority (ibid). Companies' policies on maternity
leave is still to maximise the number of hours that a person works and minimise the
amount of time they take off to have a baby (ibid). In the main these policies do not
entail much change in science itself. It is women who are expected to fit into existing
structures and approaches in science rather than changes occurring to suit women
better. For example, improved child care facilities are often seen as a perk for women;
the aim of provision is still to maximise women's hours of work in science. I would
argue that this merely removes the burden of child care temporarily, to allow women
to function as honorary men in science. The expectation is still that child care is
women's work and becomes a problem when women parents, never men parents, are
employed or recruited (MacRae et al, 1991).
Much of this has parallels in other professional fields of employment such as
engineering and business. The approach is also similar - to change women or their
lifestyles to fit into science rather than to change science. This implies that the
feminisation of science must challenge the formal structures of employment. The
introduction of job sharing and paternity leave is more important than improved child
care facilities as this would challenge the supposition that child care is women's
responsibility. This will be discussed further in Part 2, as it turned out to be a major
concern of women in science.
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2.3 Women and Communication Amongst Scientists
Similar issues are raised when social relations in science are considered more
broadly. Work on this topic is again USA dominated, disparate and often subject-
specific. However, it is also more rich as it is invariably qualitative, and more
progressive, as it is less linked to government initiatives to increase the numbers of
women in science, but carried out mainly by feminists and women in, or sympathetic
to, science (Abir-Am & Outram, 1987; Bindman, Brading & Tansey, 1993; Hass &
Perrucci, 1984, Kahle, 1985, Rossiter, 1982). I detail women's informal position in the
scientific community before moving on to consider strategies to improve this position.
Zuckerman et al (1991) call women's position in science The Outer Circle.
They argue that the marginalised status of women is as much to do with informal
networks as formal positions of employment. Women do not tend to have mentors in
the way that men do (Grant et al, 1992), particularly in the physical sciences, where
the numbers of women further up the hierarchy is low. Furthermore, women tend to
work less with eminent mentors, whose sponsorship might bring them closer to the
centre of science, and can face problems, such as paternalism, in mentoring
relationships with men (ibid). Moreover, women tend to be disadvantaged through
what Bielby refers to as the 'subtle nuances of everyday interaction between the male
majority and the female minority' (Bielby, 1991). This can mean that all the things men
take for granted in science - socialising with male colleagues; acquiring advice and
information about research funding; even getting preprints of research papers (Fox,
1991) - disadvantage women.
It is further claimed that men tend to be more at ease with the prevailing style
of interaction in science. Anecdotal evidence suggests that men are more comfortable
with 'sticking their necks out' in science, for example 'cold phoning' a funding agency
programme director for advice and information about grant applications (Barinaga,
1993, p385). Other evidence suggests that females tend to be less competitive with
their peers, preferring to run research laboratories non-competitively; to work in
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collaborations more often; and to avoid 'hot topics' in science which are excessively
competitive on an international scale. Instead women tend to prefer to adopt what has
been called a 'niche' approach (ibid, p386). Cole and Zuckerman (1987) have argued
that this difference in approach between men and women is due to scientist's standing
in their field, not their sex. However, as I have shown in the previous section, there is
a direct correlation between the male sex and success in science, which can be traced
to the male culture of science, as opposed to men's greater ability at science
(Burrows, 1992). This is another important feature of the gendering of the practice of
science and will be highlighted by the practitioner data presented in Chapter 8.
Strategies for improving women's position in scientific communities include
setting up female mentoring schemes and networks to provide support and
encouragement for young women and other female peers (see Urry et al, 1992).
However, this often depends on there being a critical mass of women scientists
(Barinaga, 1993, p387) and therefore relies on women jumping through the
institutional hurdles (alone), in both research subject and employment grade, in the
first instance. Although a modest goal, this is often difficult to achieve.
As in the case of improving women's structural position in science, improving
their informal position has its drawbacks. Women mentoring and networking schemes
run the dangers of putting women into a ghetto in science which means not breaking
into the mainstream culture, and may in fact act to perpetuate the status quo as men
continue to dominate powerful positions (Appel, 1994). On the other hand, this may
be seen as a first step for women to gain a foothold in science.
2.4 Conclusion
It is clear from this literature that science is male dominated numerically, and
that men fit in more to the prevailing style of communication between scientists. This
is explored further in interviews with practitioners. In addition, this literature implied
that the structures of science, and the social relations amongst scientists should be
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radically challenged. Women in science are disadvantaged both formally and
informally. Getting more women into science is part of the project, but must also be
supplemented by organisational change. This is also part of the feminisation of science
project I envision and will therefore be explored further - theoretically in Chapter 4,
and empirically in Chapters 7 and 8.
However there is an important feature of scientific practice which is not
discussed in the women in science literature: the 'integrity' of the scientific method is
not questioned. How does the organisation of science impact on scientific knowledge?
There is an implicit assumption in this literature of value free, neutral, objective
scientific method, which is not affected by the sex of the scientist. In my view the
social relations between scientists, including the formal arrangements around
employment and publishing, cannot be isolated in this way from the knowledge
scientists produce and the methodologies scientists adopt. Scientific knowledge is
socially shaped, as I demonstrate in the next chapter, where the impact of the male
domination of science on the entire practice of science is explored.
A radical approach to improving women's place in science involves a
fundamental restructuring of science (Tobias, 1992). This would also involve changes
in scientific practice in the laboratory and in publishing. To achieve these changes a
more comprehensive picture of how science, including research practice, is linked
with gender, is necessary. I will now consider the feminist critique of science as a
starting point for building such a picture.
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Chapter 3 Science as Masculine
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter I review the feminist critique of the masculinity of science. This
extends beyond the last chapter's focus on the organisation of science and deals with
how the content of scientific knowledge, and the methodologies of science, are
gendered. The relationship between the male domination of science and the
masculinity of science is also discussed.
It is important to note that there are different meanings of masculinity within
feminism. An essentialist position is taken in radical and cultural feminism: male
behaviour is seen as being determined by male sex (Daly, 1978; Dworkin, 1981;
Firestone, 1971). In liberal feminism, masculinity is seen as a stereotypical role which
is encouraged through gender socialisation (Friedan, 1963, Oakley, 1972; see also
Mitchell & Oakley, 1986; Franklin et al, 1991). Marxist/socialist feminists have used
Lacanian and object-relations psychoanalysis to explain gender (Chodorow, 1978;
Eichenbaum & Orbach, 1984; Gilligan 1982; Mitchell, 1974).
There are various criticisms of all these approaches. The first is that each over
emphasises the influence of one particular factor: biology, society or psychology. In
addition, there are problems with generalisation about differences between men and
women, and other social differences, eg class and race (Segal, 1987; Connell, 1983,
1987). Another approach to theorising gender is the argument that the dichotomy
between sex as biological and gender as cultural is itself a product of 'masculinisf
thinking. It may be that 'compulsory heterosexuality' is promoted by such
dichotomous thinking (Butler, 1990). Instead we could view both sex and gender as
cultural products because the very act of distinguishing between male and female
infants at birth is cultural. However, this brings us full circle, as yet another critique of
this position is that to attribute everything to culture and deny nature is simplistic and,
at worst, arrogant. The uniqueness of women's biological role as the bearer of
19
children, for example, can be used to critique this over-emphasis on the cultural
construction of gender. Moreover, the lack of subjecthood implied by this view of
gender and sex as purely cultural products is politically problematic for feminists
seeking to grant women agency which has so long been denied to them (Benhabib,
1990; Di Stephano, 1990; Hartsock, 1984).
The problematic nature of the notion of gender is an important aspect of my
argument in this thesis and one which I intend to trace throughout the next two
chapters. As I shall show, the feminist critique of science incorporates these issues and
tensions.
In sections 3.2 and 3.3 I outline the background to the feminist critique of
science. I explore the radical science movement and the more academic sociology of
science, in particular, sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK). This is in order to
meet three main aims. First, I introduce the terms and issues which come to be
important in the later feminist critique. The links between science and the wider
economy, the values shaping scientific knowledge, the culture of science and the
relationship between science and the wider society are particularly important themes.
Second, I emphasise the lack of gender sensitivity in the male dominated radical
science movement and sociology of science, and thus establish the need for a feminist
analysis. Finally, I draw attention to some important tensions which have been
inherited by the feminist treatment of science, especially that between relativism and
objectivity.
I then explore two complementary feminist critiques: section 3.4 addresses the
role of gender in scientific methodology and discourse; and section 3.5 the science of
gender difference (or sex difference as it is usually thought of in science). In section
3.4 I focus on how scientific methodology, especially objectivity, is gendered. I then
discuss the more contemporary feminist critique of scientific discourse. The role of
rhetoric and its relation to practice is a central concern of both sections. In section 3.5
I consider one feminist critique of the science of sex difference in detail, before
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moving on to explore more general themes in the feminist treatment of the science of
gender. This is a major part of the feminist critique of science and particularly
important in this case because of its emphasis on the construction of sex and gender.
There are two purposes of this section: it provides concrete examples of how science
in practice is gendered; and it provides a basis for further consideration of the
connections between ideology and practice.
In section 3.6 I explore the reaction inside the scientific community, amongst
women scientists, to the critique of masculinity and science advanced by feminists.
This is in an attempt to start to understand the disjuncture between feminist criticisms
of science and the dominant view amongst scientists (and indeed the wider public).
Understanding the gap between the perspectives of women in science and feminist
science critics gives a valuable insight into how science functions in practice, and so it
is an important aspect of developing a practical framework for a feminist science.
3.2 The Radical Science Movement
The radical science movement arose in the 1960s, as a result of growing
discontent amongst scientists and others about their role in war and pollution (Rose
and Rose, 1969; 1976 a & b). Pressure groups were formed, and laboratories and
factories occupied, in Europe and the USA, as well as Japan and Australia. Writing in
1976 Hilary and Steven Rose argued that the time had come to,
develop a theoretical perspective which would enable them to articulate the
links between struggles in the different areas ... it was time to move beyond
the early pragmatic phase to a stage at which the contradictions present within
science could be seen as part of a generally revolutionary perspective (Rose
and Rose, 1976a, pxiv).
The critique of science that the movement sought to articulate was to focus on the
ways in which science and technology are part of capitalism and imperialism, and to
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offer more radical alternatives. This required an understanding of the political
economy of and 'ideology of/in science' (Rose and Rose, 1976b, pxv).
The aspects of this critique of existing capitalist science most relevant to the
feminist critique that would later develop are, first, the links between science and
'systems of domination' - capitalism and imperialism (Rose, 1994, p3) - and second,
the dialectic between ideology and science, especially on neutrality in science.
Theorists in the radical science movement, amongst them Steven and Hilary
Rose, argued that science is part of the system of production and social control in
capitalist and imperialist economies,
it has a productive and an ideological role, the understanding of which is
confused by reference to the 'scientific community' as an undifferentiated
whole. In fact this community is divided into, on the one part, the majority of
alienated, proletarianised scientific workers, and on the other, the tiny minority
of the elite carriers of bourgeois ideology, the scientists (Rose and Rose,
1976a, pxvii, emphasis in original).
Here ideology is produced for the purposes of social control. However the concept of
ideology proved slippery ground for theorists. The Lysenko affair and the Soviet
cultural revolution of the 1930s, which caused bitter disputes between scientists and
non-scientists in the Communist Party in the UK, was a problematic backdrop (see
Rose, 1994, p6 for more details). The movement of the 1970s split over the concept
of ideology, some holding to the old Marxist assumption the science (including
Marxism) was above ideology. Others, like the Roses, argued science was shaped by
ideology. They argued that science is, by its very nature mystifying, and designed to
enter the consciousness of the worker to obscure the contradictions of capitalist
production (Rose and Rose, 1976a, pxviii-xix)
A good example of the position that science is permeated by ideology is
provided by Steven Rose in his chapter entitled, 'Scientific Racism and Ideology: The
IQ Racket from Galton to Jensen' in Political Economy of Science and Technology
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(Rose in Rose and Rose, 1976a, Chapter 7, ppl 12-141). Here, and in Chapter 6 by
Steven and Hilary Rose, a critique of biologism is developed,
Biologism takes one part of the explanation of the human condition, excludes
all other considerations, and announces that it has the explanation for
aggression and altruism, war and class struggle, love and hate. Attempting to
change the human condition is then perceived as an absurd opposition to both
our natural selves and the natural world ... Biologism, for all its apparent
scientificity, is thus mere ideology, the legitimation of the status quo ... In
biologism reductionism, which was originally simply a powerful tool for
examining specific problems under rigorously defined conditions, became
saturated with ideology. Reductionism is thus part of the ideology of science,
and in so far as the theories serve specific dominant classes, also legitimises
and obscures ideology within science (Rose and Rose, 1976a, pxx).
As an illustration of this last point Rose takes issue with all aspects of the scientific
claims that IQ is linked to race and class. He criticises the ideas that:
(1) There is a thing called intelligence, which IQ tests measure;
(2) The working class, the Irish, Blacks, and Mexican Americans score lower
that the middle class, the English, and white Americans;
(3) Studies on the hereditability of IQ with the White population, based largely
on the evidence of identical (monozygotic) twins reared apart, suggest that 80
percent of the variance between individuals can be parceled out as genetic, 20
percent as environmental;
(4) For the purposes of applying these calculations to social groups, Blacks,
Mexican Americans, and so on can be regarded as representing biologically
defined as well as socially defined races; and
(5) The differences between these groups are larger than can be accounted for
by the 'environmental' factor, and hence are genetically based (S. Rose, 1976,
pl 16).
Rose's main argument is that the reemergence of IQ theories in the 1970s, was a
product of social and economic concerns. Defeats for white imperialism in the 1960s,
as well as deepening race conflicts in the US and increasing levels of immigration in
Europe, combined with the economic recession, provided the breeding ground for a
renewal of scientific racism (S. Rose, 1976, pl37). Intelligence was narrowly defined,
from a white man's perspective, and tested via questions which reflected the interests
and values of the white middle classes. Assumptions about causation ie hereditability
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as opposed to environment were based on limited data and unexamined
presuppositions.
Here, on one side of the radical science movement, predominantly non-
scientists argued that the IQ story was an example of how science is permeated by
ideology, and in that sense a product of social and economic concerns in wider
society. On the other side of the movement, scientists argued that the IQ saga was an
example of bad, socially polluted, science, and, by implication at least, that good,
ideology-free science was possible (Rose, 1994, p5).
These issues of biological reductionism and the extent of the 'ideological
pollution', or the integrity of science, were to be important in a feminist critique of
science, which would bring in the role of patriarchy and social control of women
through gender ideology. This second argument was to be particularly relevant to a
feminist treatment of science: is sexist science merely bad science? Or is all science
socially constructed and if so, how do we judge between what is good and bad?
A related point of differences between some scientists and other non-scientists
involved in the radical science critique was the issue of the neutrality of science.
Giovanni Ciccotti, Marcello Cini and Michelangelo de Maria, in Chapter 3 of The
Political Economy of Science, approach the role of science in productivity with
Marx's theory of surplus value. They see scientists as the producers of the commodity
of information and therefore alienated from their product, as are manual workers. The
scientific fields which are not directly involved in producing information, the so-called
'pure sciences', are involved as the 'base' on which the information-commodity market
rests through their role as generators of new languages and methods in science and as
a testing area for checking new technology (Ciccotti et al, 1976, pp44-46). This
clearly ties science to the capitalist economy, and therefore challenges the concept of
the neutrality of science:
the concept of neutrality is nothing more than a specific form of fetishism,
which attributes an objective intrinsic property to a product of human activity
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labour which actually derives from the social relationships which intervene
between them (Ciccotti et al, 1976, p45).
This 'fetishism' was also seen by many in the radical science movement as playing a
part in legitimating the authority of scientific knowledge in the wider society and thus
legitimating sciences' contributing to ideology. As in the IQ story, when prejudices
are given scientific backing and couched in scientific terminology, their potency is
only increased.
In contrast, those who argued for the neutrality of science, took two main
positions. The first was that whilst the overarching aims of science are to contribute
to the capitalist economy, the actual practice of the scientist is removed from the
concerns of capital, and is instead permeated by a moral commitment to rigorous and
value-free science. The use/abuse of the resulting knowledge depends upon the wider
society. In the right hands science will be liberating, in the wrong hands science will
be oppressive. This remains a popular argument today, eg the view of science's
relationship with the military. The second argument rests upon a distinction between
pure and applied science. Here applied science has clear links to the economy, but
pure science is seen as more independent and therefore more neutral. Ciccotti et al
seek to challenge this argument by their insistence that pure science serves a role in
the economy. However, the more indirect relationship between pure science and the
economy, as opposed to applied science and the economy, is not explored. Thus a
perception of pure science as more independent (if not thoroughly independent) can
remain.5
This conflict is also relevant to a feminist treatment of science. To what extent
is science neutral, and isolated from the wider society, including patriarchy? It is also
important to note that the economic explanation of the lack of neutrality of science
5 The debate about the relationship between science and technology has similar
themes, eg the notion that technology is 'applied science'. A view of the two as
distinct, yet evolving in parallel is favoured by some, and is perhaps a good
compromise position in relation to pure and applied science.
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fails to take into account patriarchy [the dominance of women by men economically,
sexually and culturally] and what role this plays in the economy, in particular woman's
labour which is often outwith the formal economy in unpaid domestic duties is not
considered.
These disputes about ideology and neutrality were never resolved in the
radical science movement. Hilary Rose argues that the balance between activism and
theorising slipped too far in the direction of theory that not only alienated practicing
scientists, but also alienated women and ethnic minorities. Earlier doubts about the
male- and white-dominated nature of the activism magnified into doubts about the
lack of proper analyses of gender and race in the radical science critique (Rose, 1994,
p4).
It is important to note, however, that, although disputes about the neutrality
and integrity of science were never resolved in the radical science movement, they did
perform an important service in bringing to the fore issues about the relationship
between science and ideology. Moreover, although the conflict between good
science/bad science, the use abuse model, and social constructivism, may remain
unresolved, the tensions need not be unproductive, as I shall go on to argue later.
3.3 Sociology and Philosophy of Science
3.3.1 Critique ofMertonian Sociology of Science
Prior to Kuhn the sociology, history and philosophy of science did not
question the neutrality of science or the concept of progress. Robert Merton's work
on the interactions between the social organisation of science and the growth of
knowledge encapsulates this view of science. Barnes and Edge write:
Robert Merton stressed the point in his pioneering work, and the important
school of functionalist sociologists which followed him tended to take it for
granted. This led them to explore the interactions between scientists
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themselves for evidence of the social processes which maintain order, confer
rewards and recognition, and allow for the exercise of control over the content
and quality of certified knowledge. Further, the Mertonian tradition
emphasised the role of academic science as the fullest embodiment of
scientific ideals and practices, and the ultimate source of cognitive authority
(Barnes and Edge, 1982, pi3).
Around the time of the radical science movement this view of science was also being
challenged in academia, by the ground breaking work of Thomas Kuhn (1962).
Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions introduced the concept of normal
science, which characterises routine science as puzzle-solving activity in a received
tradition, or paradigm. Paradigm shifts occur when the paradigm can no longer
provide a sufficient explanation of the phenomena in question, and a new and 'better'
theory is developed. Although Kuhn's work was subsequently subject to detailed
debate and critique of the notions of revolution and paradigm, his work marked a
turning point in the sociology of science which paved the way for the emergence of a
new field, the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK).
There are two main themes to my review in this section. First, I address the
social shaping of science and how this forms a backdrop for the feminist critique. I
deal with sociology of science's treatment of the relationship between the culture of
science and the wider culture, which involves the interaction of society and science: I
then move on to consider SSK's analysis of how theory in science is 'underdetermined'
by the evidence and how observation in science is theory laden; the extent to which
we can speak of knowledge as socially constructed; and use of symmetry to analyse
scientific knowledge claims, which brings me to the issue of relativism. My second
main aim is to point out the inadequacies of the initial sociology of science and SSK
theories for dealing with gender in science, to explain the need for a distinct feminist
critique.
There is a vast array of different writings in sociology of science and it would
be impossible for me to do it all justice here. Instead I have chosen to base my
discussion around the main ideas which are of relevance to the development of the
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feminist critique. This initial treatment is based largely on overviews provided by
Knorr-Cetina and Mulkay (eds) (1983) and Barnes and Edge (eds) (1982). I return
later to a discussion of some of the newer methodologies when I reach the feminist
critique of science in the 1990s.
3.3.2 The New Sociology of Science
Sociology of science deals with the social relations within science: most
notably in the Mertonian tradition, with the so called 'reward system' based on peer
judgment in the scientific funding and publication process:
the contribution of a scientist is assessed by an "audience" of colleagues, who
are potentially in a position to make use of it. If they judge it to be original and
significant, allow it to be published and capitalise on it in their own work
(citing the contribution meanwhile in the references to their papers) then the
scientist achieves the award of recognition (Barnes and Edge, 1982, pl5).
This follows from the Mertonian assumption that interactions between scientists
maintain social order. Pure science, an ideal type of academic science, is the model for
this analysis as opposed to more applied science (although such a distinction is
problematic).
Merton identified the institutional norms of science as universalism,
communality, disinterestedness and organised skepticism. However this was later
criticised in the new sociology of science for encouraging an internalist picture of
science. These norms are now considered by some to be a set of rhetorical resources
that scientists draw upon to justify their behaviour (Mulkay, detailed in Barnes and
Edge, 1982, pl8).
The new sociology of science was not shackled by functionalist assumptions
and felt free to investigate the knowledge claims of science. It has analysed the
important boundaries between scientists and non-scientists, experts and non-experts,
and disciplines of science. The status of the expert scientists, for example, is
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'reinforced by a command of esoteric language and skills' (Barnes and Edge, 1982,
pi8). It demonstrated that the choice of one expert opinion over the other is not
based on technicalities alone but is context dependent. Boundaries between fields
show that the scientific community is not homogeneous; more informal research
networks are established by small groups with similar interests -what Crane has called
invisible colleges (Crane, 1972; Price, 1963). These informal networks are established
by scientists in order to promote their interests vis a vis other competing groups. For
example, preprints of papers are circulated through invisible colleges prior to
publication. Information is thus circulated, and contained within, privileged groups,
which have a mutually supportive relationship. In Chapter 2 I showed how these
networks are often male dominated, and act to marginalise women scientists. These
boundaries and networks of communication are fluid - for example at certain stages
the effect of competition may be to limit communication (see Collins in Barnes and
Edge, 1982). Conventions are established in science, and are thought of in sociology
of science as products rather than determinant of action (Barnes and Edge, 1982,
p70). Closure - choice of one scientific theory over another - is achieved through
preference for the option that 'best maintained current practice and created
opportunity for the extension of that practice' (Barnes and Edge, 1982, p74).
There has been a significant amount of work done in sociology of science on
the role of the scientific expert in society (see, for example, Nelkin and Gillespie, Eva
and Johnston in Barnes and Edge, 1982). In public disputes, such as around the siting
of a nuclear power plant (Nelkin, 1982) technical expertise is utilised by both sides in
the conflict. More powerful groups are better able to mobilise scientific opinion,
which brings weight and legitimacy to their argument. This is a mutually reinforcing
relationship - it is the authority of science in society that lends weight and legitimacy
to scientific expertise. Note that this often means that women in the community are
generally at a disadvantage, as they tend to be amongst the least powerful groups.
Studies of the role of scientific experts in higher levels of government and
industry reveal:
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the consolidating effect of expertise on power structures has come to be
widely realised ... experts are cited when they confirm prejudices and
overlooked when they do not (Barnes and Edge describing Nelkin's work,
1982, p249).
Sociologists have also highlighted the role of 'scientism' (Habermas, 1971 reprinted in
Barnes and Edge, 1982). Scientism is the wider use of scientific and technical
terminology in society. This
infiltration of technical expertise determines the conceptualisation of political
problems, the language in which they were expressed, and the institutional
forms by which decisions are reached (Barnes and Edge, 1982, p244).
The mobilisation of the scientific expert in public disputes, illustrates the privileging of
scientific information over subjective experience, and the link between access to
information and power. These will prove to be important themes in the feminist
critique of science.
3.3.3 Sociology of Scientific Knowledge
The SSK was initially concerned with the way that interests construct
knowledge, and took the form of two distinct schools - the Edinburgh 'strong'
programme including Barry Barnes (1974, 1977, 1988) and David Bloor (1973,
1976); and the relativist school associated with Bath, a principal writer being Harry
Collins (1981). Others involved in the field have subsequently developed new
methodologies: for example ethnomethodology of scientific practice; discourse
analysis (eg Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984) and constructivist/ethnographic studies of
scientific work (Knorr-Cetina, 1981; Latour and Woolgar, 1979).
A central theme in SSK, in all its variants, is that scientific theories are never
neutral or objective (Hesse, 1980). Instead, following on from an idea promoted by
the philosopher Quine amongst others, theories are said to be 'underdetermined' by the
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evidence and assumptions on which they are based. As Knorr-Cetina and Mulkay
argue this means:
any theory can be maintained in face of any evidence, provided we make
sufficiently radical adjustments elsewhere in our beliefs. This follows from the
fact that no one theory can ever be extricated 'from the ever present web of
collateral assumptions' so as to be open to conclusive refutation (Knorr-Cetina
and Mulkay, 1983, p3).
Furthermore, observations are 'theory laden' as they involve assumptions, for example
about how to make certain measurements, and depend on the theory which the
experiment is designed to test in order to determine what is relevant and proper
evidence. This line of analysis provides the opening for 'social factors' into
sociological accounts of scientific theories and results.
Note the difference in justification for scientific knowledge being socially
determined between the radical science movement and SSK. In the previous analysis
the emphasis is much more on the external political and economic factors, whereas
with SSK the emphasis is on the micro-level laboratory context.
The 'social factors' involved in scientific knowledge are, as with the radical
science movement, a matter of debate. Bloor, for example, argues for symmetry when
treating scientific claims that are considered by the scientific community to be true and
those that are considered false (Bloor, 1976). This was in response to previous studies
of science that sought to attribute social factors to discarded scientific knowledge, but
regarded current scientific understandings as immune to social influences. In such
studies social influence was equated with bad science whereas SSK treats all science
as socially constructed knowledge and no value judgment is made about the validity
of scientific knowledge claims.
Knorr-Cetina and Mulkay argue that this form of epistemological relativism is
not to be collapsed onto judgmental relativism, which makes the additional claim that
all forms of knowledge are equally valid and one cannot discriminate between
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different claims. However I am not convinced that the sociologists of scientific
knowledge actually avoid any form of judgmental relativism. For example Barry
Barnes writes:
In arguing that all belief systems must be treated symmetrically for purposes of
sociological explanation, many traditional ways of justifying belief as
knowledge were incidentally undermined. It transpires that one perspective
can only be shown to be preferable to another in expedient terms [as means to
an end] ... Thus the epistemological message of the work could be said to be
skeptical, or relativistic. It is skeptical since it suggests that no arguments will
ever be available which could establish a particular epistemology or ontology
as ultimately correct. It is relativistic because it suggests that belief systems
cannot be objectively ranked in terms of their proximity to reality or to
rationality (Barnes, 1974, pl54).
The justification for each claim over another therefore 'lies within itself and no
external adjudication can take place. This appears to be judgmental relativism of belief
systems; for example, different claims in science cannot be distinguished as nearer the
truth or nature, which implies that we cannot value one over the other on these
criteria.
Feminists generally oppose judgmental relativism. The problem of full blown
relativism for feminists is, in short, that it makes it impossible to distinguish between
sexist and non-sexist scientific claims. For feminists this is politically regressive. A
weaker form of relativism may be more acceptable - to acknowledge that both sexist
and non-sexist claims are socially constructed - however some criteria for judgment is
necessary to distinguish the two and here feminists are inclined to fall back on the
good science/bad science distinction, at least partially. In other words, the problem for
feminists is to establish what social factors are involved in the construction of
scientific knowledge and, at the same time, what are acceptable criteria against which
to judge scientific knowledge. Are some social factors shaping knowledge more
acceptable than others: for example, factors internal to the scientific community
(background assumptions) as opposed to external factors (including ideology)? Or are
some external and internal factors more acceptable than others: for example counter
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ideology which is anti-sexist as opposed to sexist ideology? This is explored further in
Chapter 4.
A related theme in SSK is the concept of reflexivity. This is where sociologists
apply relativistic concepts to their own work, leaving them to argue that theirs is only
one version of events and not any more accurate or valuable (depending on the extent
of their relativism) than other accounts. Again, this initially appears to be a problem
for feminists: if they were to adopt a reflexive approach how would they argue that a
feminist treatment of science was more accurate or valid than a misogynist one?
Feminism involves a committed approach to knowledge which seeks to further
equality for men and women. The issue is a political one. In their most extreme form
relativism and reflexivity demand an apolitical stance. Because SSK theorists can end
up saying nothing judgmental about science they can be accused of passively
accepting and thus contributing to the perpetuation of the status quo.
The tendency amongst certain members to adopt 'methodological internalism'
as Knorr-Cetina and Mulkay call it (Knorr-Cetina and Mulkay, 1983, p6) is worth
considering further. SSK mostly deals with microscopic study of scientific practice
and prioritises how rather than why scientists do and talk about science (Latour &
Woolgar, 1979; Knorr-Cetina, 1981; Traweek, 1984, 1988, 1989; Gilbert & Mulkay,
1984). These theorists are generally not interested in imposing explanations for
behaviour on their accounts. Internal mechanisms shaping scientific knowledge are
seen as much more important and than so called external factors (Barnes & Edge,
1982, pi88). By some the very existence of external social structures, eg capitalism
and imperialism, which can affect scientists' work, is even rejected (for example, by
Latour, 1987).6
6 Note that the initial theorists were concerned with power and interests, and how
these shaped science (cf Barnes, 1977, 1988), but that this strand of research did not
emerge as prominent.
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These two aspects of SSK scholarship - the micro level of many of these
studies, and their preoccupation with description rather than explanation of scientists'
practices - seem to be at odds with many more political concerns. For those in the
radical science movement and for feminists, the question of why scientists do what
they do seems to me to be extremely important. How much this has to do with their
sex and/or gender and class and race is also a key issue. Similarly the internalist
quality to much of SSK work leaves out some big questions that are important in the
radical science debate and feminism. Patriarchy is a social structure central to a
feminist analysis. To what extent is science immune from outside cultural influences?
How does gender ideology translate into scientific theory? How does the sexual
division of labour in society translate into division of labour in science and ultimately
into scientific theories and results? These questions cannot be answered with a purely
internalistic analysis.
Some areas of SSK are of potential importance to a feminist analysis of
science. Not all theorists shy away from discussion of the reasons for scientists'
actions. For example, the Marxist and so-called 'weak' school (eg Restivo, 1983) are
interested in critique. Whilst their concern with the 'how' questions are still dominant,
they judge their analysis by its value in explaining the reasons behind how scientists
work and by how much it tells them about how to effect change (Knorr-Cetina and
Mulkay, 1983, p8). A minority have looked at the wider societies' influence on
science, usually in historical studies (see for example Miller, 1972; Provine, 1973;
Ben-David, 1960; Shapin, 1980, 1982; Ezrahi, 1971). Barnes and Edge describe their
claims:
that the images and representations, particularly images of social and political
relationships have been drawn from the surrounding context and incorporated
into the culture of science; or claims that the external context has engendered
variations in scientific judgment of matters of fact (Barnes and Edge, 1982,
p 192).
Brian Wynne has looked at how the social usage of science has affected the meaning
of scientific terms and therefore the context of the science itself (see Wynne in Barnes
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and Edge, 1982). Barnes and Edge argue that these external contingencies often take
the role of generation of ideology as opposed to 'genuinely technically applicable
knowledge' generated by internal contingencies (Barnes and Edge, 1982, pl94). This
relates to debate about the extent and role of ideology in the radical science
movement, as detailed in section 3.2.
3.3.4 The Missing Element: Gender
The gender blindness of these sociologies of science cannot be ignored. With
the notably exception of Traweek (1984, 1988, 1989) who gives an account of gender
in her work on high energy physics, the relationship between the sex of the scientist
and the established conventions and boundaries of science are not analysed. The way
that gender metaphors work in science and the association of science with masculinity
also tends to be ignored, despite the concern with rhetoric. In addition, the position of
the (male) scientific expert in relation to female 'non-experts' in the community is not
addressed, and so there is no attempt to empower women in their dealings with
experts by unmasking the contingent nature of their knowledge.
Insufficient interest in how gender relations enter into the social construction
of scientific knowledge is one consequence of the SSK theorists' methodological
internalism and lack of concern with explanation. Thus important questions such as,
'are certain assumptions and methodologies in science based on stereotypical notions
of masculinity and femininity?' are ignored. Even those theorists who do address the
wider societies' influence on science do not sufficiently consider gender.
Although radical science activists were more aware of gender than their
academic counterparts, the male domination of the left, still notorious today for its
machismo, and their move to abstract theorising, prevented any serious consideration
of gender.
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I now consider the feminist critique of science. Feminist critics seek to explore
the gendered ideology and social construction of science, and tend to adopt different
tools from the radical science movement and sociology of science, such as
psychoanalysis. As I shall show, important analytical tools and findings in the radical
science and sociology of science fields are missing from the feminist critique. There
may, however, be a way to unite the three traditions, to form a more powerful critique
of science, as I try to show later.
3.4 Feminist Critique: Science as Masculine
The feminist critique of science as masculine developed from the late 1970s
onwards, and drew feminists from different backgrounds, including the radical science
movement, the feminist movement, and academic disciplines of the history and
sociology of science. By outlining different themes in the radical science movement
and SSK, I do not wish to imply that the feminist critique was a linear progression
from these areas. This would be a rewriting of history. Nonetheless there are several
aspects to the feminist critique which share common themes with both the radical
science movement and SSK. There are also differences in the feminist approach which
require exploration. The purpose of drawing out these similarities and differences is to
increase understanding of the feminist critique of science in terms of practice.
A central theme in feminist critiques of science, since the late 1970s and early
1980s, is the claim that science is masculine. Evelyn Fox Keller traces the origins of
the term 'gender and science' to 1978 (Keller, 1994), when she wrote a paper
demanding an inquiry into what she refers to as,
ft]he historically pervasive association between masculinity and objectivity,
more specifically between masculine and scientific (Keller, 1978),
and criticised both the scientific community, and philosophers and historians of
science, for their failure to investigate this relation. She attributed their silence, in
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part, to the tenacity of the 'myth of objectivity' in science, even amongst outside
critics. However, as we have seen in sections 3.2 and 3.3, those in the sociology of
science who reject the 'myth of objectivity' largely ignored gender too, and the radical
science movement did not provide a comprehensive approach (Rose, 1994). The male
domination and/or masculinity of both these areas must be considered as potential
reasons (see also Easlea, 1978,1981; Griffin, 1984; Merchant, 1980; Haraway, 1979).
Around the same time as Keller's initial critique, other women in science were
beginning to develop an interest in gender and science, notably the Brighton Women
in Science Group (1980) in the UK, and various women biologists in the US
(Hubbard, Henifin and Fried, 1979, 1982; Hubbard and Lowe, 1979, 1983; Bleier,
1984, 1986). Other women in science were criticising science from a feminist
perspective in Canada, notably the late Margaret Benson (1982) (see also Franklin et
al, 1993). A lot of this work concerns gender and sex in human biology, which I will
consider in section 3.5. Nevertheless, there is a significant portion which develops a
feminist critique of the methodology and discourse of science and is therefore dealt
with here.
For these feminist theorists the main issue was initially the gendering of
scientific objectivity, the 'sacred cow' of orthodox science. It is this critique that I
consider first. I then move on to a more contemporaneous critique, which draws on
this initial concern with objectivity, but is primarily concerned with how the language
of science is gendered.
3.4.1 Methodology and Objectivity
The radical science movement and SSK provided feminist critics of science
with a valuable insight into the social shaping of science, in particular the nature of
objectivity. As I have already shown in sections 3.2 and 3.3 appeals to objectivity in
science have a role in legitimating scientific information in the wider community, and
play an ideological role: in maintaining the image of objectivity scientists protect their
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position. In addition, within science, appeals to objectivity are often used as a
rhetorical device to legitimate choosing one approach over another. Scientific results
are never objective but value-laden, and based on both internal and external
contingencies, ie results can be influenced by social relations within the particular sub-
community of science, or beyond, in the wider culture (see Savan, 1988). However,
neither SSK or the radical science movement have considered how notions of
objectivity may be gendered.
Feminists (see for example Hubbard et al, 1983; Bleier, 1984) have argued
that natural science is not objective, but instead 'reflects the outlook and interests of
its producers' (Hubbard et al, 1983, p4). This is evident in the problems that scientists
consider worthy of study and in the acceptable answers to such problems. Both will
be 'congruent with the implicit assumptions that form the basis of their understanding
of the world' (ibid). Science has a long history of male domination: feminists have
asked does this affect the science produced? There are various answers to this
question, many of which seem to rely on assumptions of men sharing a world-view
which differs from that of women. (The extent to which this is biological or social is
not clear.) Others reject this and prefer to concentrate on the (imputed) masculinity of
the actual methods of science.
Feminists have argued that science is far from neutral as the principles of
scientific inquiry are 'masculine'. Fee notes:
the liberal ideology of rational man is actually dependent on an unstated
clause: that the characteristics of "man" are actually the characteristics of
males, and that rational man is inextricably bound to his less visible partner,
emotional woman (Fee, 1983, pi 1).
She outlines a series of sexual dichotomies which became evident in the new liberal










Note that Fee argues that each side of the dichotomy is dependent on the other: for
example emotionality cannot exist without rationality. There is a fundamental
inequality as male is privileged over female. Fee continues that this dichotomising
became a essential feature in the development of rational inquiry:
science came to be seem as necessarily male, as an essentially masculine
activity (Fee, 1983, p 13).
Fee thus argues that science is not masculine simply because it is male dominated, but
because the fundamental principles of scientific inquiry are perceived as masculine.
The perceived attributes ofmen are the attributes of science (ibid).
The reasons for this are not dealt with by Fee. One theorist, Ruth Bleier,
suggests that the rationale behind the creation of such dichotomies was the
perpetuation of the separate spheres of men and women in the mid 19th century
(Bleier, 1984, pl97). Bleier notes that others have suggested that these dualisms may
be a product of a,
male reproductive consciousness, expressed in the need and the struggle to
displace women from their material base of power in reproductive and genetic
continuity (Bleier, 1984, pl98 paraphrases O'Brien, 1981).
Easlea (1978, 1981), Griffin (1984) and Merchant (1980) have addressed these issues
historically. However, there is no clear and uncontested analysis of how these
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dichotomies came about, just a widespread belief that they are fundamental to an
understanding of the philosophy associated with the emergence of modern science.
Objectivity in this feminist analysis is therefore a masculine epistemological
stance that denies its own subjectivity (Bleier, 1984, pl96). Furthermore, the basic
dualism between masculine and feminine is unequal, with the feminine, emotional,
subjective and so on being subordinate (Bleier, 1984, p 198). This privileges objective,
scientific knowledge over other forms of subjective knowledge. The myth of the
neutrality of such knowledge minimises the criticism of such knowledge, and
effectively enhances the privileged position of the scientist in the community (Hubbard
et al, 1982, p3). Feminists have engaged in detailed criticism of the way the myth of
objectivity encourages scientific elitism. For example Marion Lowe writes:
The conventional view of objectivity is not simply a misconception that has
occurred by chance. The rhetoric of objectivity serves to obscure the very real
social and political biases of knowledge produced within universities. This
knowledge is systematically more useful to the privileged than to the majority
of people. It especially benefits businesses, the military and governments.
However, if knowledge is seen as value-free then the question of who the
knowledge serves can never arise. In fact the emphasis on objective
knowledge acts to limit inquiry to topics which do not threaten the social
order, since work that suggests changing the class structure or the gender or
racial biases of our societies is seen as unsound (Lowe, 1993, p8).
This of course means that the producers of knowledge are limited to a supposedly
apolitical group whose privileged status is maintained by their immunity from criticism
on the grounds of their 'neutrality1. Hence the status quo is perpetuated.
To recap, in this analysis objectivity is labelled as at once masculine and
neutral in liberal philosophy of science. Objectivity was named as a masculine trait (by
male philosophers and scientists), and this was used as a justification for the exclusion
of women from science. It is implied that males are more likely to exhibit masculine
behaviour (be that for social or natural reasons, or a combination) which is more
congruent with behaviour acceptable in science than behaviour based on feminine
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characteristics. This process becomes mutually reinforcing: individual male scientists
perpetuate the masculine values of science just as the masculine values of science
perpetuate the male domination of science. This analysis has some empirical weight:
as we near the end of the 20th century the myth of objectivity is alive and well, and
men still dominate science. Theirs is a privileged and protected position in the wider
community which acts to maintain the status quo.
3.4.2 Keller's Work on Gender Ideology
Evelyn Fox Keller is the principal feminist critic of science who has elaborated
this critique in her exploration of the role of what she calls 'gender ideology' in science
(Keller, 1985, p4). Gender is socially constructed and defined as a 'label' we place on
our human experience - male or female:
gender is neither simply the manifestation of sex, nor simply an easily
dispensable artifact of culture. It is instead what a culture makes of sex - it is
the cultural transformation of male and female infants into adult men and
women (Keller, 1994, p 81).
The way in which gender ideology works in science is rooted in what Keller calls the
'science-gender system' (1985, p8). A mutually reinforcing set of dichotomies exist,
which, as above, means that
the division between objective fact and subjective feeling is sustained by the
association of objectivity with power and masculinity, and is removed from the
world of women and love. In turn the disjuncture of male from female is
sustained by the association of masculinity with power and objectivity, and its
disjuncture from subjectivity and love. And so on (Keller, 1985, p8).
Keller is especially concerned with the subtler ways in which gender ideology
manifests itself in science. Objectivity, she argues, plays a role in imposing a 'veil not
so much of secrecy but of tautology' [repetition of the same idea in different ways]
(1985, pl2). The practices of science become immune to criticism because they are
viewed as objective.
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Keller's preferred tool for analysing the relation between gender ideology and
science is object-relations psychoanalysis. In Chapter 6 of Reflections On Gender and
Science (1985), entitled 'Dynamic Objectivity: Love, Power and Knowledge', she
considers ways in which objectivity is linked to domination and power as opposed to
love, drawing on object-relations theory to develop her point. Keller focuses on the
adversarial relationship of the scientist to the object of study:
the specific kinds of aggression expressed in scientific discourse reflect not
simply the absence of a felt connection to the object one studies but also the
subjective feelings many children (and some adults) experience in attempting
to secure a sense of self as separate from the more immediate objects of their
emotional world [primarily the mother] ... similarly the need to dominate
nature is, in this view, a projection of the need to dominate other human
beings; it arises not so much out of empowerment as out of anxiety about
impotence (Keller, 1985, pi24).
Here gender ideology in science is reflected in the individual psychology of the (male)
scientist.
Rhetoric of domination and aggressive separation from the object of study has
had a decisive impact on the development ofWestern science, according to Keller:
Rhetoric of domination, coercion and mastery serves to select a scientific
community that tends towards particular emotional and cognitive styles ... this
rhetoric, internalised by that community, in turn selects for compatible
scientific styles of work, methodologies, and even theories (Keller, 1985,
pl26).
But the role of rhetoric in scientific practice is not straightforward:
ideological norms may be formative but they are never fully binding. In every
period of scientific history, in every school of science, we can see a rich
diversity of meanings and practices. In fact it would appear that where
ideology makes its force felt most crucially is in the process by which some
theories, methodologies and experiences are discarded (Keller, 1994, p ).
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Keller makes an important point here: there is a diversity of approaches in science, but
the predominant approach that gets legitimated as 'good science' is one that most
closely reflects the rhetoric of domination and separation.
This is illustrated in Keller's biography of Barbara McClintock (1983).
Although McClintock eventually won the Nobel Prize for medicine and physiology in
1983, it took 32 years for her pioneering work in genetics to be recognised. Her
complex 'jumping gene's' theory ran contrary to the received wisdom of the time of
strictly organised genetic arrangements. McClintock's was a very different kind of
science, one which involved a more connected relationship with the material and a
humble approach based on 'letting the material speak' (Keller, 1983). Keller examined
McClintock's methodology and claimed it was different from that of masculine
science:
The tenacity with which she hunted down every observable chromosomal
modification, the thoroughness and rigor that accompanied her virtuoso
technique ... might lead one to think of the focus of her research as narrow. In
fact what she was pursuing was nothing less than an understanding of the
entire organism. The word 'understanding' and the particular meaning which
she attributed to it is the cornerstone of Barbara McClintock's entire approach
to science. For her the smallest detail provided the key to the larger whole. It
was her conviction that the closer her focus, the greater her attention to
individual detail, to the unique characteristics of a single plant, of a single
kernel, of a single chromosome, the more she could learn about the general
principles by which the maize plant as a whole was organised, the better her
'feeling for the organism' (Keller, 1983, plOl).
Keller holds that McClintock herself was not subject to typical feminine socialisation,
and so focuses her analysis on examining why science repudiates McClintock's
methods in the main (as deviant), rather than on why McClintock herself uses them
(Keller, 1987a, p42). She argues that there is only one place in which McClintock's
sex is important: as McClintock is not a man she does not have to prove her
masculinity in science by adopting masculine methods (Keller, 1985, pl74). Instead
Keller argues McClintock was pursuing a gender-neutral science:
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in her adamant rejection of female stereotypes McClintock poses a challenge
to any simple notion of 'feminine' science. Her pursuit of a life in which 'the
matter of gender drops away' provides us instead with a glimpse of what a
'gender free' science might look like (Keller, 1983, pxvii).
Elsewhere Keller argues that some women have, however, conformed to the norms
and practices of science:
professional success [for women in science] requires conformation to norms
that remain, in opposition to what the culture, even today, labels "feminine" ...
the exclusion of values culturally relegated to the female domain has led to an
effective "masculinisation" of science - to an unwitting alliance between
scientific values and the ideals of masculinity embraced by our particular
culture (Keller, 1987^, p79-80).
McClintock does not conform to theories of feminine socialisation, and her practice of
science differed from the dominant paradigm, which Keller associates with
masculinity. Moreover, Keller argues that women who practice a masculine science
do not conform to their prescribed gender role in society. Although Keller argues,
actual human beings are of course never fully bound by stereotypes, and some
men and some women - and some scientists - will always go beyond them. But
at the same time stereotypes are never idle. To a remarkable degree, to learn
to be a scientist is to learn the attributes of what our culture calls masculinity
(Keller, 1992a, p47),
I would nevertheless argue that these two types of women - McClintock and women
scientists practicing masculine science - defy simplistic categories and highlight the
important problem of stereotypes about women or men in science.
3.4.3 Problems with the Feminist Critique of Gender Ideology in/of Science
The role of gender in science is illustrated by feminist critics in their discussion
of the function of gender ideology, rhetoric and stereotypes. However this analysis is
mainly at the epistemological level of science. In my view the function of such
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ideology in the actual practice of science is still unclear. This is in part due to the
general difficulty which exists in relating epistemology and ideology to scientific
practice, ie the relationship between theory and practice. Keller's is one of the few
discussions of how gender ideology functions in the practice of science, ie the
legitimation of good science. However she provides us with an excellent example of
how this process of legitimation breaks down in the case of Barbara McClintock.
Although belatedly, McClintock was nevertheless honoured in science for heretical
methodology.7 Her theory is now an important part of molecular genetics. Keller does
not discuss how often this type of theory is recognised, and if it spawned other less
'masculine' theories. Similarly, McClintock (and other women in science who may
have been socialised in a more traditionally 'feminine' manner) appear to contradict
Keller's emphasis on the cognitive development of the scientist as an explanation of
the way the "masculinisation" of science is reinforced.
This leads me to question further the role of stereotypes and ideology of
gender and science. I would argue that the first problematic stereotype is of
masculinity. A popular example of this comes from object-relations theory which can
be accused of psychological essentialism.8 Child development is undoubtedly one
feature of socialisation experienced by each individual. However there are many other
'layers' of socialisation as a child matures into an adult. For example, masculinity is
constructed in the work place (including the institutions of science) as well as in the
home (see Cockburn, 1981, 1983, 1985). This complexity of gender development
challenges the psychoanalytical notion of an unstable and fragile identity based on
7
Note that other biologists have claimed that the interactionist parts of McClintock's
theories can be eliminated, or placed in a reductionist framework. However, this may
be more of a reaction against the valorisation of McClintock's feminine methods by
some feminists (not Keller) than a fundamental reason for the recognition of
McClintock in the first place.
8 This argument can be adapted to criticise socialisation theory for being socially
deterministic and for not taking account of the individual's capacity to reject socialised
values; and for treating society as uniform. Radical/cultural feminist biological
essentialism, which appeals to arguments about men's natures, can be criticised as
biologically determinist. See Segal (1987) and Connell (1983, 1987) for a fuller
critique of the different theories of gender in feminism.
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early child development. Indeed, there are many social processes which act to
reinforce masculine identity through reinforcing male power over women.
Although she recognises that stereotypes are never fully binding, Keller's
argument rests on a generalisation about individual scientists' psychological
development. Whilst some male scientists undoubtedly have fragile egos it is another
thing to accept that this is the norm. Generalisation is a problem for all of the theories
of gender, not only object-relations theory. How are we to explain people's behaviour
when it does not conform to stereotypes of gender, eg women scientists who adopt
orthodox (masculine) methods? And what proportion of people (scientists) do not
conform? Object-relations theory does not sufficiently account for the differences
amongst women (or men). Moreover, the generalisation about parenting practices is
equally problematic. As Fee argues, 'object relations theory cannot bear the weight of
explaining the larger historical structures of economic and political power' (Fee,
1986, p49) - for example, object relations theory cannot account for different family
arrangements, particularly now as the nuclear family in the West is breaking down in
many countries. I would therefore argue that there are many different types of
masculinity, which vary across race and class. How do these differences fit into a
theory about male scientists' masculinity?
Haraway (1989), in 'Biopolitics of a Multicultural Field', compares Japanese
and Western primatology. This usefully draws out some of the problems with
generalising about a masculine scientific method. Haraway notes that Japanese
primatology takes a very different approach than its Western equivalent. Most
significantly, the separation between the object and the observer is missing (p245).
She notes the strong Japanese cultural preoccupation with mothering and how this is
reflected in primatology. Haraway lists the following features of Japanese
primatology:
Holism, appreciation of intuitive method, presence of "matriarchal" myth
systems and histories of women's cultural innovation, cultivation of emotional
and cognitive connection between human and animals, absence of dualist splits
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in objects of knowledge, qualitative methods subtly integrated with rigorous
long-term quantification, extensive attention to the female social organisation
as the infrastructure grounding more visible male activities, and lack of
culturally reinforced fear of loss of personal boundaries in loving scientific
attention to the world (Haraway, 1989, p256).
However these qualities coexist with male domination in Japanese primatology, and a
Japanese Buddhist philosophy of transition from lower states of animal to human, and
of pollutants coming from animals, women and the body. Haraway argues that this is
also a masculinist epistemology.
This raises important problems for the feminist analysis of fragile masculine
egos and separation and control within science, based on object-relations theory.
Japanese primatologists are raised by their mothers, yet their methodology is not
compatible with a masculine ego as defined by object-relations theory. Wider and
more complex social relations obviously modify peoples' behaviour fundamentally.
This problematises the feminist theorists' excessive dependence on child development
as an explanation for masculinist science and further generalisation about gender and
society within their theories.
The myth of objective science is worth considering further. How does the
myth of objectivity relate to actual scientific practice? We have already seen that the
myth of objectivity maintains the privileged position of (male) scientists and scientific
knowledge in the community. Similarly, appeals to objectivity within science are used
as rhetorical devices to promote one approach over another.
In the past scientists and philosophers have appealed to links between
masculinity and objectivity. The reasons for this are complex. The set of dichotomies
between masculine and feminine that arose in the Enlightenment may have been
rhetorical devices to promote the separate spheres of men and women (as Bleier,
1984 argued). Male scientists may have used this to secure support and legitimacy for
their new empirical approach to understanding the natural world. Similarly the
seventeenth century characterisation of nature as a wild and untamed female was
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certainly used as a justification for the new science, whose alliance with 'masculine'
control and domination was the necessary corollary (see Merchant, 1980).
Others have suggested that masculinity and objectivity are actually linked in
practice. The reason might be, for example, a deep seated male fear of women's
reproductive power, and close links with nature, and a consequent need to control
(Daly, 1978; Easlea, 1978, 1981). Another possible argument comes from object-
relations, as advanced by Keller.
However, modern science has moved on since the time of Bacon and the link
between masculinity and objectivity is now denied by most scientists and
philosophers. Few openly argue that women cannot do science. Now it is feminists
who are in the strange position of defending the existence of such an association in
their efforts to explain the seemingly pervasive link between masculinity and science.
Are the links between masculinity and science now used by feminists as rhetorical
devices or do they have concrete substance?
Rhetoric of domination and control within science, whatever its extent, may be
little to do with scientists' fragile masculine identities (which can be reinforced
through this type of controlling science). Scientists may appeal to a rhetoric of
domination and control in methodology without actually taking such a manipulative
approach. This may be about language as opposed to practice. Whether this is
rhetorical or practical, it may appeal to what has come to be valued in science,
through tradition. Can the traditions of science be transmitted through repetition,
without links to a particular psychological state of individual male scientists? For
example, the way scientists are trained is a powerful mechanism for maintaining the
status quo of experimental technique within science. The appeal/approach today may
be little to do with the original reasoning behind this approach in the 19th Century.
In reality scientific knowledge is value-laden. But the extent to which
masculine values are shaping the content of different types of scientific knowledge is
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not yet clear. Do all male scientists have masculine values? Are all male scientists
transmitting their masculine values into scientific knowledge? Are these values
uniform?
An important point relevant to this issue that comes from the radical science
critique related to the stereotype of a homogeneous scientific community. As Rose
and Rose (1976a) have shown, there is a difference between scientific workers and the
smaller elite of scientists, who act as producers of ideology. This has implications for
the feminist critique. The scientific workers do not have control over the means of
production and therefore, presumably, little choice about the research questions they
work on or the methodologies they employ. They are involved in the mundane
processes of science and have little influence over the final content of scientific
knowledge. This brings into question the extent to which scientists' masculinity is
reflected in science, when so many have little influence. The division of labour in
science adds another dimension to the feminist critique of the masculinity of science.
These issues require further investigation to develop a clearer picture of the
relationship between gender, sex and science. In the next section I move on to
consider more recent critiques of science which concentrate on the role of language in
science, treating science as discourse.
3.4.4 Language and Metaphor
A more recent development in feminist analyses of gender and science treat
science as a discourse.9 This approach comes from Foucault, a French philosopher
and historian (1926-1984), often thought of as one of the first postmodernists,
although he rejected this label (see Foucault, 1973).
9 See Bleier (1984) for an early approach and Keller (1990, 1992b) Martin (1989,
1991) for later more fully developed example. See Haraway (1989) for a fascinating
analysis of primatology, which treats science as story-telling.
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SSK has developed this approach (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984) and has a general
interest in linguistics in science (Latour and Woolgar, 1979, Knorr-Cetina, 1981).
Discourse can be considered as ways of talking and writing about the world, shared
by a social group. In the case of science we can think of the assumptions shared by
scientists about good practice and see this reflected in the language of scientific
writing. This approach shares the methodological internalism of much of SSK, and,
like it, performs more of a descriptive than explanatory role. As argued earlier, this is
obviously problematic for feminists seeking to understand the role of gender in
science.
An extreme approach in this area reduces scientific work to a form of writing
(Knorr-Cetina and Mulkay, 1983, plO, on Latour and Woolgar, 1979, 1986). Priority
is placed on organisation of meaning within scientific discourse and not on action. The
aim of the analyst is to improve understanding of these accounting practices. However
the privileging of one analytical perspective over another became problematic. A
reflexive approach was therefore adopted as discourse analysis progressed.
Authorship was deconstructed and the 'new literary forms' adopted 'multivocality' and
largely abstained from coherent argument.
This type of approach can be criticised for not furthering our understanding of
science and leaving us where we started: with the status quo. For feminists seeking to
change science this is clearly unacceptable. However the SSK treatment of scientific
discourse raises one important issue for feminists, namely illustrating the need for a
strong justification of a particular feminist analysis over another.
Keller provides a fascinating example of the feminist approach to discourse
analysis in her article 'From Secrets of Life to Secrets of Death' (Keller, 1990, based
on earlier work Keller, 1986, see also 1992b). Keller's move into discourse analysis
was based on a desire to work on the relationship between science and language, as
the 'next step' in understanding gender and science (see, for example, Keller, 1992b).
In this article she explores the search in biological science for 'the wellspring of life
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and, simultaneously, for ever more effective instruments of death' in physics (Keller,
1990, p 177). Keller continues to use psychoanalysis, but this time concentrates on the
language employed in articulating these two aims in science. Keller juxtaposes the two
stories and focuses on
certain interweaving of fantasies of birth and death, that, at least on a
psychological level, can be seen to connect the project of uncovering the
secrets of life with that of producing instruments of death rather than
distinguishing them (Keller, 1990, pi82).
Keller goes on to consider how these stories share a particular theme of male
appropriation of female procreativity (pi86). She considers, for example, Mary
Jacobus' paper on James Watson's account of the discovery of DNA, The Double
Helix (Jacobus, 1982), which describes the 'symbolic displacements' of women and
adds her own analysis of 'the displacement of life itself (Keller, 1990, pi87). The
metaphors of bombs as babies in the development of the atomic bomb is considered
by Keller as again a metaphor reflecting a 'deadening of flesh-and-blood' (ibid). Keller
argues:
•
Surely, the fantasies I describe can neither be seen as causal (in any primary
sense) nor as inconsequential. Where then, between causal and
inconsequential, are we to place the role of such fantasies? - fantasies are in
one sense private, but at the same time collectively reinforced, even exploited,
by collateral interests. What is their role in the dynamics of the overtly (and
primarily) public and political crisis we find ourselves in? (Keller, 1990, pi89).
Before considering how Keller later approaches the question she raised here I want to
take a short detour to consider the approach taken by another theorist, Emily Martin
(Martin, 1991).
Martin, an anthropologist, explores the way in which culture shapes how
biologists represent their 'discoveries' and looks at how the 'gender stereotypes are
hidden within the scientific language of biology' (1991, p486). Specifically, Martin
considers representation of the egg and the sperm, and how, despite newer accounts
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of their relationship, the hierarchical imagery of older accounts iqi still evident:
Even though each new account gives the egg a larger and more active role,
taken together they bring into play another cultural stereotype: women as a
dangerous and aggressive threat. In the Johns Hopkins lab's revised model the
egg ends up as the female aggressor who "captures and tethers the sperm with
her sticky zona", rather like a spider lying in wait in her web (Martin, 1991,
p489).
Martin links this imagery to male fear of engulfment by the mother (ibid). She then
goes on to argue that these metaphors affect scientific practice and wider social
practice:
The stereotypical imagery might also encourage people to imagine that what
results from the interaction of egg and sperm ... is the result of deliberate
"human" action at the cellular level. Whatever the intentions of the human
couple, in this microscopic "culture" a cellular "bride" (or femme fatale) and a
cellular "groom" (her victim) make a cellular baby ... Endowing egg and sperm
with intentional action, a key aspect of personhood in our culture, lays the
foundation for the point of viability being pushed back to the moment of
fertilisation. This will likely lead to greater acceptance of technological
developments and new forms of scrutiny and manipulation, for the benefits of
those " inner persons" (Martin, 1991, p500).
Here Martin draws clear scientific and social implications from representations of eggs
and sperm, and shows us how images are a product of ideas about masculinity and
femininity in society. The extent to which this is related to a masculine culture of
science and how this comes about is not, however, considered. For this we must go
back to Keller, who picks up the story of reproductive and developmental biology.
Keller argues that metaphors of gender in science work in two ways:
they import social expectations into our representation of nature and by so
doing they simultaneously serve to reify (or naturalise) cultural beliefs and
practices (Keller, 1994, p90).
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Interestingly, Keller now rejects her earlier theories concerning the projection of the
'mindset' of scientists onto the natural world as,
unduly limited - above all by its failure to take into account the particular kinds
of material consequences that models or metaphors of domination have, and
accordingly, the particular kinds of material ambitions such models support
(Keller, 1994, p90).
She continues to argue that the problem with the feminist arguments about the use of
gendered metaphor is that they,
are often read in caricature, to approximate a kind of conspiracy theory ... [but
that] metaphors clearly do not by themselves drive the production of scientific
knowledge; nor is language, by itself, capable of conjuring up material effects
... but language does guide the human activities necessary to the construction
of material effects (ibid).
In considering how metaphors function in relating representation and action Keller
looks at two examples. The first is the role language plays in 'conceptually magnifying'
(pi20) our ideas about differences and similarities in, for example, the way metaphors
about race and gender in the nineteenth century lead to scientific work on the
similarities between African men and women (see Stepan, 1982). The second way in
which language functions is in guiding the construction of new scientific instruments,
for example the metaphor of the mind's eye can be related to the development of the
microscope. In both these cases the resultant scientific work expanded and
strengthened the original metaphors.
This insight is of crucial importance in understanding the role gendered
metaphors play in shaping the direction of scientific research, both in aims and
objectives, and in shaping innovations in scientific instruments. Thus Keller has gone
further than other theorists towards a more practice-oriented analysis of gender and
science. However, it is still difficult to provide a comprehensive picture.
Sandra Harding also takes a useful approach to metaphors in science. She
stresses the mutually supportive relationship between three aspects of gender in
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science: individual gender, gender symbolism and structural gender (division of labour
etc). She argues that this helps to clarify how metaphors shape practice:
gender symbolism has provided resources for the moral and political
advancement of scientific modes of knowledge seeking ... this is always
supported by actual division of labour or threats to existing gender-divided
activity (Harding, 1986, pill).
Harding introduces historical examples from the Enlightenment, drawing from
Merchant (1980), to illustrate her argument about the rhetorical role of gender
metaphors. These were used to,
make morally and politically attractive the new conceptions of nature and
inquiry required by experimental method and the emerging technologies of the
period (Harding, 1986, pi 13).
She notes that gender symbolism is often in the margins of scientific texts, for
example anecdotes, and functions as an appeal for approval from the audience, which
is assumed to be male.10
3.4.5 Problems with the Feminist Critique of Gender and Scientific Discourse
I view discourse analysis as useful up to a point in analysing gender and
science, but feel that scientific practice goes beyond the written, or spoken, word.
Language is clearly important, but science is a highly practical activity. Maybe tactile
interaction with natural objects also determines how scientists do science. The
importance of tactile interaction is highlighted by the work of several scholars in SSK,
who have examined the nature of skill and tacit knowledge in science (Collins, 1974;
Ravetz, 1971). As well as determining future research and practice, scientific language
may conceal previous practice. Scientists' anecdotes about science in popular writing
10 An example Harding uses is from Richard Feynman, who, in a Nobel lecture,
compares his feelings for ideas to falling in love with women. Young theories, which
Feynman finds attractive, come from old and worn-out theories, which have become
less attractive (Harding, 1986, pi20).
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and speeches, and in their formal research reports, conceal other aspects of their
activities, as we have seen in the earlier discussion about the use of rhetorical devices
in science (Section 3.4.2). Harding's contribution highlights the role language has
played in legitimating particular types of scientific inquiry or gender division of labour.
Gendered metaphors are used to gain approval from the male scientific audience.
Another example, drawing on Keller's main concern, might be appeals to control and
domination to give legitimacy to a particular approach. A further problem with the
feminist discourse analysis of science reviewed so far is that the theoretical
underpinnings of psychoanalysis require proper justification (see section 3.4.3).
Psychoanalysis may not be the best tool for understanding social relations and
discourse in science. All of these factors suggest a more complex picture of the
relationship between practice and language in science.
Keller's interest in fantasy, and how this shapes scientific practice, is
understandable, given the usefulness of the Lacanian type of psychoanalysis she
employs for understanding fantasy. Nonetheless, the role of individual or collective
fantasy in determining scientists' practice should not be over-emphasised. The
relationship between fantasy and science is by no means uniform across all branches of
science, nor is it even fundamental in shaping scientific research. The particular
discourses feminists are analysing - weapons of mass destruction, reproduction and
discovering the basic chemical building blocks for life - are all highly emotive issues,
ripe for gender metaphors. What about the vast majority of science, which is much
more mundane, and does not involve such visibly 'path breaking' research? Most
research science is less fundamental - for example, developing new techniques to
study cell pH in renal physiology. All of these factors mean that the role of fantasy in
determining scientific practice must not be over emphasised.
These problems, added to those raised earlier in relation to feminist theories
about objectivity and masculinity, mean that clear picture of how the practice of
science is gendered is missing. I now move on the studies of androcentric (male-
centred) science, as this work might help by giving examples of concrete practice in
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science. This illustrates the interactions between societies' and scientists' ideas about
gender and sex, and their research into sex difference.
3.5 Science of Gender
There is a wide range of articles and books criticising many different aspects
of scientific research, for example, ethology, primatology, endocrinology, sexology,
sociobiology, medicine, psychology and physiology (see for example, Hubbard,
Henifin & Fried, 1979, 1982; Hubbard & Lowe, 1979, 1983; Bleier, 1984, 1986;
Birke, 1986, 1992a; Fausto-Sterling, 1985; Haraway, 1979, 1986, 1987; Tuana,
1989). Research into sex difference from a feminist perspective is of particular interest
in this study of the gendering of science. Here I deal with a case study of the
psychology and biology of sex difference in section 3.5.1 to illustrate the main themes
in the feminist critique, before going on to discuss these more generally in section
3.5.2.
3.5.1 Case Study: Sex Difference Research
It is worth considering one example of the feminist critique of research into
sex difference in detail to highlight the issues involved. 'In pursuit of difference:
scientific studies of women and men' by Lynda Birke (Birke, 1992a, p81-102) gives
details of the main problems with sex difference research. The first area of difficulty is
the allocation of sex to a baby depending on the shape of their genitals. Birke points
out that the dichotomy between male and female is not always so unambiguous, 'even
the chromosomes are not as dichotomous as appears at first sight, even chromosomes
cannot always indicate whether a person is male or female' (Birke, 1992a, p82). Some
individuals are born with a combination of male and female genitalia. Second, as they
grow up there is a significant similarity between girls and boys in the first ten years of
their lives. Differences in shape and size that occur around puberty are the result of
different hormone levels in men and women. However both men and women have all
the sex hormones present in their bodies, the difference is that men have more of the
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male hormones, androgens, and women have more of the female hormones,
oestrogens and progestins.
Third, Birke points out that there is no absolute physiological difference
between the sexes, and that many of the sex differences in physical attributes, like
height and weight, have a significant overlap. These qualities change over time, and in
different communities, as they are dependent on amounts and types of exercise. The
argument that males' physical dominance in sport is because of innate biological
characteristics is challenged by this information.
Turning to differences in the brain, Birke highlights a fourth area of difficulty
with this type of science when she argues that typical justifications for male
dominance in certain intellectual pursuits is flawed. More modern theories focus on
the different qualities and abilities of men's and women's brains. Birke criticises in
detail studies which look at people's skills and the different parts of the brain. Much of
this research is based on knowledge about how animals' brains work: for example
knowledge gained via electrical or chemical investigations. Observation of people who
have suffered brain damage is also utilised: for example the left hand side of the brain
is known to specialise in speech. This type of 'evidence' is clearly patchy and based
on assumptions about similarities between animal and brain functioning and
generalisations based on the changes between pre- and post-accident brain
functioning.
Researchers have inferred from psychological tests of visual and spatial
abilities that males and females think differently. They then infer that this is related to
brain symmetry because some of these skills are supposed to be associated with one
side of the brain. Women are understood to be more 'left brained' as females
apparently perform better at language, which is associated with the left hand side of
the brain. In contrast, men are supposedly more 'right brained' and more 'visual'. This
is sometimes used as a reason for why so few women become scientists or engineers.
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I have even heard it given as a reason for men's interest in pornographic imagery, and
women's interest in erotic literature. Birke argues that,
the mass of inferences and assumptions far outweighs that of clear evidence ...
tests may measure only a very limited range of appropriate skills ... It is unsure
what is being measured ... there is an enormous overlap ... A second strand of
criticism is that the alleged links between brain asymmetry and sex difference
often contradict themselves ... we should [also] not automatically assume that
any difference between men and women in performance of psychological tests
is due to biology ... (Birke, 1992a, p99-100).
Birke notes how our society attaches a great amount of importance to such
stories of difference. Both in popular accounts, and in supposedly 'serious' science,
over-stating the case is common (Birke, 1992a, plOO). This obviously acts to 'explain
away' differences between men's and women's participation in science as biological
and implies that nothing can be done to change the situation. Hence the status quo is
perpetuated.
This work clearly illustrates the detailed way in which scientific research into
sex difference is constructed. Birke makes four important points.
1. She highlights the inferences and assumptions which shape scientists research;
some of which are evident in the wider culture (eg the assumption that differences
between men and women is biological); and others which may be more specific to
this type of science (eg that animal brains can tell scientists about human brains)
2. The cultural construction of sex, and the overlaps between men and women in
many aspects of physiology is also noted by Birke.
3. She draws attention to the contradictory nature ofmuch of the research.
4. The role sex difference research plays in legitimating the status quo is also noted.
This has parallels in the radical science movement's treatment of ideology of/in
science. The theme of good science/bad science also has parallels in Birke's treatment
of sex difference research, when she criticises science at an empirical level, for bad
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methodology, raising the possibility that the research could be more empirically
accurate, and therefore better.
3.5.2 Androcentrism in Science
Section 3.5.1 illustrates several key themes in the feminist analyses of how
scientists' understanding of sex is a product of patriarchal culture and how their
research serves to perpetuate the status quo. I will now consider these in more detail.
Looking first at scientific research into sex differences, several authors argue
that scientists' understanding of what is male and what is female is related to the
'power of naming' (eg. Hubbard et al, 1982). For example:
Having designated the disease of "femininity" we can easily prove its existence
by innumerable symptoms of "feminine" behaviour which females display to be
worthy of their given name. When men display similar behaviour the bimodal
model is preserved by saying that they, too, can occasionally be "feminine"
(persistence, however, indicates "abnormality") (Hubbard et al, 1982, p3).
People, in fact, vary a great deal and examples can be found to prove any bimodal
distribution, for example, that fat people are cheery. The issue of proof is important:
there may be other reasons that people who are overweight appear cheery. This is
similar to the point raised by Rose in his critique of the science of IQ (see section 3.2).
The matching of black people with lower IQs did not mean that black people were
less intelligent. Their social circumstances and unfamiliarity with the questions used to
measure their 'intelligence' may have been other important contributory factors. The
overlap between, for example, fat people who aren't cheery and thin people who are,
is the grey area in between, where the exceptions to the rule are placed. However, the
fact that this 'grey area' is reasonably large, and would be a similar size with a different
hypothesis, is not typically addressed in orthodox research into sex or race difference.
Hubbard argues that what is important is who has the power to choose names:
'the limits of our language presents the limits of reality as we know it' (Hubbard et al,
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1982, p4). She takes the view that language restricts us to think in terms of opposites:
male and female; black and white; fat and thin. These dichotomies shape scientists'
understanding of the world, and the classification system they adopt. As we saw when
considering underdetermination of scientific theories and theory-ladenness of
observation, scientists tend to find what they are looking for.
The scientific quest for innate biological femininity is, in fact, misguided,
according to feminist critics, as women and men are primarily social beings,
from the moment of birth each of us is admitted into a social club whose
membership, at least until the advent of transsexual surgery, has been
considered fixed for life. The rules of this membership are often the most
stringent that will ever be invoked to govern our conduct (Hubbard et al,
1982, p9).
In other words,
what we must begin to give voice to as scientists and feminists is that there is
no such thing as a place underneath it all... the only accurate locus of research
about us ... is the changing, moving complex web of our interactions, in light
of the language, power structures, natural environments ... and beliefs that
weave it in time (Hubbard et al, 1982, p9, quoting Star, 1979).
We must now ask why scientists bother to try and find an 'underneath' and to separate
nature and nurture?
Feminist critics argue that scientists ask questions about sex difference in
order to perpetuate the status quo. The idea that behaviour is determined by nature,
and not nurture, is used to suppress women, by limiting them to their 'natural' role. As
Steven Rose argued in the radical science literature, biological reductionism is
profoundly ideological (see section 3.2). Hubbard et al (1982, p284) explore
sociobiology, arguing that it is a backlash against feminism and has been used to
justify discriminatory practices in employment. Bleier argues that the intense media
interest and popularising of the theories indicates that the question of innate sex
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difference is of immense social, political and economic consequence (Bleier, 1984,
p3). It is interesting to consider how these theories of 'women's nature' have a built-in
flexibility and so are able to rationalise different women's positions dependent on class
and race:
A generalised description of woman's biological nature has been created, but
when it comes to explaining the status of actual women the picture, as we
would expect, is modified. The arguments used to explain and rationalise the
position of middle class white women and working class black women in the
nineteenth century are necessarily somewhat different. However, they all
somehow involve the capacity to bear children. The universal, idealised
description of the nature of women that has been constructed from this
multiplicity of pictures tends to correspond quite closely to the myth of the
nature of women as passive, nurturing, and focusing on motherhood and
domesticity (Hubbard & Lowe, 1983, pxi).
Theories of women's nature act in the service of racist as well as sexist ideology.
Scientists are, in effect, involved in perpetuating social inequality:
commitment to a gender ideology and to gender difference in scientific
research has great force and implacability for several reasons. It is a scientific
commitment identical with a personal, individual commitment of some
scientists and a collective social ideological commitment; that is, it has great
public sanction as a subject of investigation that everyone understands and
most find comfort in ... that is a commitment to the gender status quo in
society at large and within university departments and laboratories in
particular (Bleier, 1986, plO).
This does not involve any conspiracy amongst scientists in a simplistic sense; but,
according to Bleier, it does protect the position of men in science. Moreover, there is
a definite link between subjective beliefs and experiences amongst some individual
scientist and the theories that they produce (ibid, pi 1).
To summarise, the main issues identified by feminists in this area are as
follows. First, the 'power of naming', and second, how this cultural construction of
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dichotomies between men and women shapes experimental design and ultimately the
results of research. Third, the problem with uncovering an innate biological difference
between men and women when the evidence in so murky, and fourth, the way in
which these types of theories perpetuate the status quo. These are important pointers
to understanding ways in which science is linked with gender in practice.
3.5.3 Problems with the Feminist Critique of the Science of Gender
There are several problems with the feminist analysis of the science of gender.
First, as I argued earlier in section 3.4.3, the emphasis on language in the feminist
critique of science is important, but how deterministic is it? People do think in terms
of dichotomies based on their socialisation, of which language is a part. However
socialisation is never simple, and subversion of traditional beliefs about male and
female is possible, and this in turn can change language, as feminists have done.
Language is an important part of socialisation, but its significance in shaping societies'
values should not be exaggerated. Values also shape language.
Second, sex-difference research is a relatively small area of science. How do
all the other biological sciences, as well as the physical sciences, perpetuate the gender
status quo? And, is all sex-difference research aimed at social control? Birke does us
an important service by uncovering the rampant sexism of some of the sex-difference
research that is going on. But is it all so outrageous?
Third, to argue for no 'nature' within scientific understanding is problematic, as
Birke herself notes:
There are undoubtedly powerful social divisions in our society; and feminists
must insist that these are not caused by the biological attributes (sex or colour
of one's skin, for example) with which they are sometimes associated. But at
the same time, feminists must also insist that we experience those divisions as
embodied persons. Refusing to see our biology as primary and controlling is
essential: human behaviour and social organisation are not caused by biology
or by the social/cultural environment, and we are puppets of neither. But we
do have bodies. (Birke, 1992b, p77).
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This raises a fourth point the problem of criticising scientific research - feminists
criticise 'bad' science as it is riddled with dodgy inferences. Does this mean that some
science is less underdetermined than other science, or is it all equally contingent?
Against what criteria are we to judge claims in science?
3.6 Women Scientists' Response
How do women in science react to the feminist critique of science as
masculine? In this section I investigate their views.
Many women scientists are hostile to claims that science is masculine. Keller
has written about how women in science respond to the feminist critique of science as
masculine, based on her experiences as a woman in science and a feminist critic of
science who has spoken with a lot of women scientists (see Keller, 1982, 1987c). She
argues that their hostility is a product of their struggle to gain acceptance in science:
for many women this has depended on the disavowal of any difference in how men
and women do science. Moreover, following their scientific training, women scientists
tend not to think of gender and sex as separate. This means that issues around gender
and science reduces to the question of whether men and women think differently, a
suggestion that is rejected by women in science because it is seen as threatening to
their position (Keller, 1987b, p43).
Women scientists tend to reject any congruence with objectivity and
masculinity because of its associations with statements that women are not suited for
scientific careers (Keller, 1987b, p40). They also share with men a vested interest in
their authority as scientists (albeit limited because they are women) and are likely to
reject the notion that objectivity is a myth. Scientific training remains largely in
isolation from any sociological study of science. As Anne Fausto-Sterling, a feminist
critic of science and practicing scientist, notes, science students tend not to take social
science courses, which leaves them largely oblivious to the social shaping of the
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scientific enterprise (Fausto-Sterling, 1992). Harding, a philosopher who has spoken
with women in science, in a comment on Fausto-Sterling's piece adds,
it is no accident that scientists turn away from both learning more about the
social context of their own work, or modern Western science more generally,
and from exhibiting what little they learn to innocent young folks whom they
wish to recruit to careers in their field (Harding, 1993, p50).
A disdain amongst scientists for sociological understandings of their own work and
disciplines is evident (ibid).
Finally women scientists may find the feminist critique problematic, because
they interpret the suggestion that science is socially shaped as meaning that all
scientific knowledge is equally valid. Although this is a misreading because few
feminists take such a relativist position, it is understandable, given women scientists'
unfamiliarity with the difficult language of the feminist critique and their beliefs in the
value of rigorous empirical investigation.
This interpretation of how women scientists come to be so hostile to the
feminist critique of science as masculine fits into the feminist theories of gender in
scientific practice sketched above quite well. The main issue seems to be the epistemic
authority gained from the myth of objectivity for both women and men in science. The
reliance on this myth is, ironically, perhaps more important for women in science than
men, because of their need to assert legitimacy which is so limited in other ways.
However, this type of argument, highlights problems in the feminist critique.
The argument that women in science are socialised to reject the masculinity of science
can be construed as a suggestion of false consciousness. This is patronising to women
in science and will alienate them even more. Furthermore, as we have already seen,
socialisation arguments (in this case of women scientists who are hostile to the
feminist critique) are problematic because they fail to account for those who do not fit
into the stereotype. The authority to be gained from science is obviously one aspect of
many women's hostility, but there are other factors.
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An important issue is the relevance of the critique, based mainly on human and
animal biology, to other women in science, eg women in physics. The lack of
congruence to their own experience or subject matter will contribute to women's
dismissal. Another point which might explain women scientists' hostility, is the level at
which much of the critique is conducted, involving sociological and philosophical
concepts. These women are practicing scientists and much of the discussion may not
relate to their experience of how science gets done, or their experience of men within
science. Whilst their view is obviously limited by the institutionalised lack of self-
reflection amongst scientists, they do have a point. There may be aspects of their
practice that feminists are glossing over in their concern with language and rhetoric.
For example, returning to the point about the difference between scientific workers
and scientists, many women in science fall into the former category. This again limits
the type of science they practice to replication of other work and means that few have
the opportunity to develop new research let alone head a research team. This may
well limit their perspective on how science is linked to gender ideology.
Moreover, women scientists' rejection of an extreme relativist position is
important. The feminist critique of science has yet to resolve the conflict between
social constructivism and good science/bad science, or to clearly establish the criteria
for judging valid knowledge claims. In a sense this leaves a vacuum which promotes
women scientists' rejection of the feminist analysis of science. A total rejection of
empiricism may not be in the best interests of feminists seeking to adjudicate between
knowledge claims. Surely feminists are seeking a 'better' account of the natural world.
It is also quite arrogant to assume that nature has no part to play in the construction
of scientific knowledge, and that humans construct the whole picture. Haraway makes
this point:
Just how science "gets at" the world remains far from resolved. What does
seem resolved, however, is that science grows from and enables concrete ways
of life, including particular constructions of love, knowledge and power. That
is the core of its instrumentalism and the limits of its universalism (Haraway,
1989, p7-8).
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She argues that primatologists must listen to the animals, who are active participants
in primatology. This can be compared with Keller's account of McClintock's emphasis
on 'listening to the material' (Keller, 1983), and will be discussed further in the next
chapter about a feminist science.
3.7 Conclusion
The feminist critique of the gendering of science presented here has brought
gender into the social analysis of science. Feminists have argued that science is not
objective, and that the interests and views of scientists are reflected in the science they
produce. Given that science is male-dominated these views must, to some extent,
reflect male values. Objectivity has been linked to masculinity in the feminist critique.
Feminists have documented the links in liberal philosophy between masculinity and the
values of science: objectivity and reason. Others have argued that this link is more
than rhetorical, but is reflected in the fragile male ego developed through mother-child
relations. Language and metaphors in science have been analysed by feminists and
show links to male fantasy (again shaped by early child development). The language
of science has been shown to shape scientific practice. The final area of feminist
concern with science is the science of gender. Feminists have criticised scientific
research, especially that concerned with sex or sex difference, emphasising, amongst
other things, the power of naming difference between men and women in shaping
scientific analysis. They have illustrated the ideological role science plays in
perpetuating the status quo, ie gendered division of labour. The problematic
inferences and assumptions in scientific research are also criticised for producing 'bad
science'.
I have shown several key flaws in these analyses. The first is the understanding
of masculinity. Generalisations about a male 'world view' or masculinity are
problematic for feminists. If masculinity is a product of social relations, and not purely
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biology, it is shaped by many different social relations which vary across ethnic groups
and class. Masculinity is dynamic, not static, meaning that it develops as men grow
up. The way in which masculinity is reinforced by social relations which emphasise
male power over women is important. This raises problems for feminists seeking to
generalise about a male 'world view' being reflected in science, or about a particular
set of masculine methods.
The use of psychoanalysis in this area raises particular problems. Feminist
psychoanalysis can be criticised as placing too much importance on early child
development in shaping gender. Whilst this is important, socialisation does not stop at
this point, but continues throughout life, as argued above. The emphasis on the
fragility of the masculine ego is particularly problematic, given the way in which
society acts to reinforce the male ego. Control and domination within science are
linked with the fragility of the male ego by feminists. When this fragility is questioned
the link breaks down. The psychoanalytical interpretation may not be the best way for
understanding the gendering of science.
A further problem for feminists is their current emphasis on links between
language and gender within science. I would argue that they risk falling into the same
determinist trap as above, by over-emphasising the role of fantasy (again based on
child development). Language clearly guides social practices, scientific
experimentation and theories. However language is only one part of scientific
investigation: physically doing science is important.
Moreover, language can be a rhetorical device. This is important in feminists'
discussion of discourse and method. Scientists use gendered metaphors, and make
connections between gender and particular practices within science, in order to gain
legitimacy for a particular approach (either within or out with science). This allows
for the possibility that language obscures practices which do not fit in with the
dominant rhetoric, and guides further practice to conform to the dominant rhetoric.
Perhaps the issue of whether scientists have a subconscious affinity with a particular
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approach is not as important as the way that they construct affinities (which can
change) for political goals.
A third flaw in the feminist theories about how science is masculine is an
inadequate understanding of how science is practiced. Hierarchies within science
obviously limit the extent to which all scientists can influence their work. There is a
difference between new 'ground breaking' research and the mundane repetitive work
in which most scientific workers are engaged. The opportunity to construct new
metaphors or theories is limited in most scientific work. Moreover, there are many
different subjects within science which have different methodologies and theories. The
difference between animal and human biology and physical sciences are important.
Gender is obviously more important in sex difference research than in the physical
science, whose role in perpetuating gender inequality is difficult to analyse.
All of these flaws can be related to women scientists' alienation from the
feminist critique of science, and the important criticisms raised about criteria for
judging scientific knowledge claims. The feminist (and SSK) emphasis on the social
construction of scientific knowledge conflicts with the prevailing ideology which is
that science is a neutral reflection, or a direct reading, of the natural world. However,
as I argued in relation to SSK, it is possible to go too far in the constructivist analysis
- the emphasis on methodological relativism may lead to judgmental relativism. The
debate within the radical science movement about good science/bad science and use
and abuse of science also highlights (mainly scientists') fears of relativism. Feminists
are now faced with the same dilemma.
There is a trend in feminism today away from understanding based on
women's exploration of their own oppression to abstract academic theorising. This is
evident in feminist theories of science. The progressive shift towards language and
metaphors is symptomatic of the trend. These theories are alien to many women
scientists, and women in general. The theory has become divorced from scientific
practice in many ways.
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One particularly important issue relating to the gulf that has developed
between theory and practice is that between theory and activism. These feminist
theories can be criticised as moving away from strategic theorising (Connell, 1983,
1987) - to bring about change - to theorising for its own sake. Paradoxically this acts
to reduce the possibility of change. One example of this comes from the feminist
emphasis on language in science. The political move in this case would be to try to
change language. However the existing feminist theories tend towards a deterministic
analysis of language and masculinity. The rhetorical role of language is down-played
in favour of an analysis which emphasises the role of language in determining social
practices. From this perspective, in order to change language within science, and
hence change science, feminists must look outside of science to parenting structures,
to alter child development patterns, and so alter gender relations which will in turn
change language. In my view this is not a very effective strategy for change. The
psychic essentialism of this type of feminist theorising does not contribute to good
strategies for political action. By contrast, arguing for links between masculinity and
science in language, as rhetorical devices, may provide the basis for more realistic
political action: exposure of the rhetoric.
In the next chapter I consider feminist science theories, including the position
of some of the theorists considered in this chapter. I am once more interested in how
the feminist science theories relate to practice, in two broad senses: the actual practice
of science; and practice in terms of feminist activism around changing science.
69
Chapter 4 Feminist Science
4.1 Introduction
Developing a theory of feminist science is clearly an important part of the
feminist treatment of science. There is undoubtedly a danger, recognised by many
feminists who practice and criticise science, in failing to provide an alternative to the
current gendered science. Science is too important to be dismissed by feminists. Yet it
is feminists outside of science, primarily in the discipline of philosophy, and to a lesser
extent the social sciences, who have since taken up the feminist science project.
Theirs' is a theoretical treatment of the concept of a feminist science, and leaves many
unanswered questions about the practical implications of their work. It is thinking
about the nature of a feminist science in practice which guides my review of the
feminist epistemologies of science.
I start in section 4.2 with a consideration of the feminist science critics'
approach to the idea of a feminist science This follows on from Chapter 3 and
introduces the key issues concerning the practice of a feminist science. It is these
issues which I consider in the more detailed review of the three principal bodies of
work in feminist epistemology of science: the theory of feminist standpoint applied to
science; postmodernist additions to standpoint theory; and feminist empiricism.
Section 4.3 deals with the feminist standpoint theorists (as labelled by Sandra
Harding, 1986, 1991), namely Hilary Rose (1983 and 1994) and Nancy Hartsock
(1983, 1984). These theorists draw from Marxist philosophy of historical materialism
and incorporate a consideration of the patriarchal division of labour, involving
reproduction as well as production. In section 4.4 I consider the work of Sandra
Harding (1986, 1991) and Donna Haraway (1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1991)
who develop the standpoint position along postmodernist lines, and argue instead for
'strong objectivity' (Harding, 1991) and 'situated knowledge' (Haraway, 1988). I then
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consider feminist empiricism in section 4.5.111 take the term from Nelson (1990), who
develops the work of the philosopher Quine to advocate a form of empiricism which
does not deny the subjectivity of the knower. I also address Helen Longino's work
under this heading (1983, 1988, 1989, 1990).
4.2 From the Feminist Critique of Science to a Feminist Science
4.2.1 Feminist Critics' Views on a Feminist Science
Feminist critics of science were the first to respond to the idea of a feminist
science, both negatively and positively. In many ways their responses are cautious,
perhaps because of their awareness of the difficulty in theorising a feminist science
when the understanding of how science is masculine is so limited. Nonetheless, the
feminist critics develop their ideas in such a way as to raise four important issues
concerning the practice of a feminist science. Note that although these themes are
inter-related, I deal with them separately for simplicity.
First, an interesting feature of the views held on a feminist science by most
feminists who are scientists and critics of science is their rejection of a feminine
science, as suggested by radical feminism, cultural feminism and/or ecofeminism.12
The tendency for feminist scientists to reject the notion of a feminine science might be
related to the strong anti-essentialist element of the feminist critique of science, in
particular of sex difference research in biology and psychology. An essentialist view of
men's and women's 'natures' is seen by most feminist critics of science as over-
simplistic and as too close to the sexist theories of difference which they are trying to
11 It is important to note that I do not use the term in the same sense as Sandra
Harding, who uses it to denote a liberal feminist position. This does not question the
objectivity of science, but advocates a more rigorous form of objectivity as well as the
entry of women into science to 'police' sexist bias (Harding, 1986).
12 For a review of ecofeminism see Zimmerman (1987); Kheel (1985); Warren (1987);
Cox (1992); Gray (1981); Fox (1989); Griffin (1984); Caldecott and Leland (1983).
Another theory of a feminine science is proposed by Shepherd (1993). I choose not to
review these here as I start from a position which rejects essentialism.
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eliminate. In rejecting this view and drawing a distinction between gender and sex,
these feminist critics imply that both men and women would, in principle, be able to
do a feminist science. This raises important questions about who would do a feminist
science and how they would become 'feminist scientists'. This question is explored in
my review of each of the three feminist epistemologies of science. It is particularly
important in my treatment of standpoint theories in section 4.3, where the issue of
essentialism is paramount.
The second important concern emerging from the initial exploration of a
feminist science by these critics is methodology. The nature of objectivity is
particularly important. Here I explore four approaches taken to the question of
methodology.
The first is developed from the feminist critique of sex difference research
(reviewed in section 3.5). Importance in placed on changing science from the inside,
using science's own tools to refute false claims, and to promoting women into
positions of power in science (eg Fausto-Sterling, 1985). Some of the epistemological
ground-rules in orthodox science are also challenged - for example the idea of a
'biological substratum' underneath the social which can be 'revealed' by scientific
investigation (Star, 1979); the ideological role of science in promoting the status quo
(Hubbard et al, 1982, pi 1); and the relationship between 'man' and nature.
Environmental destruction and the treatment of animals is of particular concern to
these critics of science (Hubbard et al, 1982, p287).
Fausto-Sterling, for example, argues for rigorous methodology, including
proper controls, observational techniques which limit individual bias, and thorough
statistical analysis. She criticises biological determinism in the science of gender from
the perspective of this methodology, and argues for the development of new models
of gender based on complexity and interaction which would be part of a feminist
science (Fausto-Sterling, 1985, p212). However, the later approach is limited to
human biology.
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The implication in this work is that it is possible to distinguish good science
from bad; and that the empirical techniques used in science at present can be utilised
by feminists to achieve this aim. What is viewed as the 'over use' of reductionist
research design and methods is rejected in favour of a more holistic approach. These
critics also start to challenge the notion of objectivity in science, arguing that nature
cannot be 'revealed' as distinct from the social world, but that the two are entwined.
The task of science is to move towards a better understanding of nature, but the
'truth' can never be fully 'uncovered' as knowing is a social process. In addition, the
ideological role of scientific knowledge in perpetuating gender inequality in the wider
society is recognised and rejected. 'Good science' might take a similar role in
promoting non-sexist ideology - an important aspect of feminist politics - or the
ideological role of science might be rejected by feminists in favour of a more
knowledgeable and skeptical public. This is also a highly practical agenda for change.
The implication is that feminists could change mainstream science by becoming
involved and practicing science as feminists. Presumably institutional changes would
also be necessary to get more feminists into science, although this is not discussed
explicitly.
Despite this practical slant to Fausto-Sterling's work, for many she does not
go far enough in her critique of science. Her adoption of orthodox principles of
objectivity has been criticised - it may be that 'one cannot use the master's tools to tear
down the master's house' (Audre Lorde). This introduces one of the principal
dilemmas for feminists seeking to change science: to what extent should old
methodologies and styles be retained?
A second approach is that of Ruth Bleier, who has gone further than Fausto-
Sterling and developed some suggestions for what a feminist science might be, based
on 'change, complexity, contextualising, and interaction' (Bleier, 1984, p200). For
example, she favours,
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restoring] missing subjects and points of view ... make[ing] science better and
capable of a more complete appreciation of the world ... transform[ing]
ideological bases throughout Western civilisation and for women's place in it
(Bleier, 1984, p201).
She emphasises 'critical self reflection' and understanding of change, complexity and
context (Bleier, 1984, p205). Some principles that might characterise a feminist
science for her include the principle that scientists acknowledge they have beliefs that
affect their practice of science; and the principle that scientists should then explore
and try to understand how subjectivities affect science. Moreover, scientists ought to
be
explicit about assumptions, honest, thoughtful and careful in their methods;
open in their interpretations of each study and its significance; clear in
describing the possible pitfalls of the work and their conclusions about it, and
responsible in the language used to convey their results to the scientific and
non scientific public (Bleier, 1986, p 15-16).
Following this, in Bleier's vision, feminists could claim a feminist approach to science
and research that leads to oppression and exploitation would be eliminated. Scientists
would recognise the true complexity of nature, and be non-reductionist (Bleier, 1986).
In my opinion this is a more idealistic vision of change than Fausto-Sterling's.
Although Bleier deals more explicitly with the scientist's interaction with the natural
world - emphasising critical self reflection and exploration of subjectivities - there is
insufficient consideration of the relationship between changes in science and changes
in society, or of the institutional changes required to sustain a different methodology
in science. The processes by which more emphasis on subjectivity in science would
interact with the 'myth of objectivity' in the wider society are not considered. How
would scientists learn to be more self reflexive? These important questions will be
explored further in my review of the feminist epistemologies of science.
The third approach, represented by the work of Elizabeth Fee, avoids the
Utopian problems of Bleier's alternative vision and the difficulty with Fausto-Sterling's
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acceptance of orthodox methods. Fee focuses on the concept of objectivity (Fee,
1983). She argues that it is 'sufficiently vague to carry with it a multitude of meanings'
(Fee, 1983, p 17). Positive meanings include the:
constant process of practical interaction with nature; willingness to consider
all assumptions and methods as open to question ... idea of individual
creativity subjected to the constraints of community validation through a series
of recognised procedures (Fee, 1983, pl6).
Fee rejects what she calls the 'hierarchy of distances' in objectivity, which is manifest
in four ways: the treatment of the production of knowledge as separate from its social
use; the separation between scientific rationality and emotion in the language of
science,13 which she argues is a 'pervasive and powerful aspect of the mythology of
science' as scientists are often deeply committed to their work (Fee, 1983, pl8);14 the
distance between the subject of study and the object of study, which legitimates the
domination of nature; and the view of science as separate and distinct from society.15
Her main point is that all of these aspects of objectivity are false, and that science is
political and emotional, and not separate from nature.
The strength of Fee's approach is that it is based on a serious consideration of
what objectivity means in practice. This allows her to reach a compromise, between a
total rejection or acceptance of objectivity. She incorporates orthodox methods of
validation by peer review alongside emphasis on the effect of social context on how
knowledge is developed. A feminist science, according to Fee, is therefore one which
involves gradual change from existing practice as opposed to a sudden leap to entirely
13 This issues relate to Fee's earlier critique of the liberal philosophy of science, where
she illustrated the dualisms between masculine and feminine: the association between
masculinity and scientific rationality on the one hand, and emotion and femininity on
the other. Fee also argued that each side of the dichotomy was necessary to sustain
the other, although the 'masculine' was always privileged (see section 3.4.1).
14 This supports my point about the possibility that scientists' rhetoric of domination
and separation might be distinct from their experience of such separation (see section
3.4.2).
15 This is an important theme in the radical science movement's critique of the
neutrality of science and the emphasis in SSK on the social construction of scientific
knowledge (see sections 3.2 and 3.3).
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new methods. This raises an important question: is it possible to compromise between
orthodoxy and radically different methods? This is explored in more detail in the main
part of this chapter.
The fourth and final contribution on methodology is Keller's 'gender-neutral
science', which she proposed in her early work (Keller, 1985). She aims for the:
reclamation from within science, of science as a human instead of a masculine
project and the renunciation of the division of emotional and intellectual
labour that maintains science as a male preserve ... [and has a] vision of a
gender-free science ... premised on a transformation of the very categories of
male and female, and correspondingly of mind and nature (Keller, 1985,
P178).
Keller maintains that at present science involves a plurality of different theories, but
that those mirroring a rhetoric of control and domination are privileged. She goes on
to argue against this constraint:
a healthy science is one that allows for the productive survival of diverse
conceptions of mind and nature (Keller, 1985, p 178).
However Keller contradicts this emphasis on diversity when she favours a particular
methodology which she refers to as 'dynamic objectivity' (see section 3.4), which she
argues is better suited to dealing with the complexity of nature than constrained
'master molecule' interpretations (Keller, 1985, p 136). Here Keller introduces an
important dilemma for feminist scientists: should diversity or one particular type of
objectivity, eg dynamic objectivity, be encouraged? In the first case it seems that
Keller is looking to mainstream science to provide the resources for change; in the
second, which Keller links with feminine gender identity, it appears that change would
have to come from outside of science.
This leads on to the third area of concern raised by feminist critics' initial
investigation of a feminist science: the organisation of science. By organisation I am
referring to the social arrangements within science, in particular: boundaries between
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natural science and the rest of academia, and between different scientific disciplines;
the organisation of formal employment hierarchies, informal hierarchies and
communication networks; organisation of the working environment; and the
arrangements made to train scientists, including recruitment procedures.
Although this is not discussed by feminist critics in detail two important issues
are addressed in part by Fee and Keller. Fee's consideration of objectivity leads her to
suggest that a better understanding of the production of scientific knowledge is
necessary in promoting a feminist science:
we need both macro and micro studies of social organisation and its relation to
knowledge production ... [it is] necessary to explore the role that scientists are
given in the reproduction of economic and political power within the context
of class structured society in order to understand how these relationships of
power lead to the production of particular kinds of knowledge and to see why
certain questions are asked and others rendered invisible (Fee, 1983, pi 1).
In my view Fee is arguing for a more robust sociology of science which, could then
begin to shape the scientific project.16 This might mean sociologists of science
working in closer collaboration with scientists, or scientists developing sociological
skills as part of their training. This type of organisational change will be discussed in
more detail throughout this chapter.
The second organisational issue introduced by a feminist critic of science -
Keller - concerns the very meaning of a feminist science. Keller rejects the label
'feminist science' for her ideas detailed above. Instead, she argues that the concept of a
feminist science is extremely problematic, because of the popular equation of feminist
and feminine science (Keller, 1987a). Keller argues that this embodies all the conflicts
surrounding sex and gender, culture and nature, conflicts which she aims to
overcome. In particular, she views the widespread collapse in the public mind of the
16
Interestingly, this is also implied in the radical science movements' work on
ideology, and in the sociology of science, although neither of these groups have met
the challenge. In the former case this is largely because of internal disagreements,
however in the latter the shift towards 'methodological internalism' in SSK appears to
be an important causal factor.
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concepts of feminist and feminine, sex and gender, as meaning that women scientists
are mainly hostile to feminist criticisms of science, as they see it as meaning that
women and men do science differently. Rather, she favours a more substantive
critique of science which, crucially, 'depends on a rapprochement between feminist
critics of science and working scientists' (Keller, 1987b, p89), a rapprochement which
might well involve changes in the disciplinary boundaries between natural and social
science.
Keller's rejection of a feminist science on the grounds that it is most often
equated with a feminine science seems to contradict her own favouring of feminine
gender traits in dynamic objectivity. Nevertheless, she does raise an important point.
How can feminists convince and organise women in science? More generally, how
would a feminist science be organised? Would it involve a slow change, modifying
and adapting existing practices, or would it be more revolutionary, in Harding's terms,
a 'successor science'? Would parenting practices have to change? These are important
questions which I hope to answer.
The fourth and final issue which is raised by feminist critics of science who
are concerned with a feminist science is the relationship between change to a feminist
science and changes in the wider society. Once more it is Fee who raises two key
points. First, she argues:
scientific experts are in the male role whilst the vast majority of the population
is given the female role. Everyone lacking scientific credentials is made to feel
uninformed, unintelligent (Fee, 1983, pl9).
This suggests that a feminist science should seek to involve the public to make them
more informed. How might this be done? Second, Fee argues that a feminist science is
not possible without a feminist society (Fee, 1983, p20). This begs the question of
what is the link between feminising science and feminising society?
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4.2.2 Crucial Issues for a Feminist Science
There are four sets of questions which have emerged from this review:
1. What are the necessary 'qualifications' of feminist scientists (including sex)?
2. What constitutes a feminist methodology? To what extent should feminists retain
orthodox methods or introduce more radical approaches? Are there many feminist
methodologies or only one?
3. How would a feminist science be organised? In particular, what would the links be
between sociology of science and a feminist science?; how would scientists be
trained?; and how might feminists convince scientists, especially women, to adopt
their approach?
4. What would be the relationship between feminist changes in science and changes in
the wider society? How would the public be involved, and does a feminist science
require a feminist society?
Note that these themes are inter-related. For example, questions about
methodological changes cannot be asked in isolation from questions about
organisational changes needed to instigate such methods. I now address these four
themes, and the ways in which they are related, in my review of the three principal
feminist epistemologies of science, starting with feminist standpoint theory.
4.3 Feminist Standpoint Science
4.3.1 Introduction
The first major area of feminist theorising about science developed in the early
1980s and concerned a feminist standpoint. This is based on the notion of a
proletarian standpoint.17 Hartsock argues that the proletarian standpoint can be
appropriated by feminists when considering gendered society and the two sex-classes:
17 From a Marxist perspective standpoint theory depends on the notion of two classes:
the proletariat and the bourgeois; who have different perspectives resulting from their
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the position of women is structurally different from that of men, and ... the
lived realities of women's lives are profoundly different from those of men
(Hartsock, 1983, p284).
Although Hilary Rose does not use standpoint theory to justify her approach in her
initial paper (Rose, 1983) she does adopt the label in her later book (Rose, 1994).
Rose develops her approach from the critique of the radical science movement (see
Chapter 3). While acknowledging the usefulness of many aspects of the radical
science theories, she criticises them for being theoretically 'sex-blind' (Rose, 1983,
p81). Her main thesis is that,
their analysis of the division of labour stops short at the distinction between
the manual and mental labour associated with production. Indifferent to the
second system of production - reproduction - the analysis excludes the
relationship of science to patriarchy, to the sexual division of labour in which
caring work is primarily allocated to women in both paid and unpaid work
(Rose, 1983, p73).
Rose aims to transcend what she sees as a division between 'hand, brain and heart'
(Rose, 1983, p73) in order to produce a more humane science. This involves moving
on from the radical science movement's 'one-sided materialism' (Rose, 1983, p76) and
developing a feminist theoretical framework which 'makes it possible to explain why
science is not only bourgeois but male' (Rose, 1983, p81), ie one which explores the
links between capitalism, patriarchy and science.
4.3.2 Feminist Standpoint in Science
I now consider how Hartsock and Rose construct their versions of a feminist
standpoint, before moving on to consider what this might mean in practice. Both
Hartsock and Rose argue that, in Hartsock's words, women's lives provide k:
material circumstances. On the one hand, the proletarian standpoint is the vision of the
oppressed, and so renders the real relations of society visible. On the other hand, the
bourge/osies' vision, which dominates the society, is corrupted by their position of
power.
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a vantage point that can be ground in a powerful critique of the phallocratic
institutions and ideology which constitute the capitalist form of patriarchy
(Hartsock, 1983, p288).
There are eight main points to Hartsock's argument, three of which Rose shares.
First, Hartsock uses,
the term "feminist" rather than "female" ... to indicate both the achieved
character of a standpoint and that a standpoint by definition carries a liberatory
potential (Hartsock, 1983, p289).
Second, she argues women's labour differs systematically from men's in every society
and the sexual division of labour is the first and in some societies the only division of
labour. Hartsock stresses that she is looking at institutionalised social practices, not
individuals' visions, and claims that,
individuals may change their activities in ways which move them outside the
outlook embodied in these institutions, but such a move can be significant only
when it occurs at the level of society as a whole (Hartsock, 1983, p289).
Third, under capitalism women produce goods for wages, but their lives are
institutionally defined by their production in the home. This involves what Hartsock
calls 'a unification of mind and body for the purposes of transforming natural
substances into socially defined goods' (Hartsock, 1983, p292). For a woman,
the process of production ... consume[s] [her] whole life ... Her immersion in
the world of use - in concrete, many qualitied, changing material processes'
(ibid).
This means that women's vantage point is an intensified version of 'the materialist
world view' that Marx refers to - 'an intensification of class consciousness' (ibid).
Rose also argues that women's work is of a particular kind, and produces a
particular knowledge: it is work concerned with personal service, 'emotionally
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demanding labour (which) requires that women give something of themselves to the
child, to the man' (Rose, 1983, p83). This she calls 'the labour of love' (ibid). This can
be considered a unity of 'hand, brain and heart':
a theoretical recognition of caring labour as critical for the production of
people is necessary for any adequate materialist analysis of science and is a
crucial precondition for an alternative epistemology and method that will help
us construct a new science and a new technology (Rose, 1983, p83).
Although Rose advocates incorporation of the labour of caring into theories of
science, she does not advocate simply adding women in to the basic productionist
argument. She calls for a recognition of the,
dialectical relationship between both systems of production...(which) holds the
explanation not only of why there are so few women in science, but also
of why the knowledge produced by science is so abstract and impersonal
(Rose, 1983, p84).
As a starting point Rose turns to the sexual division of labour, to look for
explanations of how it came about and for connections between women's paid and
unpaid work. She notes that the ideology and practice of the 'family wage' to the male
breadwinner plays a central part in women's enforced dependence on men and remains
today with a 'powerful ideological grip' (Rose, 1983, p85). Rose then argues that,
science and technology as labour markets follow precisely the pattern of this
general segregated form ... It excludes women - except those in exceptionally
favourable circumstances - from occupying elite positions within the
production of knowledge (Rose, 1983, p85-86).
Those women who do 'make it' in science are, according to Rose, 'cut in two' (Rose,
1983, p87); they face a contradiction between their caring labour and the abstract
labour of scientific practice.
Fourth, both Rose and Hartsock incorporate a biological component to the
division of labour between men and women. Hartsock argues that she is looking at the
82
sexual rather than the gender division of labour: the division of labour between men
and women is not purely social but includes a biological component. Women, not
men, bear children, emphasising the 'biological, bodily component of human existence'
(ibid). She incorporates into her notion of institutionalised sexual division of labour
the concept of,
motherhood as an institution rather than experience, including pregnancy and
the preparation for motherhood almost all female children receive as
socialisation, [which] results in the construction of female existence as centred
within a complex relational nexus (Hartsock, 1983, p294).
Rose draws on similar arguments to Hartsock, in elaborating on her epistemology of
hand, brain and heart. For example, she argues that women's labour includes the
labour of birthing, arguing that this is admitting the body into feminist theory - 'a
limited essentialism and constrained social realism' (Rose, 1994, p40). A feminist
epistemology, based on 'holism and harmonious relations between women and nature'
(Rose, 1994, p33), would require a movement towards a 'deeper respect of nature'
within scientific research, possibly the stopping of animal experimentation (Rose,
1994, p233).
Fifth, Hartsock makes use of object-relations (see section 3.4.1) to explain
how the experience of oneness lasts longer for female infants than males (see Flax,
1983; Chodorow, 1978). This is reinforced by socialisation: girls leam roles from their
mothers, males from 'rules which structure the life of an absent male figure' (Hartsock,
1983, p294). Girls identify with the real, concrete world, boys with the abstract;
'[m]asculinity is idealised by boys whereas femininity is concrete for girls' (ibid). Both
different psychic make-ups in men and women as well as different activity are,
Hartsock argues, replicated in epistemology and ontology: a contrasting feminist
standpoint and abstract masculinity emerge as a result of these differences.
Sixth, Hartsock argues that, in considering the 'institutionalised sexual division
of labour' (Hartsock, 1983, p290), it is best to search for commonality amongst
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women rather to explore differences across race and class. This she does with
reluctance and comments on 'the danger of making invisible the experience of lesbians
or women of colour' (ibid). Nevertheless she still argues that all women in the West
experience the sexual division of labour.
Seventh, according to Hartsock, the female experience (the inverse of the
male) exposes the masculine standpoint as 'both partial and fundamentally perverse'.
This perversity is most dramatically represented in the 'substitution of life for death'.
Violence, death and sexual fusion are linked to the masculine standpoint both
theoretically and in real life, through rape and pornography. This 'perversity' is further
evident in 'the argument that it is the ability to kill ... which sets humans above
animals' (ibid). Superiority is ascribed to the male as the male kills. Hartsock
describes how this male perversity is taken as the standard world-view and, as such,
permeates the lives of women as well as men. For example,
The organisation of motherhood as an institution in which a woman is alone
with her children, the isolation of women from each other in domestic labour,
the female pathology of loss of self in service to others - all mark the
transformation of life into death (Hartsock, 1983, p302).
The female experience of continuity and relation with others, the natural world, and
between mind and body, provides an ontological base for developing a feminist
standpoint, which does not operate through the denial of the body, an attack of
nature, or the death struggle between the self and others.
Finally, the achievement of a society-wide feminist standpoint requires the
'generalisation of the potentiality made available by the activity of women' through a
feminist revolution, which, according to Hartsock, must involve 'institutionalising the
participation of both men and women in child rearing' (Hartsock, 1983, p304). Rose
argues that it is the task of a feminist epistemology of science to create 'a practice of
feeling, thinking and writing that opposes the abstraction of male and bourgeois
scientific thought' (Rose, 1983, p88). The subjective and objective ways of knowing
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the world are to be brought together in feminist theorising about science. This 'begins
with and constantly returns to the subjective shared experience of oppression' (ibid).
This in turn 'fuses the personal, the social and the biological' (ibid).
The examples that Rose gives are taken from feminist work to 'defend
women's interests and advance feminist interpretations' (ibid) in biology and medicine.
Feminist writing on menstruation, for example, 'fuse subjective and objective
knowledge in order to make new knowledge' (ibid). Rose gives examples of self-
examination books and self-health-care groups who are developing, 'not only
prefigurative social forms of health care, but prefigurative forms of knowledge about
natural sciences' (ibid). An example of this is the book Our Bodies, Ourselves (Boston
Women Health Collective, 1969).
Rose comments that,
in this situation a feminist biology does not attempt to be objective and
external to the female biological entity; it attempts to take over biological
knowledge in order to overcome women's alienation from our own bodies, our
own selves (Rose, 1983, p89).
In a later book (Rose, 1994) Rose claims that this theory came from feminist practice,
eg women's group's exploration of their common experience of daily life. She links
this feminist epistemology with the women's ecology movement:
the examples of third world women's environmental struggles, and first world
women's campaigns over Genome and reproduction, show the capacity to ...
enter the terrain of science and to construct new definitions of reality, infused
with a feminist understanding of caring. Within these examples we see
feminism bringing love to knowledge and power. It is love, as caring respect
for both people and nature, that offers an ethic to reshape knowledge and with
it society (Rose, 1994, p238).
I now go on to consider the translation of feminist standpoint theory into the practice
of a feminist science.
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4.3.3 Practice
Here I address the four main themes of this chapter, detailed in section 4.2.2,
and ask the following questions: most importantly, is there such a thing as a feminist
standpoint based on women's lives and how do scientists adopt a standpoint?; what
does this mean for the methodologies of science?; how would science be organised?;
and what is the link between a feminist science and the wider society?
I argue that the notion of a feminist standpoint is problematic for several
reasons. The first relates to the way that Rose and Hartsock root a feminist standpoint
in women's biological as well as social experiences. I agree that peoples' perspectives
are shaped by their social location. A biological component to experience is also
important. We are, after all, not purely social, but also biological creatures. But there
are implications of using this as the basis for a feminist science. Rooting a feminist
standpoint in women's experience, in particular pregnancy and childbirth, which only
(some) women experience, implies that men cannot achieve a feminist standpoint, as
theirs' is a different experience. This, in turn, implies that a feminist science based on
a feminist standpoint is a separatist science: men cannot participate. In my view this is
highly problematic, not least because if feminists turn away to pursue a separate
scientific project;am( they in effect leave untouched the male domination of orthodox
science. The chances of a feminist science having any impact on society from the
margins are severely limited. A more practical approach involves some continuity with
existing science, including existing male scientists.
Second, the notion of a single feminist standpoint is difficult because women's
experiences are different. One problem with the formula of a single feminist
standpoint is that it shares a tendency with right wing and sexist imagery, to restrict
the image of women to mothers and wives. In utilising the traditional stereotype of
womanhood, standpoint theorists adopt what can only be a romanticised notion of
women's caring role. Whilst women can be carerSj they can also be insensitive and
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prejudiced, authoritarian and domineering. The mono-dimensional view of the caring
mother and wife ignores these less savoury features of women's characters.
Furthermore, women's caring labour takes many forms - how much
commonality do bourgeois women who employ women to clean and care for their
children have with middle class women who stay at home in suburbia to bring up their
children, or with working class women who have to go out to work for a low wage in
a factory and constantly juggle child care amongst family and friends? The same
question could be asked of different races of women. In some instances it may be that
women and men of the same class and race may share more in common with each
other, than with members of their sex in other classes or races. Surely different
women's experiences are very different and cannot be subsumed under an idealised
version of women's caring labour? This implies many different women's and feminist's
standpoints. This does not mean that there is no commonality in women's
experiences, but that experience is also shaped by other factors, including class and
race.
Third, Hartsock's theory tends to demonise men's perspective (eg Hartsock,
1983, p290). Is this helpful in promoting a feminist science? The perversity of the
masculinist epistemology is, according to Hartsock, evident in the emphasis on death
in scientific accounts of reproduction (as opposed to life); an existential fixation with
death; as well as the deadening of women's sense of self in their role as carers. These
are diverse and disputable claims. Is there a such widespread cultural fetish with death
in the West? Surely the fascination with death in western culture can be explained in a
less sensationalist fashion, and different interpretations can be found. Indeed, there
seems to be a different interpretation of women's role as carers available in Hartsock's
theory: one which emphasises the value to be found in women's experience of caring.
How can this be reconciled with the (negative) deadening of women's sense of self?
I argue that these are potentially fatal flaws in feminist standpoint theory,
raising the serious prospect that a science based on a feminist standpoint would be
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unworkable and even counterproductive. This is reinforced on further consideration
of what the practice of science based on a feminist standpoint might look like.
There is little discussion of what methodologies would be adopted in a science
based on a feminist standpoint. Although there is clearly a commitment to better
interpretations of the real world, there is no detailed description of how a standpoint
would be reflected in the methodology adopted. Moreover, whilst the ideas for a
feminist sociology are instructive for the human sciences, there is a lack of similar
ideas for the natural sciences. To what extent would context be explored, and how
would knowledge claims be evaluated? This lack of analysis seriously weakens the
case for a science based on a feminist standpoint.
On the issue of how a feminist science would be organised I have already
argued that following Rose's and Hartsock's theory of a feminist standpoint rooted in
experience, a feminist science based on a feminist standpoint is likely to be separated
from the mainstream. This is backed up by Rose, who argues that feminist science is
being practiced now, by women in the women's health and environmentalist
movements. This type of women's activism takes place in reaction to science. It would
follow from Rose's argument that women in science tend to be alienated from their
caring principles, that there is no feminist science within scientific institutions. How
then do we create a new epistemology of science based on Rose's feminist standpoint,
within scientific institutions? This version of a feminist science is defined by its
position outside of mainstream science, on the margins. As I have argued, for a
significant challenge to science to be mounted by feminists, they must also be
positioned within mainstream scientific institutions.
Feminist standpoint theorists are, however, convinced that a science based on
their principles will not remain on the margins. Their vision is also Utopian. Hartsock
is advocating a society-wide feminist standpoint, following a feminist revolution in
which parenting would be shared. This would have to be achieved before a
mainstream science could be based on a feminist standpoint. I take the view that there
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is a distinct lack of such revolutionary potential. The requirements Hartsock sets as
precursors to a feminist science are difficult to envisage (eg fully equal responsible
parenting) and she offers no programme for their achievement. Just how feminists
would get to the position of influence to engineer such change is difficult to imagine.
There is little potential in 'waiting for the revolution'. This means a replacement
feminist science based on feminist standpoint theory must be viewed as unlikely.
4.3.4 Conclusion
Feminist standpoint theories bring to the feminist analysis of science a concern
to locate knowledge in the social location of the knower, challenging the traditional
view of disembodied, 'objective' knowledge. They also bring an analysis of gender to
the narrow economic concerns of Marxist theory. In so doing they make a significant
contribution to feminist understanding of the nature of knowledge. However, I
conclude that a science based on a feminist standpoint is likely to prove to be
unworkable and marginalised. Most importantly a single achieved position as the basis
for a feminist standpoint is difficult to envision given the differences in women's
experiences.
Moreover, it is unclear what the methodologies adopted in a science based on
a feminist standpoint would be. The implication is that such a science would be
organised outwith mainstream science on the margins. For this reason I argue the
potential for any meaningful challenge to the status quo is limited.
In the next section I move on to consider two theorists who have brought
postmodernism to bear on feminist standpoint theory in an attempt to develop a more
adequate theory of a feminist science.
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4.4 Postmodernist Additions
4.4.1 Postmodernism and Feminism: Critique of the Feminist Standpoint
Postmodernism and feminism have an uneasy relationship. Alliances arise as
theorists in both camps seek to uncover political power within the academy, and resist
generalising about women's experience or the causes of their oppression (Nicholson,
1990; Flax, 1983, 1987, 1990). Deconstruction of modernist dichotomies is also
favoured by feminists and postmodernists - for example, public and private, emotion
and reason - because these dichotomies have played a role in women's oppression
(Nicholson, 1990). On the other hand, postmodernism is viewed with skepticism by
feminists. Some argue that it is dangerously apolitical and relativist (Nicholson, 1990).
What do these debates mean for a feminist science?
Feminist theorists such as Sandra Harding (1986, 1991) and Donna Haraway
(1985, 1988) seek to resolve some of these conflicts between feminism and
postmodernism in offering a new breed of feminist epistemologies of science. Their
starting point is a critique of feminist standpoint theories, where they come to
different conclusions about how best to treat the legacy of modernism.
Harding makes a strong case against the gender blindness of traditional
externalist and internalist histories of science as well as the post-Kuhnian sociology of
science (1986, 1991). She provides a comprehensive review of the feminist critique of
science, including feminist work on 'women worthies', equity, education and
androcentrism in science (1986, 1991). She then argues that the development of
feminist epistemologies of science is the next step in the feminist critique, because
these have so often been overly-accepting of the traditional positivist epistemology of
science. She characterises feminist empiricism as positivist, but is concerned to see
more women in science to 'police' sexist bias. Harding argues that this approach has a
'radical future' given the emphasis placed on women's involvement. She then turns to
feminist standpoint theory which she considers to be more radical, and useful, in the
90
promotion of a feminist science. Note that, despite the apparent linear progression in
feminist ideas, Harding argues that each has a place in developing a feminist science,
and she wishes to see them work simultaneously.
Harding's main argument is for the development of a feminist 'emancipatory
epistemology' of science (Harding, 1986, pi8). She treats epistemology as 'mediation'
on feminist theory and practice, and rejects the privileging of understanding of
feminists' practice of science over the incorporation of wider feminist theory of
knowledge into feminist epistemology of science (Harding, 1986, p 140). Whilst not
aiming for a 'master theory' of science, the goal of a radical reconstruction of science
is central to her analysis (Harding, 1986, pi86). Her definition of epistemology
incorporates wider social issues, asking:
Who can be subjects of socially legitimate knowledge? ... What kinds of tests
must beliefs pass in order to be legitimated as knowledge? ... What kinds of
things can be known? Should all... situated knowledge be regarded as equally
plausible or valid? What is the nature of objectivity? ... What is the appropriate
relationship between the researcher and the research subjects? (Harding, 1991,
pill).
She continues:
As these questions indicate, the grounds for whole classes of knowledge-
claims are at issue in the case of feminist research ... Thus feminist research in
biology and the social sciences raises distinctively epistemological issues - that
challenge the conceptual framework - its moral, political and metaphysical
assumptions - within which the dominant Anglo-American epistemology has
posed its concerns (Harding, 1991, pill).
Harding therefore places epistemology of science (social and natural) centre stage in
her arguments for a feminist science.
Harding accepts Flax's (1987) criticism of feminist standpoint theories,
accepting that there are many partial perspectives, and no one way in which patriarchy
has permeated thinking (Harding, 1986, pl54). Nevertheless, she is concerned to
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achieve 'more true knowledge', which she sees as being at odds with Flax's
postmodernist position (Harding, 1986, pi55). This is the paradox which Harding
seeks to resolve in combining feminist standpoint theory and postmodernism. She
aims to 'reinvent' the dichotomy between men and women, and make it liberatory
instead of oppressive.18 Harding aims to resolve these issues in her treatment of
feminist standpoint, and her concept of strong objectivity, discussed in section 4.4.2.
Haraway comes to the question of a feminist science from a different
perspective. As a trained biologist, who moved into history of science, her main work
has been a critique of gender in the science of primatology (Haraway, 1989). Here she
develops a methodology for the sociology of science which treats science as 'story
telling'. She is informed by a political goal to retell Western origins stories that
rationalise their global economic and cultural domination. Epistemological concerns
are secondary for Haraway, and she is suspicious of a replacement science, arguing
that such a project carries the danger of simply reconfiguring power relations into a
new form of inequality. However Haraway does envision change in science by
developing a political manifesto for knowledge-seeking (Haraway, 1985, 1988),
although she is less explicit about the particulars of this goal. She faces a similar
dilemma to Harding's when she describes feminists as trapped between two poles -
social constructivism and appeals to the 'real' world (feminist empiricism and
standpoint theory):
So, I think my problem and "our" problem is how to have simultaneously an
account of radical historical contingency for all knowledge claims and
knowing subjects, a critical practice for reconstructing our own "semiotic
technologies" for making meanings, and a no-nonsense commitment to faithful
accounts of a "real" world, one that can be partially shared and friendly to
earth-wide projects of finite freedom, adequate material abundance, modest
meaning in suffering, and limited happiness (Haraway, 1988, pi87).
Here Haraway links radicalism with both social constructionism and realism.
18 See Harding's discussion of King et al (1976) for a discussion of a parallel approach
to race (Harding, 1991, pi54).
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In Primate Visions (1989) Haraway considers Japanese primatology (as
described briefly in Chapter 3) and highlights a similar flaw in the concept of a
women's or feminist standpoint to the one Harding raises. She notes that although
Japanese science was more 'holistic' (a supposedly feminist attribute) it was
compatible with masculinism in epistemology and male domination in science.
Haraway argues that any claim to a particular standpoint, based on race or sex,
suppresses difference to achieve unity (in opposition to the dominant race or sex).
Thus, Haraway concludes that feminist arguments for empathy and holism as a
replacement to masculine science involves a fiction which papers over differences in
masculine science; the case of Japanese primatology demonstrates that science can
involve holism and reductionism, as well as alliances between so-called feminist and
masculinist values. Haraway therefore problematises the feminist aim of replacing
masculinist stories with feminist ones.
Haraway's solution to this dilemma is more postmodernist than Harding's, as
we shall see in section 4.4.3. She sees deeper tensions between postmodernism and
feminist standpoint theories. In her 1988 paper she raises three issues. First, she is
uncomfortable about the notion of the ideal vantage point of the subjugated, seeing
the danger of romanticising and even appropriating such a vision. Second, she rejects
the privileging of these forms of knowledge on the grounds that because they are a
function of the complex sociopolitical environment in which we live they cannot be
purely advantageous, and must also have disadvantages. Third, the difficulty in 'seeing
from below' is recognised by Haraway, as is the problem of positioning oneself
simultaneously in all, or wholly in any, of the privileged subjugated positions. In short
Haraway is arguing that there is no single feminist standpoint.
4.4.2 Feminist Standpoint and Strong Objectivity
Harding's solution to the tensions between modernism and postmodernism
involves developing the feminist standpoint theory as a justificatory strategy (1991).
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Her main argument is that science would benefit if scientists (including men)
developed the ability to think from women's lives, the basis for her version of a
feminist standpoint. This requires that women articulate the 'gap they feel between
their experience and the dominant conceptual schemes' (Harding, 1991, p70).
Scientists should start from women's lives,
increasing the objectivity of research by bringing scientific observations and
the perception of the needs for explanation to bear on assumptions and
practices that appear "natural" or unremarkable from the perspectives of the
lives of men in the dominant group ... [this] makes strange what appears
familiar, which is the beginning of any scientific inquiry (Harding, 1991,
pi 50).
Harding identifies five main grounds for a feminist standpoint, relating to differences
in the social position of men and women. Note that she considers these
complementary, not competing. First she adopts Hartsock's and Rose's analysis on the
sexual division of labour (see section 4.3). She also argues that other standpoint
theories are relevant in this context: for example, Ruddick's 'maternal thinking' theory
(Ruddick, 1989); Gilligan's theories on moral reasoning (Gilligan, 1982); and
Belenkey et al's 'women's way of knowing' theory (Belenkey et al, 1986). Harding
makes an important distinction between the experiences, perspectives, and claims of
women and a feminist standpoint:
For a position to count as a standpoint, rather than as a claim - equally
valuable but for different reasons - for the importance of listening to women
tell us about their lives and experiences, we must insist on an objective
location - women's lives - as the place from which feminist research should
begin (Harding, 1991, pi23).
The second set of grounds for a feminist standpoint comes from Patricia Hill Collin's
'outsider within' theory (Collins, 1986). Women are strangers to the oppressors' social
order, and this strangeness is valuable because it acts as a fresh and illuminating
standpoint from which to criticise the dominant conceptual schemes.
Third, women's oppression gives them less interest in ignorance:
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This argument can be put in terms of what women, and especially feminist
women, can come to be willing to say. But it is less confusing if it is put in
terms of what can be seen if we start thinking and researching from the
perspective of the lives of the oppressed (Harding, 1991, pl26).
A fourth, and related, point is that 'women's perspective is from the other side of the
"battle of the sexes'" (Harding, 1991, pl26). This perspective generates less false
knowledge, but can only be achieved through struggle:
This need for struggle is emphasised by the fact that a feminist standpoint is
not something that anyone can have simply by claiming it. It is an
achievement. A standpoint differs in this case from a perspective which one
can have simply by "opening one's eyes" (Harding, 1991, pl27).
This means that not all women will adopt a feminist standpoint, but some feminist
men will.
Harding draws on Dorothy Smith's (1987) theory of a feminist sociology,
where she argues that women's perspective is from everyday life, and women's labour
shapes men's thought processes as it allows men to remain in the abstract realm.
Thinking from women's lives, on the other hand, would mean knowledge grounded in
everyday life. A sixth point draws on both Collins (1986) and Smith (1987) to argue
for a 'line of fault' which develops from women scholar's 'bifurcated consciousness' - a
disjuncture between women scholar's everyday lives, and their role in academia - this
can be a resource for new thinking.
Fifth, Harding argues that this is the right time in history for the development
of a feminist standpoint, drawing parallels between the Marxist conception of the
proletarian standpoint and a feminist standpoint where women and men are sex
classes in the present sex/gender system. Women's economic, political and sexual
gains make this the time to bring about change to a feminist science. Harding
advocates 'democratic, participatory politics' within science, arguing for a diversity of
people and approaches (Harding, 1991, pi24).
95
Harding also responds to two important criticisms of feminist standpoint: that
it is essentialist and excessively foundationalist.
On essentialism Harding argues that there are several strategies for justifying
the notion of a feminist standpoint which do not depend on claims about mothering
(which have been criticised for essentialism). Harding further argues that the feminist
standpoint theorists are not Eurocentric as they are involved in anti-racist activism
alongside women of color. Feminist standpoint theory has been used by to develop a
black women's standpoint - eg by Collins (1986). So standpoint theories can be useful
to many different oppressed groups. Harding's main point is that there are resources
within standpoint theories to combat essentialising tendencies. Most significantly, her
emphasis on bringing critical reflection on how the observer's social location
determines the way they observe into science, allows for an understanding of
difference to be part of the evidence for a particular theory.
Harding's response to the charge that feminist standpoint theory is excessively
foundational or "too epistemological" is also important. She responds to the causal
symmetry argument of the Edinburgh strong programme (Bloor, 1976) by arguing
that one can distinguish between more false and less false knowledge by looking to
the social conditions of the knowledge production. Thus, in the case of feminist
standpoint,
it is the objective perspective from women's lives that gives legitimacy to
feminist knowledge ... this is a reason to get our inquiry processes and
institutions inserted into the kinds of social contexts that have tended to cause
less false rather that more false beliefs (Harding, 1991, pl67).
Elsewhere (1986) Harding has argued that the natural science would be more usefully
conceptualised as part of the social sciences, rather than the other way around. This
would allow the physical sciences to adopt the critical practices of the social sciences
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and therefore improve the quality of the knowledge produced by putting it in context.
This may be part of the institutional changes involved with a feminist science.
Central to this type of inquiry Harding proposes is strong objectivity, which
involves
systematic understanding of powerful background beliefs ... [and] requires
causal analyses of micro processes in the laboratory and macro tendencies in
the social order which shape scientific practice ... [this] permits a robust
notion of reflexivity (1991, pi49)
This does involve cultural, sociological and historical relativism, but not judgmental or
epistemological relativism according to Harding (see 3.3.3 for a discussion of
relativism). The goal is to arrive at less false beliefs rather than any one true position.
It is essential for feminists to remain on Enlightenment ground because of their aim of
social progress (Harding, 1991, pi86).
Furthermore, she notes that this is an,
epistemological metascientific issue rather than one to do with any particular
science ... it is more like a directive to operationalise theoretical concepts than
a directive to operationalise in a certain way some particular theoretical notion
within physics or chemistry (1991, pl56).
Strategies for strong objectivity would therefore have to be developed within each
programme, although Harding argues that plenty already exist in biology and in social
science.
In her defence of postmodernist aspects of her theory, Harding makes a
distinction between 'postmodernism and Postmodernism', arguing that the critical
tendencies in the former are of use to feminism, but that the set of claims and
practices of the latter can be criticised for being epistemologically relativist. Feminists
must develop a 'robust and principled ambivalence' to postmodernism (Harding, 1991,
pi86). At the core is a commitment to understanding how knowledge is socially
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located and identifying ways in which less false knowledge claims can be distinguished
from more false claims.
Now I consider Haraway's contributions to feminist science theories.
4.4.3 Cyborgs and Situated Knowledge
In a paper entitled, 'A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and
Socialist Feminism in the 1980s' (1985), Haraway develops the metaphor of the
cyborg to make proposals which concern a feminist science. The cyborg is a hybrid
between machine and human; humans, it is claimed, have become cyborgs in this high
technology age of informatics, communications, robotics and new reproductive
technologies. Haraway argues this can be used as an 'imaginative resource' to develop
a political identity which defies boundaries between animal and humans, organism and
machine, physical and non-physical. It contributes to a politics of fusion and unity
based on coalitions, not on any essential shared identity. The importance of
recognising partial and distinct perspectives is stressed, but not without noting the
importance of the search for shared perspectives. An example might be the shared
oppositional consciousness of 'women of colour'.
Haraway develops these ideas in relation to science in a later paper. She
describes feminists' dilemma in the following way:
In our efforts to climb the greased pole leading to a usable doctrine of
objectivity I and most other feminists in the objectivity debate have
alternatively, or even simultaneously, held on to both ends of the dichotomy,
which Harding describes in terms of successor science projects versus
postmodernist accounts of difference and I have sketched ... as radical
reconstructivism versus feminist critical empiricism. It is, of course, hard to
hold on to both ends of a pole, simultaneously or alternatively. It is, therefore,
time to switch metaphors (Haraway, 1988, pi88).
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Haraway's preferred metaphor in this 1988 paper is vision, which she uses to develop
her concept of situated knowledge. This is where partial perspectives are subjected to
critical reflection:
Feminist objectivity is about limited location and situated knowledge, not
about transcending and splitting of subject and object. In this way we might
become answerable for what we learn how to see (Haraway, 1988, pl90).
Individuals share their vision by the 'loving care people might take to learn how to see
faithfully from another's point of view' (Haraway, 1988, pl90). Furthermore, 'webs of
connections called solidarities in politics and shared conversations in epistemology'
(Haraway, 1988, pl91) are formed. This helps us to become more aware of ourselves:
The split and contradictory self is the one who can interrogate positionings
and be accountable, the one who can construct and join rational conversations
and fantastic imaginings that change history. Splitting, not being, is the
privileged image for feminist epistemologies of scientific knowledge. 'Splitting'
in this context should be about heterogeneous multiplicities that are
simultaneously necessary and incapable of being squashed into isomorphic
slots or cumulative lists ... The knowing self is partial in all its guises, never
finished, whole, simply there and original; it is always constructed and stitched
together imperfectly, and therefore able to join with another, to see together
without claiming to be another. Here is the promise of objectivity: a scientific
knower seeks the subject position not of identity, but of objectivity, that is
partial connection (Haraway, 1988, pl92-3).
Haraway therefore argues that:
a splitting of senses, a confusion of voice and sight, rather than clear and
distinct ideas, becomes the metaphor for the ground of the rational (Haraway,
1988, pl96).
She therefore directly challenges the privileging of traditional notions of rationality.
Another important feature of Haraway's analysis is her insistence on treating
objects as actors, like Latour, rejecting their treatment as passive and inert. This
granting of agency includes the body. This ties into Haraway's self confessed
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nervousness about the sex/gender distinction which she argues is part of an
'appropriationist logic of domination' (Haraway, 1988, p 189) where sex becomes a
resource for its 're-presentation as gender' (ibid). The alternative is situated
knowledge:
Situated knowledge requires that the objects of knowledge be pictured as an
actor and agent, not a screen or a ground or a resource, never finally as slave
to the master that closes off the dialectic in his unique agency and authorship
of 'objective' knowledge. The point is paradigmatically clear in critical
approaches to the social and human sciences, where the agency of people
studied itself transforms the entire project of producing social theory. Instead,
coming to terms with the agency of the 'objects' studied is the only way to
avoid gross error and false knowledge of many kinds in these sciences
(Haraway, 1988, pl98).
Haraway treats the world as an 'active entity' (ibid), and argues that 'no particular
doctrine of representation or decoding or discovery guarantees anything' (Haraway,
1988, pl90). Examples of this type of approach in feminism include ecofeminism,
with its concern to represent the world as active and not a resource; and feminist
biologists' reconstruction of the body:
Difference is theorised biologically as situational, not intrinsic, at every level
from gene to foraging pattern, thereby fundamentally changing the biological
politics of the body (Haraway, 1988, p200).
In this way nature is characterised as a 'coding trickster with whom we must learn to
converse' (Haraway, 1988, p201).
Haraway disrupts the traditional boundaries between rationality and
irrationality; objects and subjects; sex and gender, to argue for a science based on




My starting point in this section is a consideration of the implications of
Harding's and Haraway's theories for the feminist scientist. I then consider issues of
methodology, organisation and the relationship between science and society.
Harding's goal of bringing an understanding of women's lives, and women's
voice, into science is extremely important. She is right to raise postmodernist
criticisms of standpoint theory whilst retaining the goal of better knowledge.
However, I do not feel that she has resolved these tensions: in my view feminist
standpoint theory remains problematic. The most pressing problem is the difficulty in
translating Harding's so called 'emancipatory epistemology' into practice. This brings
into question the fundamental premise of Harding's work: if epistemology cannot be
translated into practice how can it be liberatory? I now explore each of the
contradictions in turn.19
First, I would argue that Harding's mixture of theories regarding differences in
women's and men's social positions raises problematic contradictions. The distinction
Harding makes between experience/perspective and standpoint is unclear. Indeed, at
times she even uses the terms interchangeably. An example to illustrate this problem is
her adoption of the concept of bifurcated consciousness: the 'line of fault' for women
scholars, particularly feminists, which generates more true knowledge than that based
on a unitary consciousness. What makes this standpoint different from a perspective
based on experience? Although Harding argues a standpoint is related to experience
the relationship is unclear. How does one move from having particular experiences or
perspectives to a standpoint based on the objective location of women's lives?
19 Whilst Harding argues that contradictions should be viewed as positive (1991) I
am not convinced that this is always the case, or a robust enough defence of her
approach. The contradictions therefore require further examination before their
implications can be fully assessed.
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Harding's theory involves the problems associated with each of the theories
from which it is drawn. Her use of object-relations theory/maternal thinking is
especially troublesome to me and I find her defence against accusations of
essentialism inadequate.20 Eurocentrism in standpoint theories based on object-
relations is not avoided because individual feminist scholars are involved in anti-racist
activism. The fundamental problem with psychoanalytic theories is their false
universalism. based on inadequate grounding in an understanding of the experiences
of men and women (which, of course, depend on class and race), in particular their
psychic-essentialism. This type of understanding does not come automatically from
participation in activism, but requires the aim of linking activism and theory, what
Connell has called strategic theorising (Connell, 1983).
Harding's mixture of different feminist theories does not produce a coherent
theory. On the one hand her use of object-relations and 'maternal thinking' feminist
theories, amongst others, implies that a feminist standpoint is rooted in experience,
both biological and social. On the other hand, Harding is making an unclear
distinction between experience and standpoint. Instead, much of her theory implies
that standpoint and experience are closely related. Following on from this, the same
criticism of certain psycho-analytical feminist theories for false universalism can be
made of feminist standpoint theories. Women do not have one standpoint/experience
but many. This prevents the adoption of one single feminist standpoint by feminist
scientists, but leads to different feminist standpoints, depending on experience. (Once
more this does not negate any commonality in women's standpoints, just introduces
important differences).
My criticism leads me to conclude that a feminist standpoint is a problematic
theoretical stance, and is difficult to translate into the practice of a feminist science.
This does not, however, negate Harding's entire contribution to feminist theory of
science. The concept of strong objectivity remains. Indeed, I would suggest that
20 Cowan is equally unconvinced by Harding's solution to essentialism. See Cowan
(1995).
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Harding does not need to provide a theory of one feminist standpoint in order to fulfill
her commitment to an epistemology which seeks to identify more true knowledge. For
this reason I now consider the meaning of strong objectivity in practice.
On methodology, like Bleier, Harding makes a convincing argument that
science should be more reflexive, and should take the context of scientific knowledge
claims more seriously. Her concept of strong objectivity is, in this sense, laudable.
But, how would strong objectivity be put into practice? The key to this theory is the
possibility of distinguishing between more and less true knowledge based on its social
location. This, in turn, depends upon a systematic understanding of micro and macro
factors shaping the knowledge. However, social scientists' grasp of the way the social
and the natural are reflected in scientific knowledge does not involve distinguishing
between the social and the natural, as illustrated in the concept of the 'seamless web'
in sociology of technology (see Hughes, 1983). Relativism remains a problem for
social scientists seeking to understand knowledge claims in science. Harding argues
for separating cultural, historical and sociological relativism from judgmental
relativism. However, as we have seen in Chapter 3, this is often difficult. The natural
is always seen through social lenses.
My third criticism concerns the organisation of science. With a methodology
based on strong objectivity in natural science, would the scientists be judging between
competing knowledge claims, or would social scientists take a more involved role? If
the traditions of peer review by scientists is followed they would need to be trained to
take a sociological approach to knowledge claims, to justify their particular
interpretation. If social scientists are to become involved to judge scientists' claims
reorganisation of scientific disciplines is required.
Harding has argued that there are important structural issues relevant to
epistemology, which would require changes in science at the institutional level, eg
natural sciences as a subdiscipline of social sciences. However she fails to discuss how
social sciences should be the paradigm of scientific inquiry (as opposed to physical
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sciences). She even goes so far as to argue that she does not wish to offer directives
about how to operationalise strong objectivity in the different disciplines of science.
Arguably suggesting an agenda for strong objectivity in practice is a difficult task,
which Harding is right to be cautious over. Nonetheless, her failure to think critically
about what strong objectivity might mean in practice, fundamentally weakens her
theory.21
Fourth and finally, Harding's is a Utopian vision of change. Her emphasis on
the emancipatory potential of epistemology implies that feminist change will come
from inside science and graduate outwards, affecting society. It also implies that there
must be a change in theory (epistemology) before a change in the practice of science.
I disagree with both these features of Harding's argument. It seems unlikely to me that
widespread societal change will result from a change in science. Surely science is also
a product of society, so change in science requires some level of societal change?
Note that this does not mean I simply advocate waiting for changes in society to
change science, a position which I criticised in section 4.3.3, but am arguing that the
opposite extreme from this approach - waiting for science to change society - is
equally problematic. Instead I suggest that a more flexible approach to change, from
both within and outwith science, is likely to be more realistic and more effective.
Similarly, as epistemology and theory are products of social practice, change in
epistemology requires change in the practice of science and vice versa. The two way
relationship between science and society; theory and practice requires exploration.
This is an important theme in this thesis, and will be considered further in more detail
in Part 3.
21
For example, Harding's argument about strong objectivity in biological science
because of its more local level of research does not follow, given the international
level of much of biological research, as is the case with the Human Genome Project
(see Rose, 1994). Cowan also criticises Harding for failing to think about the 'nitty
gritty' of her epistemological claims in terms of the practice of science - Cowan
(1995).
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I now consider what Haraway's version of a feminist science might mean in
practice.
First, Haraway's feminist scientist does not need to subscribe to one particular
feminist politics or adopt one feminist standpoint. This avoids the flaws of false
universalism identified earlier. However, her use of the postmodernist concept of
coalition politics, to replace identity politics, has its problems in terms of political
strategy. The main one is the danger of coalitions leading to single-issue politics.
Obviously coalitions are fluid and change over time. Does this involve the break-down
of a coherent political movement? Factionalisation within the feminist movement has
certainly seemed, in recent years, to lead to single-issue politics, and no sense of unity
around a core set of issues. Surely a strong and influential feminist science requires
some form of unity, or it will disintegrate?
This brings me onto my second point: if situated knowledge were to be
adopted as a methodology within science it could lead to a lack of consistency in
judgment of knowledge claims. With all the splitting and confusion of voices Haraway
calls for, do we end up with a cacophony; do we lose coherent theories in science?
Harding's call for 'less false beliefs' is relevant here. This implies some sort of shared
value system in science around which scientific claims are judged. When these values
rest upon a call for difference what criteria can usefully be applied? Although
Haraway is rejecting relativism in theory I am unsure about whether there would
really be a corresponding rejection in practice if her theory is implemented.
The implications of situated knowledge for scientific methodology are difficult
to conceptualise, particularly in terms of the experimental or physical sciences.
Haraway argues that objects should be treated as actors. This is easy to see in the
social sciences, and in observational biology. However, experimental science does not
involve a passive observational approach, but an active manipulation of the objects of
study (see Rose, 1994 for a discussion of the differences). How do we give a (dead)
rat's liver, or an electron, agency? Would Haraway's feminist science involve the
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abandonment of animal experimentation, or even all experimentation, in favour of a
less interventionist, more deductive science?
The other issue is how do scientists examine the context of understanding in
the 'harder' sciences, eg chemical interactions? Perhaps gender symbolism is deep
rooted and difficult to uncover, perhaps it not as relevant in all the physical sciences
as the human sciences. It is difficult to imagine what it means to think from other's
perspectives around highly theoretical physical sciences, which have little obvious
practical relevance. Or maybe a feminist science would not involve such theoretical
'pure' science, focusing more on applied science. All of these factors are unclear in
Haraway's work.
Third, how should a feminist science based on situated knowledge be
organised? As Longino and Hammonds point out (1990, p211), Haraway argues that
the recognition of partiality involves 'the historical location of discourse, tools and
"subjects'" (Haraway, 1988, p589). Longino and Hamnmonds continue:
Subjects come into being in social fields of meaning, and discourses are
themselves social. Partiality in this sense involves the potential of connection
with other discourses to generate other partial and mutable systems of
understanding ... It is not the individual recognition of partiality ... but the
subjection of hypotheses and theories to multivocal criticism that makes
objectivity possible ... reflexivity is community-wide and the openness of
partial knowledge facilitates transformation (Longino and Hammonds, 1990,
p212-3).
Longino's reading of situated knowledge at the institutional level, concerns critical
interaction amongst scientists. (Note that I would still argue, as previously, that this
requires some form of situated knowledge at the individual level: as Haraway's split
and contradictory self implies.) However it is unclear how this would be developed in
science. How do people develop such a style? Does this require scientific training, or
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more fundamental changes, in parenting practices, for example (if we accept object-
relations theory)?22
Finally, it is unclear what the relationship would be between Haraway's
feminist science and society. Important questions raised earlier, concerning the
viability of a feminist science without a feminist society and the involvement of the
wider public in science are not addressed. I am unable to find any implicit assumptions
in Haraway's work which might help in answering these questions.
4.4.5 Conclusion
Following this first level theoretical analysis I conclude that neither Harding's
or Haraway's feminist epistemologies translate well into practice. Harding's criteria for
a feminist scientist are likely to be unworkable. I argue that her adaptation of the
notion of a feminist standpoint does not overcome the problems identified in section
4.3.4: difficulty with the notion of one feminist standpoint; and the way different
standpoints are rooted in different experiences. Women may share common
experiences and perspectives on certain issues, but, in other areas their experiences
and perspectives are bound to be different. This implies a feminist science cannot be
based on a single feminist standpoint. In contrast, Haraway's feminist science, based
on fractured identities, may be unworkable precisely because of her emphasis on
difference. The danger is that in a science based on fractured identities, consensus will
be impossibly compromised and feminist scientists will be unable to work as a
coherent group.
This relates to the problems I raised concerning methodology. Harding's
'strong objectivity' and Haraway's 'situated knowledge' both seek to find a
compromise between objectivism and relativism. However their solutions are not
22 This is drawn from an earlier discussion of Hartsock (1983) whose emphasis on
object-relations theory in relation to scientific knowledge led to her call for a
revolutionary change in parenting structures, in a move towards a feminist science.
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unproblematic. The danger in emphasising different perspectives (ie relativism) is the
threat to coherent grounds of knowledge claims. Moreover, both raise the issue of
deconstructing the basis for knowledge claims without explaining the mechanisms.
How would scientists analyse the 'seamless web' of science and their position therein?
What are the mechanisms for treating objects as actors in practice, particularly in the
hard sciences?
Organisational changes necessary to achieve Harding's and Haraway's feminist
science are also unclear. What changes would be required to generate multivocal
criticism of scientific theories, and how would social scientists and natural scientists
interact?
Finally the relationship between science and society is ambiguous. Harding
seems to be arguing that changes in science would change society, but a one way
relationship is unlikely since science is a product of society.
These are important issues in developing a practical framework for a feminist
science and will be examined further in my empirical research and analysis.
4.5 Feminist Empiricist Science
4.5.1 Feminism and Empiricism
Empiricism tends to be viewed with skepticism by the feminist theorists of
science detailed in sections 4.3 and 4.4. For many it is seen as part of a masculinist
epistemology, and inevitably bound up with the positivist deceit of value-free
knowledge. In contrast, Nelson and Longino both argue that empiricism has more to
offer a feminist science than we might think. In this sense they share the view of
feminist critics such as Fausto-Sterling and Fee, who seek a compromise between
orthodoxy and radicalism. I therefore return to consider what empiricism means for a
feminist science in more depth, focusing on the work of Nelson and Longino.
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Longino criticises the popular feminist rejection of empiricism, arguing that
Harding's version of feminist empiricism is a 'straw woman' (Longino, 1988). She
argues that feminist empiricists do not claim that women or feminists are more likely
to produce unbiased results, and are far from content with existing methodologies in
science (eg the review of Anne Fausto-Sterling's position in section 4.1.1). Instead
their empiricism is based on a commitment to critical evaluation of knowledge claims
based on the available evidence.
Nelson also argues that contemporary empiricism is different from the
caricature, based on traditional logical positivist empiricism:
Empiricism, which is at bottom a theory of evidence, is one way of
understanding [scientific accounts]. And as a theory of evidence empiricism is
far from bankrupt (Nelson, 1990, p6).
Both Nelson and Longino are critical of feminist epistemology of science, especially
feminist standpoint theories. They aim to provide a new theory of a feminist science,
based on the practice of science instead of the product - scientific knowledge.
Longino notes that this approach emphasises the practical, active character of
scientific inquiry, and hence the way in which science is social (Longino, 1989, pi8).
It involves asking questions about the goals and criteria of scientific inquiry, for
example, and resists the treatment of scientific knowledge as somehow disembodied
from, and uninfluenced by, social practices. Longino argues:
By focusing on science as practice rather than content, as process rather than
product, we can reach the idea of doing a feminist science through that of
doing science as a feminist (Longino, 1989, p 188).
I now consider the approach taken by Nelson and Longino in more depth.
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4.5.2 Feminist Empiricist Science
Nelson and Longino argue that for feminist empiricism to be successful the
traditional epistemological framework must be updated with an understanding of how
science is socially constructed. Both reject what Longino calls, 'epistemological
reductionism' (Longino, 1989, p226). The basic epistemological unit should be the
community of knowers, not individual knowers. They emphasise the social location of
knowledge producers, and its influence on the knowledge they produce. Nelson draws
on Jagger (1983) to argue:
Even "ascribing" these perspectives [feminist and androcentric] to individuals
abstracted from social and political context is at best artificial, if indeed, we
could make sense of "selves" so abstracted. In any event ascription would be
unhelpful. We cannot reasonably credit any individual with the assumptions,
research questions, or methodologies we have been considering - feminist or
androcentric. Androcentric assumptions, no less than feminist assumptions,
incorporate and build from social experiences, from public ways of
conceptualising sex/gender, from experiences of sex/gender, and other
political experiences, and from the practices from which such
conceptualisations cannot be separated. Nor am I suggesting that there is "a"
feminist perspective or "an" androcentric perspective at issue; each kind of
perspective can be discerned in a variety of assumptions and views (Nelson,
1990, p267).
She continues that these perspectives are relative to groups or subcommunities within
the larger society. Their acceptability is limited to the subcommunity.
In the case of a feminist science community, Nelson continues, scientists and
philosophers should be involved. Empiricism, it is argued, is the key to bridging the
traditional gap between these groups. Scientists must be brought into the dialogue as,
the point of feminist science criticism, must, in the end, be to change science,
and changing science requires changing the practice of scientists ... Science as
currently practiced is too entrenched, too pervasive and too successful to be
simply abandoned (Nelson, 1990, p6).
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Nelson highlights the importance of reflecting on the role, aims and effectiveness of
science in today's society, when thinking about the meaning of a feminist science. As
previously noted in section 4.2.1, feminists could turn the function of science as
producer of ideology to their advantage, or may instead choose to expose the
ideological role of science in order to defy it. The commitment to understanding
nature is also valued by feminist scientists. Many reject the concept of 'throwing the
baby out with the bath water' when thinking about a feminist science. Instead they
favour utilising some of the methods and practices of existing science. This has
parallels in Longino's recognition of the need to change science from within.
Both Longino and Nelson argue that feminist scientists need not base then-
science on a feminist standpoint. For Longino standpoint theory is a circular argument
(and therefore flawed):
Both forms of standpoint theory [Marxist and feminist] share the same
weakness. Since neither wage labourers nor women share a common
perspective, it becomes necessary to identify a subclass within each of those
groups whose perspective does form an appropriate standpoint. However, the
theory one is attempting to vindicate by a standpoint methodology is required
to identify this subclass, thus making the procedure circular (Longino, 1989,
pi 1-12).
Later, Longino continues her criticism:
women are too diverse in our experiences to generate a single cognitive
framework ... In addition, the sciences are themselves too diverse for me to
think that they might be equally transformed by such a framework (Longino,
1989, pl88).
The evaluation of knowledge in feminist standpoint theory, in terms of the extent of
its grounding in women's social position, ie outside of science, is also rejected by
Nelson. Instead she argues, along with Longino, that the justificatory grounds for
knowledge should be located inside the conceptual scheme of science (Nelson, 1990,
p8-9). The argument promoted by standpoint theory, that only feminists or women
can know certain things, is rejected by Nelson, on the grounds of lack of evidence.
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She focuses on the gap between the understanding of feminists and scientists, which
feminist standpoint theorists seek to explain by appealing to an inevitable
epistemological chasm. This chasm, according to Nelson, is neither inevitable or
unbridgeable.
Moreover, Longino rejects the conflation of feminist with feminine (also
discussed by Keller). She argues that the feminist focus on the content (rather than the
practice) of science leads them to argue that feminist science theories might encode a
particular (feminine) world view, or that women have certain traits that should be
incorporated into science, eg a focus on complexity (cf Rose, 1983; Bleier, 1986).
Longino argues that this alienates women scientists because it is seen as 'new clothing
for the old idea that women can't do science' (Longino, 1989, pi88). In any case,
feminists should recognise that, 'women are constructed to occupy positions of social
subordination ... we should not uncritically embrace the feminine' (Longino, 1989,
p 188).
Longino's and Nelson's rejection of feminist standpoint theory does not lead
to their adoption of relativism. Indeed, the rejection of relativism is the second
important point about feminist empiricism, which stresses critical evaluation which
leads to knowledge being constrained by evidence:
this view of experience and the constraints it places on justifiable beliefs leads
to a minimalist form of realism. There is a world independent of our senses
with which those senses interact to produce our sensations and the regularities
of our experience. There is "something out there" that imposes limits on what
we can say about it. Once we have decided on a system for measuring
movement, the speed of an object is not arbitrary. The sort of things we
measure, however, will change as our needs, interests and understanding
change. The processes that occur in the world will continue regardless of
changes in our descriptive systems. Indeed it is that very constancy that
enables us to develop a descriptive system at all (Longino, 1989, p222).
This position, that nature is 'out there' and that we can only, at best, approximate its
make-up, is common to all of the feminist epistemologies reviewed in this chapter.
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Feminist critics and many of those in the radical science movement and sociology of
science share this position. However, Longino places greater emphasis on solving the
issue of judgmental relativism. She claims that judgmental relativism can be avoided,
ie it is possible to distinguish between better and worse beliefs and values in science.
Note that Longino and Nelson agree on this point, but differ on how to evaluate
values and beliefs.
Longino advocates 'contextual empiricism', ie starting from the position of
contextual, value-laden research. This means deliberately bringing feminist views into
science so that a feminist science is doing science as a feminist. Longino uses the
example of research in the biology of behaviour, contrasting a linear model of
hormonal determined behaviour with a more complex model which focuses on the
interaction of physiological and environmental factors in shaping behaviour (drawing
on her earlier work, Longino and Doell, 1983). This view of behaviour includes the
potential for self-modification. She argues that commitment to one or other of these
two models is strongly influenced by beliefs and values. The second model is more
acceptable to feminists because of their emphasis on women's subjective experience
and their potential for change:
feminism is about the expansion of human potentiality. When feminists talk of
breaking out and do break out of socially prescribed sex roles, when feminists
criticise the institutions of domination, we are thereby insisting on the
capacities of humans ... to act on perceptions of self and society and to act to
bring about change in self and society on the basis of these perceptions ... And
so our criticism of theories of the hormonal influence or determination of so-
called gender role behaviour is not just a rejection of the sexist bias in the
description of the phenomena ... but of the limitation on human capacity
imposed by the explanatory model underlying such research (Longino, 1989,
pl90).
Longino suggests that feminists should allow their political commitments to guide
their choice of particular models in science, not simply aim to uncover sexist bias.
Crucially, she appears to reject any form of 'letting the material speak' (as in the case
of Barbara McClintock):
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[we] should not wait for such a framework to emerge from the data ... Instead
of remaining passive to the data and what the data suggests we can therefore
acknowledge our ability to affect the course of knowledge and fashion or
favour research programs that are consistent with the values and commitments
we express in the rest of our lives (Longino, 1989, pl91).
Moreover, to remain passive to the data also allows for the prevailing gender ideology
to shape interpretation covertly.
Nelson, on the other hand, argues that knowledge and beliefs should be
subject to empirical evaluation, ie scientists can evaluate the distortion of their picture
of 'nature' via empirical methodologies. This is developed from Quine's argument
(1960) that scientific knowledge cannot be isolated from common-sense knowledge;
the two are fundamentally interdependent. Common-sense theories are part of the
evidence for science theories, and as such, must be subject to empirical control. For
example, there is evidence that male domination is neither universal or natural which
can be marshalled to challenge the implicit assumption of male domination in much
scientific theorising. This means that Nelson rejects Longino's position, outlined
above, arguing that she is wrong to evaluate beliefs on the basis of their social
usefulness, but should evaluate them on the basis of empirical evidence.
Nelson's 'naturalised epistemology' aims to 'explain the "how" of successful
theorising' (Nelson, 1990, p292) and involves a type of critical self reflection on one's
social identity - on the social, sex/gendered, racial, class, and political experiences and
beliefs that one has as a member of a community.
Despite this difference, both theorists agree that feminist science involves
doing science as a feminist and both share the major goals of empiricism. Moreover,
both argue feminist science should be continuous with existing practice:
the development of "new" science involves a more dialectical evolution and
more continuity with established science than the feminist language of
scientific revolutions implies ... in particular, only frameworks that make
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possible ordered interactions with a particular scientific subject matter will
ever get serious attention (Longino, 1989, p 193).
Note here the commitment to an organised step-by-step scientific method.
Nelson and Longino have different views on how science is organised which
lead to different views on the organisation of a feminist science. Nelson argues against
Harding's separation of physics from the other sciences, on the grounds that physics
shares meanings with other theories and disciplines. She continues:
thus it is possible, however unlikely it seems now, that changes in other of our
theories will reverberate with sufficient resonance through the network of our
going theories, to carry with them a need for a different logic, a different
mathematics, or a different physics (Nelson, 1990, p252).
Nevertheless some sciences, eg mathematics, are more 'insulated' from values. This is:
due to the fact that they do not face sensory experiences directly, but do so
indirectly "via" more "low-level" theories. Their insulation is also due to their
deep connection with the bulk of our other going theories. And in general
scientific theories are more well insulated than common sense theories because
they represent higher theoretical ground - that is, they systemise common-
sense theorising (Nelson, 1990, p246).
Longino rejects this unity of science and favours theoretical pluralism, arguing
feminists should:
think through a particular field and try to understand just what its unstated and
fundamental assumptions are and how they influence the course of inquiry.
Knowing something of the history of this field is necessary, as is continued
conversation with feminists. The feminist intervention will be local, that is
specific to a particular area of research ... The accretion of such interventions
of science done by feminists ... and by members of other disenfranchised
groups, has the potential, nevertheless, ultimately to transform the character of
scientific discourse (Longino, 1989, pl93-194).
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Both Longino and Nelson consider feminist critiques of biological sciences as the
most appropriate focus for a feminist science at this stage, following from the large
amount of feminist work in this area.
Regarding the relationship between science and society, Nelson argues that,
because science communities cannot be separated from the wider community, it is
futile to think in terms of 'science of the future' or a 'successor science':
If knowledge is of a piece, if it is the property of communities, and if special
science communities are inextricably related to and embedded in the practices
and beliefs of the larger society and political context, there will be no feminist
society without feminist science. Feminist society and feminist science will
evolve apiece, if at all (Nelson, 1990, pi5).
Longino makes a similar argument when she argues that an oppositional science only
becomes a successor science with changes in societies' values.
In the next section I will consider in more depth what Longino's and Nelson's
theories of a feminist science mean for the practice of science.
4.5.3 Practice
Feminist empiricism takes the practice of science as its starting point. Both
Longino and Nelson focus explicidy on scientific practice as opposed to scientific
knowledge, and make the most detailed practical suggestions so far about how a
feminist empiricist science might operate. Their emphasis on communicating with
scientists is equally important. In many ways Longino and Nelson have succeeded in
developing a practical framework for a feminist empiricism which avoids many of the
problems of feminist standpoint theories and their postmodern hybrids. Their emphasis
on a feminist science evolving from orthodox science, and in connection with changes
in the wider society, is particularly pragmatic and so seems to avoid the utopianism of
other positions.
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Nevertheless I see three main points of contention within feminist empiricism
which I explore further here. First I consider the status of the feminist scientist in the
scientific community. Second, the controversy over evaluation of knowledge claims
requires further examination. Should feminist scientists evaluate values embedded in
scientific theories according to their acceptability in terms of the feminist
communities' views, or should theories be subject to empirical testing? This addresses
the earlier claim made by both Longino and Nelson regarding their transcendence of
the dichotomy between objectivism and relativism. Third, I consider the disagreement
between Longino and Nelson over theoretical pluralism or a commonality in scientific
theories, which has implications for how a feminist science should be organised. The
relationship between scientific subcommunities is the issue here, as is the extent of
'insulation' of different types of science.
Longino and Nelson are both clear that the epistemological unit should be the
community of scientists, not the individual. I support their emphasis on the community
and social location of individuals, given the way in which 'knowing' is a social
process. However the role of the individual in the community is unclear. Individuals
hold certain beliefs (which are shaped by the community), and espouse these views via
points of reference and language acceptable in their community. Individuals are also
capable of questioning and reconfiguring so-called 'community values' - feminist
scientists have questioned the mainstream scientific community. Therefore, I would
argue, there is at least some role for individual agency within a feminist science. This
ties in with Nelson's point that there is no one feminist or one androcentric
perspective, but a multitude. These are variations on a community theme, which can
be ascribed to the individual. The relationship between the individual and the
community in moving towards a feminist science therefore requires further
consideration. It is important to understand how women come to join and remain
within a feminist community of scientists.
The second, and perhaps most difficult, issue concerns the evaluation of
knowledge claims with empirical techniques. Neither Nelson and Longino succeeds in
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confounding the alleged false dichotomy between objectivism and relativism. The
tension is clearly between evaluating beliefs and values based on evidence or making a
choice based on political commitment. Can all beliefs be evaluated on the basis of
evidence? One problem is that the way in which evidence in selected, and combined,
depends on one's implicit political and social commitments. Another problem is
uncertainty: what one, at any one time, cannot know. As Longino in common with
much of the sociology of science, in particular SSK, argues, to a large degree
scientists find what they are looking for when they do science, since observation is
theory laden. Even a type of science which sought to combine all the available
evidence would be manifesting particular (political) values of eclecticism and fairness.
On the other hand, shouldn't scientists at least try to evaluate evidence based
on empirical testing? I am uncomfortable with selecting 'feminist' values and
deliberately embedding them in scientific knowledge. How does it get decided what
values we embed in which science? In any particular subcommunity will there be
consensus, or a variety of different science theories? If there is a variety will the
subcommunities split, will science become atomised and incoherent? This relates to
the first point which questions the extent of autonomy of individuals within
communities.
The tension between objectivism and relativism remains. Longino also notes,
in a point that is pertinent whether one advocates empirical evaluation or not, that it is
difficult for scientists to 'see' values and beliefs in science, especially when they are
comfortably a member of a particular community. She suggests scientists join together
in examining and criticising science, using history and sociology, as do Keller and
Harding. However, the mechanisms for promoting and learning such critical
techniques in science are not discussed. As is the case with Harding's feminist science,
the organisational changes required to support changes in methodology are not fully
developed in Longino's theory of a feminist science.
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Third, although there are obvious common links that all science shares in
terms of ideology and practice, to qualify as a disciplinary subcommunity, a definitive
topic or practice which is distinct from the wider community must be evident. To
what extent to these definitive topics or practices make the knowledge produced
substantively different? This has implications for the promotion of a feminist science.
If certain sciences are more autonomous than others then change will be difficult to
achieve through 'chain reaction'. There may be certain groups of scientific sub-
communities where change might reverberate and others where it might not.
4.5.4 Conclusion
I argue that feminist empiricism is the most practical of the feminist science
theories. The emphasis on practice, evolution, community, and values in science is
refreshingly pragmatic. Nevertheless, whilst these theorists are 'closest' to feminist and
women scientists, and aim to communicate with them directly, they still come from a
philosophical background. Several tensions remain for putting a feminist science into
practice: the role of the individual in the community; the relationship between
different scientific subdisciplines and the potential for feminist science 'snowballing'
through the disciplines; and finally, the mechanisms and criteria for evaluating values
and beliefs that are part of the evidence in science.
4.6 Conclusion
The importance of theorising about a feminist science cannot be
overemphasised. Feminists have long recognised the importance of providing an
alternative vision of science in tandem with criticising the links between gender and
orthodox science. They have made significant contributions to theory and
epistemology. Standpoint theorists introduced gender into the Marxist equation of
knowledge and social location. The postmodern critique introduces a recognition of
difference in women's experiences and perspectives whilst retaining the goal of 'more
true' knowledge. The third area of feminist empiricism follows in this tradition, in
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addition to recognising the need to think in terms of practical changes that can be
made in moving towards a feminist science.
Nevertheless, in thinking about how a feminist science might be practiced I
raised four main questions which, I argue, are not fully answered in the feminist
epistemologies: who are the feminist scientists?; what is the methodology employed in
a feminist science?; how is a feminist science to be organised?; and what is the
relationship between change in science and change in society?
The tension between individual and community is the main theme, in my
exploration of the status of feminist scientists. In relation to a feminist standpoint I
asked to what extent is a standpoint achieved or rooted in experience, and, to what
extent do women's experiences differ? This is also raised when considering situated
knowledge and feminist empiricism: how much commonality do feminist scientists
have, and how might this impact on their science?
The methodological questions raised in this chapter concern another
fundamental tension in social science: between objectivism and relativism. To what
extent can scientific knowledge be evaluated in relation to the standard of empirical
evidence, ie 'closeness' to nature, or should political commitments be the criteria for
evaluation? This relates to the above point: if political commitments are to be the
criteria how coherent are they amongst the feminist community? Moreover, what is
the potential for the development of systematic understanding of the way in which
both micro and macro level political values shape scientific knowledge?
Both of these issues are closely tied to the organisation of science. I argue that
insufficient consideration of organisational change is a fundamental weakness in the
theories about a feminist science. I have previously argued that any realistic feminist
science must develop from within science, in tandem with change in the wider society.
This view is also expounded by feminist empiricists. Nevertheless it is unclear what
the relationship between the social and the natural sciences would be in a feminist
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science? How would feminist scientists be trained? And, to what extent is there
commonality between various scientific disciplines which allows for the 'reverberation
of feminist change'? This last point is related to the extent of shared methodologies
and common topics.
Finally, how would the public be involved in a feminist science, and what is the
link between feminising science and feminising society?
In Chapter 5 I outline how I intend to explore these questions empirically, in
order to suggest a 'best version' of a feminist science. As I stated in Chapter 1, my
measures of 'best' are based on my commitment to a workable version of a feminist
science which can be promoted from within the existing scientific institutions, that is
one which links theory and practice. At the same time, practicality must not be at the
expense of radicalism. The questions that remain concern the 'best' criteria for
feminist scientists; the 'best' methodology or methodologies; the 'best' organisation
and the 'best' relationship between changes in science and changes in society.
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Chapter 5 Linking Theory and Practice
5.1 Introduction: Building a Practical Framework for a Feminist
Science
The purpose of this thesis is to build a practical framework for a feminist
science by grounding feminist theory in an understanding of the practice of science.
There are three major aims:
1. The first is to develop a better understanding of how gender relations shape the
practice of science by synthesising the feminist critique of science and women in
science literature with the experiences and perspectives of current and past feminist
practitioners of science, in addition to those of the next generation of scientists -
today's science students. This will in turn provide a practical basis for change.
2. My second aim is to explore what a feminist science might look like by combining
this first step in my analysis with the feminist epistemologies of science and the
experiences and perspectives of feminist practitioners and students. This is with the
intention of identifying the most practical version of a feminist science.
3. My third and final aim is to provide pointers to practical strategies for change. This
follows on from the first two aims and concerns change in science education as
well as wider changes to the organisation and practice of science.
I now draw out the implications of my review of the existing literature for these
objectives, before moving on to introduce my empirical investigation.
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5.2 Practical Considerations: the Position ofWomen in Science
In Chapter 2 I considered the issues for women in science, focusing mainly on
the institutional inequalities surrounding women's employment in science. Of course
inequality in the sexes' access to science starts much earlier than this: the message,
both at home and in school, that science is a masculine pursuit also has a profound
effect on limiting the number of girls going into the natural sciences at university
(although the numbers are much higher in the life sciences than in the physical
sciences). Once women have made it into the university system, success is by no
means guaranteed. Discrimination and subtle discouragement are still evident. On
graduating, women scientists can look forward to a career in science which is, in most
cases, affected by sexism. In general, women scientists are in lower paid, lower
prestige jobs in the 'softer sciences'. Women can be excluded from the networks in
science which have important functions in distributing information and advice
necessary for success in science. By the same token, women are ill-served by the
paternalistic mentoring system in science. Furthermore, the lifestyle of scientists is
difficult for many women scientists, especially the long hours expected of junior
scientists. In a world where child care is still seen to be the preserve of women, child
care facilities and flexible working arrangements are woefully inadequate. The
competitive culture further alienates women. Such elements of the male domination of
science mean that some women choose to leave science (if they are not 'pushed out'
first). This is a self perpetuating cycle: the incidence of women leaving science further
enhances the popular image of science as a masculine pursuit. This in turn limits the
number of female 'role models' for girls considering science and puts many other
women off a career in science.
These issues have been well covered in the women and science literature. The
institutions of science are clearly sexist. This has major implications for any discussion
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of a feminist science, a fundamental feature of which must be an end to discrimination.
However, science is also gendered - associated with masculinity - in a wider sense.
This literature does not include a consideration of the social production of scientific
knowledge and thus of how the research topics, aims, methodology, language, and
discourse of science may be shaped by gender relations, nor does it address the
gendered image of science. As discussed in Chapter 3, science concerning gender has
a role in perpetuating gender ideology.
It seems likely that the relationship between science, masculinity and male
domination is mutually reinforcing, but this is far from obvious and requires further
consideration. The empirical part of this study addresses the following questions.
How is the masculinity of science constructed? For example, are the male domination
of networks of communication and mentoring related to a 'masculine style' of research
practice? What about women in science? Do men and women do science differently, if
so, in what ways? Does scientific training override particular gendered behaviour?
Empirical information about how the practice and content of science is shaped by
gender relations is needed to enhance our understanding of the gendering of science.
5.3 The Feminist Critique: Unanswered Questions
Chapter 3 reviewed the feminist critique of science in order to explore how
science is masculine in practice. Three areas of concern came out of this literature:
masculinity and theories of gender in general, the role of language, and the nature of
scientific practice and knowledge. Starting with the first, there are clearly different
masculinities in different social groups and men's masculine identity can change as
they grow older. Following my empirical study I hope to answer the question: how, if
masculinity is a social construct, do social relations in science reinforce scientists'
masculinity and vice versa?
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Language clearly plays a role in constructing both masculinity and practice.
However, an overly deterministic view of language is unhelpful. I have shown, in the
criticism of Lacanian psychoanalytic theories of gender, that masculinity is
constructed through a complex interaction of social, psychological and biological
processes. Linguistic links between masculinity and science may be used primarily as
rhetorical devices, which begs questions about any literal associations. For example, is
the 'myth' of objectivity more masculine than the practice? What do the associations in
scientific discourse between masculinity and objectivity in the past, mean to the
practice of science today? To what extent do scientists seek to control and dominate
their subject matter and, by implication, nature?
The third area of concern arising from the feminist critique of science relates
directly to the practice of science. Practice in science varies enormously - according
to whether the science is observational or experimental, involved animate or inanimate
'objects' of study, is 'cutting edge', or mundane and repetitive. Moreover, the
structures of scientific hierarchies limit the potential at the lower grades for input to
new theories, or construction of new metaphors. It is only a small elite in science that
perform such a role. The extent to which these various disciplinary approaches are
gendered requires more detailed consideration.
A fourth area of concern that I have raised is the place of nature within
scientific truth claims. Moreover, it is important for feminists to find some way of
distinguishing between better and worse science, either depending on the acceptability
of the values embedded in science, or its empirical accuracy, ie 'closeness' to nature.
5.4 Feminist Science: The Gap Between Theory and Practice
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In Chapter 4 I considered feminist theories of science and introduced my
analysis of the gap between theory and practice. I reject Utopian aspects of the
feminist science theories, in favour of a practical framework. This raises four main
inter-related issues. First, the role of the individual feminist scientist within the
feminist scientific community is highlighted. Are feminist scientists' and future feminist
scientists' perspectives grounded in experience or are they achieved positions? To
what extent do/will feminist scientists share views in common?
Second, the nature of a feminist methodology, especially the tension between
relativism and objectivism, is an issue. The criteria for evaluating knowledge claims in
science are yet to be established. Should these be based on empirical accuracy or
congruence with political views in the feminist science community? This relates to the
first area of concern - to what extent feminist scientists in the feminist science
community share common views. The difficulty in fully uncovering how micro and
macro political factors shape scientific knowledge is also at issue.
Third, the organisation of a feminist science is extremely important. I have
argued that this is closely related to the number of feminist scientists and the potential
for the operationalisation of a feminist science. How will the social and natural
sciences be related and how will feminist scientists be trained? How much
commonality is there between scientific disciplines? This will determine the extent of
change in certain disciplines influencing others.
Finally, the relationship between science and society requires further
consideration, in particular the role of the public in a feminist science, and the
dependence of change in society on change in science, or vice versa.
5.5 From Theoretical to Empirical Questions
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The next step is to develop empirical research, in an attempt to fill some of the
gaps in the feminist literature, in order to identify a practical framework for the
development of a feminist science. I chose to interview a wide variety of feminists
working as scientists and as science critics (with science backgrounds) and a sample
of science students.
Material from the interviews with science students provides a more
conventional view of science, and pointers on what must be overcome in moving
towards a feminist science (although this was not my original intention: see Chapter
6). I am interested in students' perceptions of how science is gendered, whether men
and women do or know science differently, and, as a point of reference to this, the
qualities that students think are important in science. I use this to build up an
understanding of students' model of science. I highlight flaws and contradictions in
students' perceptions based on: the radical science movements' critique of science and
systems of domination and the role of ideology of/in science; the emphasis in SSK on
the social construction of scientific knowledge; and the feminist critique of science as
gendered. I also explore students' attitudes to feminism and to changing science,
again to provide pointers to feminist educators and scientists hoping to promote a
feminist science.
A secondary use for the student data is to criticise the feminist theories and
epistemologies. Students' reflections on how science is masculine in practice, and
ideas about how science might be changed provide insight into flaws in the feminist
literature.
The questions I asked practitioners are in four main sections. First I am
interested in if and how science is experienced as masculine in practice. How is
science sexist and androcentric, in the widest possible sense and across different
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disciplines and different levels of research? I focus on all the areas of social relations
in science, including communication amongst scientists, between scientists and
students, research questions, methodology and analysis.
Second, I gather women's views on whether men and women do and know
science differently. As I have previously argued, women sympathetic to feminism, and
with an understanding of science from the point of view of practice, have a privileged
perspective on the way gender affects science because of their 'outsider within' status
(Collins, 1986). I try to build up a comprehensive understanding of the types of
difference, again covering all the social relations in science, eg laboratory
organisation, teaching methods, communication, and research methodology. This
provides evidence and examples of how science is gendered in practice. Note that I
am particularly concerned to explore the question raised in section 5.2 concerning
how the male domination and masculinity of science interact in practice.
Third, I am interested in how practitioners want science to change and how
this fits in with the feminist epistemologies. This produces detailed examples of ideas
for different research projects, methodologies, social relations within science (eg
lifestyle, networking, laboratory organisation), plus the role of scientists in society,
and the way these interact.
Fourth, I asked questions about the practicalities of different epistemologies,
especially feminist empiricism and standpoint epistemologies. What do respondents
think of the role of the natural world in a feminist science? How would knowledge
claims be evaluated, internally or externally; empirically or politically? How would
consensus be achieved? The role of the individual scientists in relation to the science
community; the possibility of a feminist science without a feminist society; the
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changes within science required to bring about a feminist science, eg more women in
science; and differences in science training and funding, are all explored.
In short, I try to use this practitioner data to identify and 'fill in the gaps' in the
feminist epistemologies of science. I evaluate the feminist epistemologies, identifying
the pros and cons of each theory. This is combined with data from the student
interviews, in addition to data covering how science is gendered in practice, to
develop a practical framework for a feminist science.
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Part 2 Empirical Exploration
Chapter 6 Empirical Research Design
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter I give details of my empirical research. I explain how I decided
which subjects to interview, the questions I asked, and the relations between myself
and the interviewees, and how this shaped the data. I then explain how I selected the
data represented in Chapters 7 and 8, which I later analyse in Chapter 9.
6.2 Research Subjects
6.2.1 Students
When I started this thesis one of my initial research aims was to explore
students' views on gender, feminism and science. I aimed to compare two groups of
students: first, those with a knowledge of feminist theory from courses of
epistemology; and second, those who had no formal knowledge. Each group was to
be made up of male and female students from physics and biology to allow further
comparisons based on the sex of the students and the science subject they were
studying. I expected the first group to be more familiar with the issues, and to give
more insight into how a feminist science might work. I hoped to provide evidence that
teaching these kind of courses was one way to promote a feminist science.
I wrote to universities with a history and philosophy of science department to
inquire about their courses for science students. I found one university - Leeds -
which provided an options course for science students on history and philosophy of
science (HPS) with a small section on feminist theory. I arranged to interview a
selection of second year male and female students who had studied HPS and an equal
number who had not, from zoology and physics.
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In an effort to get a larger selection of views I aimed to supplement my
student interviews at Leeds with interviews with students from Edinburgh University
who were studying sociology of science, which also incorporated some discussion of
the feminist issues by making an announcement at lectures, asking for volunteers.
6.2.2 Practitioners
To move towards a practical framework for a feminist science a detailed
understanding of sympathetic scientists' views on gender and science and a feminist
science is necessary. As I have already argued, feminist scientists and feminist critics
of science who have a science background, or are 'close' to science more generally,
are ideally located in the feminist community and science community. I argued this
meant they could provide important insights into the feminist theories of science.23 Of
course there are different degrees of feminisms, ranging from the liberal equal
opportunities feminists to the more radical feminists who see science as androcentric
in terms of subject matter, methods and theories. I aimed to cover this range. A
selection of disciplines and levels of experience was also important to gain a breadth
of understanding of the different ways science could be gendered, and how a feminist
science might be in practice.
I initially arranged interviews with feminists in the UK. I contacted feminist
scientists whose names I was familiar with and also interviewed people that were
recommended by these initial interviewees. I also advertised for interviewees in
various women and science journals, and wrote to organisations for women in
science. The numbers of women I interviewed at this stage were quite low, and
typically liberal feminists. I decided to try to extend my interviews to feminists in the
US. I arranged for a grant from the ESRC and contacted familiar names, as well as
23 Note that I have covered the work of the six women critics of science whom I
interviewed in Chapters 3 and 4, but I do not see this as a problem for the research
design as much of the work covered is over ten years old, and the type of questions I
asked specifically addressed the practice of science, whereas their critique was more
theoretical.
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advertising on a feminist bulletin board on e-mail. I also interviewed women




I arranged to conduct the student interviews between February and April of
1993. I constructed an interview script to cover the four main issues outlined in
Chapter 5: experience of and perception of sexism and androcentrism in science;
whether men and women do or know science differently; the qualities that should be
important in science; and feminist science. Initially I developed a grid system, where
respondents were to chose their response from a selection offered in a grid. After
conducting two pilot interviews with colleges from a science background I decided to
make the script less structured. I found that the grids limited instead of aided
responses.
I therefore constructed a second schedule (See Appendix 1). On the first issue,
sexism and androcentrism, after asking an open question about experience and views,
I provided a list of aspects of science where bias may be involved, covering aims and
objectives, research methodology and methods, and teaching. (See Appendix 2). I
asked students to think about bias in each of these areas.
For the questions about sex difference in knowing and doing science I used
material from Rosser (1990) which provided a list of suggested differences between
men and women, eg women are more intuitive. I tried to ask the questions in a neutral
way, for example, 'is either sex more patient?' (See Appendix 1 for a full list of
questions).
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I used a list, which I showed to students for them to select qualities that
should be important in science. This included suggestions from S0rensen (1992), eg
withstanding adversity, cooperation with others. I also added some qualities I knew to
be associated with stereotypical notions of difference between men and women, eg
patience (See Appendix 2).
Finally, in asking question about a feminist science I provided an outline for
students of two main concepts in feminist epistemology: liberal feminist empiricism
and feminist standpoint theory as explained by Sandra Harding (1986, 1991) (detailed
in Appendix 2).
In addition, because I was aware of the problems with lack of familiarity with
some of the terms and concepts I would be using, I arranged a pre-interview talk on
some of the feminist science issues (see Appendix 3). I also provided a reference sheet
with terminology and check-lists to prompt answers (detailed in Appendix 2). I had
hoped to arrange a post-interview discussion session to see what happened when
students of different views came together but this was not possible as students were
unavailable at the time because it was the end of term.
Practitioner Interviews
I started interviewing practitioners with the same script as I used for the
student interviews (see above). This proved to be over-simplistic for the more
knowledgeable women I spoke to, so I adapted my questionnaire (see Appendix 4). I
used the same format as student interviews with women who were less
knowledgeable, and asked more direct and searching questions of women who were
more familiar with the feminist theories and epistemologies of science (See Appendix
4). It is important to note that there was a lack of order in many of my interviews with
feminist scientists, as the discussion tended to flow more naturally. I also asked
particular questions of some women I spoke to, if I knew they had a special interest
in, or a strong opinion on, one aspect of the feminist science literature. This makes
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the material more uneven than in the case of students, and it is therefore more
difficult to compare answers directly. However, comparison is not the main aim of the
analysis. The irregularity of the data also means that valuable input to certain
questions from particular interviewees has also been obtained.
6.3.2 Interview Relations
In both sets of interviews I was concerned to have a good relationship with
interviewees. I did not want to take a powerful role in relation to the people I
interviewed, as it implied 'appropriating' their views and the possibility of
misrepresentation. In the student interviews I wanted to avoid a 'tutor-student'
relationship, where I would inhibit students from expressing particular views that they
perceived to be the 'wrong' answers. I endeavoured to stress the equivocal nature of
my views on many of the questions, especially those about women and men doing
science differently. I did this in the pre-interview talk and in interviews where I felt
students were taking this role. I also sent copies of the interview transcripts back to
both students and practitioners and asked for feedback and comments.
However, the power-relationship between myself and the interviewees, was
difficult to alter. My efforts to avoid the student-tutor relationship in student
interviews had little effect. The very act of doing an interview, going away with the
'data', and analysing it, is privileging the interviewer's interpretation over the
interviewees'. The interviewer is therefore in a more powerful position, semi-
structured questions, feedback or not. Most students did treat me like a tutor. Some
students obviously thought I was a failed physicist, and treated some of my questions
with contempt ('what is the point in asking that?'). But most were polite and
deferential. Some even apologised for not giving the 'right' answer. This was despite
my strong assertions in the pre-interview briefing, and before the start of each
interview, that I was equivocal on the issue of sex difference.
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I did not have the same concerns about interviewing practitioners. Power
relations existed nonetheless, and also affected the data I gathered. I am particularly
interested in the way different women responded. The junior scientists, or women
who are not very familiar with the feminist criticism were invariably extremely friendly
and eager to give me 'good' answers (in this case, well thought through and
complete). The more senior women, or well known participants in feminist criticism
or feminist science, were also, in the main, friendly and very helpful. But their
responses were qualitatively different. The interviews changed, in some cases I felt
like I was being interviewed! Some women actively took control of the interview,
usually in an attempt to fit it into a busy schedule. It is also interesting that these
senior women, with some exceptions, tended to answer their phones during the
interview, whilst the others did not. A lot of the questions could have been boring for
them, as they had already thought them through and knew where they stood.
Certainly many of their answers are very thorough, and well polished. As with the
student interviews, I was not able to change these relationships. Ultimately, however,
I am in the powerful position because I analyse the data.
6.4 Selection and Preliminary Analysis of Data
Student Data
The students interviews I used in my analysis are detailed below in Table 1.
The codes used in Chapter 7 are 5 digit, covering: sex (M or F); interviewee
number; place of study (L=Leeds, E=Edinburgh); subject (Z=Zoology, P=Physics,




(L = Leeds, Zoology E = Edinburgh, Biology)
Zoology/Biology
HPS Not HPS
Male 2 L 2 L
Female 2 L, 2 E 2 L
Physics Philosophy Not Philosophy
Male 2 L 3 L
Female 3 L 2 L
It became quite obvious as I did more interviews that the HPS course had an
extremely small component of feminist epistemology, which did not cover many of the
issues I wanted to discuss. This part of the course was also poorly attended by
students, and seemed to be treated with some amusement. There was no discernible
difference between the views of students who had studied HPS and those that had
not. There was also a lack of any significant depth of thinking about many of the
epistemological issues I raised. The majority of students also failed to turn up to a
post interview discussion session, largely because it was the end of term, so this was
abandoned. I supplemented the student data with two interviews with female science
students studying a course in science and society in Edinburgh, who had a similar
level of knowledge and sophistication.
I chose to use the student data to provide a sketch of the conventional view
held by students to illustrate what feminist educators must challenge. I also decided to
look for inconsistencies in the conventional view that pointed the way to a more
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radical view of science. The data also threw up some interesting issues about the
construction by feminists of science as masculine, which I also explore in my later
analysis.
Practitioner Data
I succeeded in getting a good range of views and opinions from practitioners.
In my analysis I use interviews with thirty women who all have science backgrounds
and have either stayed in academia or retired, but are now variously involved in
science as practitioners or, outside of science, as critics (one was conducted via e-
mail). Three digit codes are used to represent the practitioners interviewed, covering:
whether their principal role was as a critic or practitioner of science (P=practitioner,
C=critic, PC=both); interviewee number; and broad subject area (B=Biology,
C=Chemistry, P=Physics). These women's positions range from a liberal interest in
promoting women and science through to a more radical criticism of science. Four
main groups emerged from the data. The first accounts for roughly half of the women
interviewed and is made up of women whose views are at the more liberal end of this
spectrum. These women all have an interest in women in science, but not all would
call themselves feminists. The majority are involved in groups to promote women in
science eg: Edinburgh Women's Science Forum, set up to discuss women and science
issues and arrange exhibitions and talks, which is now more of a support group for
women in science; Zorra, a mentoring project for women physics undergraduates; and
The Baltimore Charter for Women in Astronomy which mainly focuses on
discriminatory practices in science. Note that some women in two of these groups
were interviewed in a group rather than individually: this was organised by
interviewees from the groups to save time.
The second group consists of six feminist scientists who are more familiar with
the feminist critique of science, and to a lesser degree, the literature on feminist
epistemology of science. A third group consists of three women who are part time
scientists and also critics of science.
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The fourth group is of seven women who have left research science for
various reasons - disillusionment, exclusion by their peers or a greater interest in
criticising science. These women are now teachers, onlookers and critics of science,
usually outside of scientific departments in various disciplines, eg Education or Social
Studies of Science. Their degree of involvement in criticising science varies: some
simply follow the debates in feminist circles about science, whilst others are some of
the key writers in the field.
I include five women from the UK in the first group and three others in the
fourth group of critics. I include ten from the US (in all four groups) and twelve from
Canada (mostly in the first group). This reflects the fact that the majority of active
critical writers in this field are American. However, differences in the acceptability and
style of feminism across the Atlantic are also apparent here: these can only really be
noted without more detailed consideration.
Five of these women in the first group are still completing their doctorates,
and two in the fourth group left science after their undergraduate degrees. However,
by far the greatest majority of women that I spoke to (twenty five) have postdoctorate
qualifications in natural science. Of these, eleven have permanent lecturing positions
in science (referred to as having tenure in North America) and two are retired
Professors of science.
The disciplines which these women come from can be roughly categorised into
physics, chemistry and biology, with thirteen each in physics and biology and a much
smaller four in chemistry. Of the physicists the vast majority, eleven, are in the first
group of women scientists and the majority of biologists are split between groups two
and four, whilst the chemists are spread more evenly across the four groups. This
reflects a higher profile of women in physics as opposed to chemistry (presumably
because physics is the 'harder' science and so has fewer women). The majority of
critics in this area are also from biological science backgrounds as are the women who
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consider themselves feminist scientists. This also mirrors the difficulty in
conceptualising and practicing a feminist physics.
6.5 Conclusion
I now give details of the interview material. First, I deal with the student data.
This covers students' perceptions of how the sex of the scientist and gender relation
affects science; their views on how science should change; and their attitude to
feminism. The chapter is much shorter than the practitioner chapter because it mainly
deals with a secondary objective of this study: exploring the teaching of a feminist
science. The second chapter covers the practitioner interview data in more detail and
is used to build a picture of how science is gendered in practice, and a better
understanding of the process of feminising the practice of science in Chapter 9.
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Chapter 7 Student Interviews
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter I document students' perspectives on science, gender and
feminism. My aim is to lay the ground for the later analysis which relates feminist
critiques and epistemologies of science to the practice of science. As detailed in
Chapter 6, I originally intended to examine any sex or subject difference in student
responses. I also hoped to consider differences in the views of students who had
studied philosophy and those who had not. However, I found that no such differences
were significant in shaping student responses in the majority of instances, with one
notable exception, which will be considered in the later analysis.
I start in section 7.2 by detailing students' perceptions of gender and science,
including their experiences and attitudes to sexism and androcentrism in science;
whether men and women do science differently; and their perception of what qualities
go together to constitute 'good' practice in science. In the next section, 7.3, I
consider their views on changing science, addressing sexism, androcentrism and their
reactions to feminism and science.
7.2 Student's Perception of Gender and Science
7.2.1 Sexism in Science24
There was a recognition of sexism in science amongst most of the students
whom I interviewed; 8 out of 10 women had experienced sexism, most commonly via
teacher's sexist assumptions. There was also a strong perception that this type of
sexism did not affect the content of science. A significant minority also argue that the
24
Note: the students I spoke to had a limited experience of science. This means some
felt unable to answer questions on sexism in research, and some referred to sexism
through knowledge from reading, not experience. Similarly, 6 pointed out that
questions on funding were beyond their scope.
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male domination of science does not necessarily equate with sexism. For example,
one woman commented,
I haven't actually seen many things published by women in science, I don't
know whether that's because there aren't as many women publishing things ...
in the biological sciences, yes ... that must be a generation gap. (F2LPN)
This corresponds with a general naivete about the position of women in science and
how to improve it, which will be considered further in section 7.3.1.
7.2.1 Gender and science
I was particularly concerned to establish whether the students I spoke to had
experienced or perceived science as androcentric and/or masculine. Did they view
androcentrism and masculinity as being confined to external areas of science, or as
playing a role in the practice of science? More specifically, did they view reductionism
and objectivity as masculine?
The majority of students rejected the notion of androcentric or masculine
influence on the methods of science. For example,
I don't think [science is androcentric] because when you were saying before
about how men would just look at one variable and study it and a woman
might look at the overall picture as far as I'm concerned we do the opposite,
because you can't really perform an experiment, in physics anyway, trying to
look at the overall picture, it just won't work, you have to have each thing
individually and then put them together. As far as I'm concerned experiments
are... asexual. (F2LPN)
This student argued that physics demands a reductionist approach from scientists,
male or female, and that this is asexual. Perhaps her rejection is related to an
interpretation of the suggestion that females were more holistic as saying females
were less competent at physics. The importance of the rigidity of scientific training is
highlighted here, and will be considered later.
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There was an openness on the part of most students to the idea of science as
androcentric (14 out of 19). The most articulate response was the following:
We had this tutorial the other week with a bloke ... his specialisation is
contraception ... control of population ... he was talking about this thing called
Norplant which is 5 match stick things which you stick in your arm and it
protects you 97% against pregnancy, it's for use in the third world. We had
this big argument... he was talking about how we should just leave the third
world alone, we shouldn't feed them or anything because ... looking at it from
a biologist's point of view ... this is a natural thing that would happen in
biology - disease and famine come along, knock down the population, let the
resources build up ... and he said the root of all the problem ... with over¬
population was that these days if a single woman gets pregnant we don't throw
her out in the streets, we give her welfare ... and ... the pill ... it's giving
everybody this freedom, but it's not completely effective so the population is
running wild. That blew us up when he said that. (F5LZP)
This student viewed her tutor's opinions as male centred because of his (somewhat
contradictory) morality, which condemns women who have children out of wedlock,
and women who were sexually active without using effective contraception. This
student continued the theme of masculine influence in science, in a response to a later
question about whether science is masculine:
I do [think science is masculine] in the fact that its always been regarded as a
male dominated career ... the men have got time to sit and think whereas the
women haven't because they've got other things to do ... in that case the men
have got time to grow up to be scientists ... and so its always been seen as a
male dominated area, but... I think that, say ... lots of male Doctors ... if they
can give you the pill that will stop your leg dropping off then they will... but it
seems that nurses or female Doctors ... will follow up, see how you feel ...
that's just the different nature of men and women ... The men are definitely
more practical ... in that they have closed vision to anything else, to morals
and things that might be behind things, and I think ... with war and weapons ...
they're all into that, whereas if men had period pains they'd be sorted ...
instantly. (F5LZP)
This response has several important features. First, this student related the pursuit of
science to men as she saw science as a creative luxury that men can indulge in, whilst
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she saw women as having less opportunity for such a pursuit because of more
pressing responsibilities. This is presumably related to the different social roles of men
and women. The second point of interest here was the student's comments about
females in medical science being more empathetic. It is also worth noting here that
this student took an essentialist position - arguing that men and women have different
natures implies that there is something inherent about masculinity and femininity.
Third, she suggested men were more practical and their work reflects their own
interests and a relative lack of interest in women's problems, eg period pains.
The rest of the students' responses were less definite about science being
androcentric. Consider, for example, this student's answer to the question about his
experience or witnessing of androcentrism.
I think maybe quite a lot of the literature you use may tend to be written by
men, but they're not written for men particularly. (M7LZP)
Now compare this with his response to a later question on the methods of science
being masculine:
I think a lot of methods in science ... because there are so many men in
science, are male ideas, but I can't see how if they had come from females they
would have changed drastically. (M7LZP)
There is a difference between the student's view of science as being performed by
men, but not being influenced in its goals because of this (ie science is done by men
but not for men), reflected in the first quote, and the perception of scientific methods
as maybe being influenced by men's ideas in the second quote. The contradiction lies
in confusion about the way in which masculine attributes actually affect science.
The majority argued that the scientific methods are not androcentric. This
woman commented:
I think the act of doing science would be the same either way, but that the way
it's directed is very masculine, because much more emphasis is placed on
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economic importance, you're going to have ... military research ... and that's all
come from a masculine bias in politics ... the directives of science are
masculine, I don't think the methods of going about it are. (F7LZN)
This student drew a distinction between the application of science (which are shaped
by men's interests) and the methods, which are gender-free.
There was no consensus amongst the students I interviewed about the extent
and nature of men's influence on science. In particular the way in which the male
domination of science is related to masculinity and the notion of a male world view, or
essential male qualities affecting science, was ambiguous, as was the relationship
between the aims and methods of science and the wider issues of funding. Rather than
simply viewing this confusion as an indication of the limitations in students' thinking,
it may be more useful to see it as an indication of limitations in the feminist critique of
science as gendered. This will be discussed further in Chapter 9.
Although they were a small group, those who argued that science as a whole
were androcentric, were all male bar one. On the other hand, those who argued that
some aspects of science were androcentric, but that the methods were neutral, were
all female bar one. This suggests that males were more amenable to the idea that
science is androcentric in a wider sense, and women were more concerned to stress
that the methods of science were neutral. A possible reason for women's hostility to
the notion that science, particularly the scientific methods, are androcentric was their
equation of the argument that scientific methods were gendered with the argument
that women were less suited to science. This is also related to two women's argument
that to say that sexism could infiltrate the methods of science, because men and
women do science differently, was itself sexist. This idea is much more prevalent in
the next section where it becomes clear that students rejected the idea of men and
women doing science differently because they saw such a distinction as sexist.
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7.2.3 Sex and Doing Science Differently25
The methods of science were seen by the majority of students as neutral, and
acting to suppress any prominent differences between individual's results. The
differences in scientists' practice that were identified were mostly related to individual
personality, not sex. Consider the following example of this general theme:
Again, I think it depends on the person ... but in science I think the emphasis is
on a reductionist approach, because again, you can't solve a problem if you
concentrate on a lot of things, you have to isolate something. (F9LZP)
What about being objective? (AK)
No one is objective ... I mean you can use objective methods but you really
explain something as you expect it to be, it comes from your personality your
experiences. (F9LZP)
So you don't think men or women are more objective? (AK)
No one is objective. (F9LZP)
Roughly half of students - 10 out of 19 - viewed scientist's influence on their work as
being related to their individuality, which was not seen to be related to their sex.
However, some sex differences in scientists' practices were identified. A
significant minority argued that women are more patient (7 out of 19), or more
concerned with detail and more self critical (6 out of 19). For example:
Ah, now you're talking [about a difference in observation] ... well this is a
strange one ... generally I'd say that the girls are a lot more patient than I am
because if an experiment doesn't work I lose my temper within an hour ...
some of the girls I work with ... go on. (M9LZN)
25 It is important to note that a significant proportion of the students (7 out of 19)
commented at some point in the interview that the methods of science they use were
laid down in guidelines for how to approach practical work in the teaching
laboratories, hence the opportunity available to them to choose particular methods
was limited.
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I think the girls tend to be more critical ... and say, 'we could have done this,
we could have done that', whereas the boys think it's been and done.
(M7LZP)
This fits in with a view, held by the majority of students, of science as being gender
neutral and objective, and with the minority view of science, where students argued
that it was not possible to be objective. Patience and criticism were not related to
objectivity:
That's the thing about science, that's why I like it because its either right or
wrong, the way I see it anyway, it's not as complicated, so ... the level of
hormone goes up or it doesn't ... so there's not that much subjectivity comes
in (F5LZP)
They [men and women] both can be equally objective, or depending on what
data you've got, what you've read, they can be equally subjective ... or even
who's taught us what... they've got a certain leaning towards a certain idea, a
hypothesis, and they've taught it to us, then I suppose we're all equally
subjective (M7LZP)
A significant minority - 8 out of 19 - also argued that men were more likely to be
scientists first and foremost in their lives:
I'd say that was a man's point of view [being a scientist first and foremost] - he
is a scientist whereas a woman has other things, like if she's going to have a
family and that sort of thing, it all has to be interactive in her whole life.
(F7LZN)
The same proportion thought men were more interested in control of nature:
I think males tend to think they're trying to harness nature, to use science to
turn nature to their advantage, perhaps females think they're trying to work
with nature ... looking at science as a way forward ... I think males are
definitely more towards controlling nature because ... you're depending on
industries such a lot who're funding science ... the top level industry tend to
be male dominated ... I think men definitely want to be able to turn nature to
their advantage. (M7LZP)
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Women were seen as more empathetic by a similar number of students:
Yes. Well, I don't tend to get involved in anything. OK we have rabbits ... I'd
be quite happy to kill any of them. (M6LZN)
What about the girls? (AK)
I don't think so. (M6LZN)
Do they empathise more? (AK)
Yes, definitely, not with the creepy crawlies. (M6LZN)
And from a female point of view:
The lads have got this bravado act - 'yes, we'll chop the head off the locust' -
where the girls are more reluctant ... to do so ... I don't think its because
they're worried about hurting them but simply because it's not necessary half
the time - not everyone has to cut the locust but you can if you want to - the
lads will go on ahead and do it. (F5LZP)
I think that's the girls [who are empathetic]. We occasionally do something
with frogs and boys are pulling their legs off - stupid things like that - girls
wouldn't do that... they see it from other people's point of view. (F10LZN)
The emphasis in each of these cases - men's role as scientists first and foremost,
women's empathy and men's control of nature - was on females' viewpoint being
different from males', and can be related to women's role in the private (and
emotional) sphere as opposed to the public (and rational) sphere. However, this is
contrasted by a general emphasis on there being no differences in the 'core' practice of
science, from choice of experiment to interpretation of results.
Neither sets of differences identified by students - concerning patience and self
criticism or empathy and control - compromised their views on scientific theories and
data as not being open to influence by the sex of the scientist. I would argue that this
is an important conclusion for students. Consider this statement from a female
physicist:
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They're both about the same [men and women]. I suppose it's always thought
of that it's a man that should be the one that's controlling nature but if women
come into science they want to control it just as much as men do. (F4LPP)
Controlling nature was associated with men, but women were also seen as being able
to adopt these values when they come into science. I view this as related to the nature
of scientific training and ways in which it may suppress difference between men and
women. More importantly, as argued earlier, this conclusion is important for female
students, as it means no one can argue that because they do science differently they
must be doing science badly. Perhaps the focus on women's patience and self
criticism; men's perception of their role as scientists as first and foremost in their life;
women's empathy; and men's association with control of nature, is especially easy for
females (and males) concerned about the implication of their identification of
difference (ie sexism) because they find it easy to dissociate these factors from
scientific methods and results. Although students accepted that control and empathy
might guide the aims of some science, and that patience and self criticism might affect
the time it takes for results to be uncovered, theirs is a view based on their experience
in learning science by repeating old experiments where the results are already
'known', so they find it easier to accept that scientific methods and results are
untainted by these factors. On the other hand, these features clearly do affect the
content of science. Surely, in a less restricted environment where new science is being
done (as opposed to repetition of old experiments as in the teaching lab) patience and
self criticism will affect the quality and type of results. This will be explored later in
Chapter 8.
7.2.4 Good Science
In this section I consider the qualities that students thought were important in
science and how they relate to gender. This is based on a set of questions in the
interview where students were asked to select from a list the qualities that they
thought should, and should not, be important in their ideal science. In practice,
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however, probably because of the way that students have been taught science, this
question seems to have been misunderstood. As science teaching provides
standardised and uncritical versions of methodology, some students seemed to
respond instead with qualities that they have learned were important in science.
Nevertheless the information obtained is still valid to a degree, as it provides a
snapshot of what students thought good science meant.
The majority of students identified the following qualities as important:
objectivity; working in a group; working alone; creativity; intuition; inventiveness;
patience; accuracy; cooperation; and questioning information and theories.
Engagement in social and political issues were identified by the majority as not
important. A significant minority (between 6 and 8 out of 19) also considered respect
for nature; practical sense; empathy; and ability to withstand adversity, to be
important. Interestingly, there was no clear differentiation between supposedly
opposing values. Most importantly, both subjectivity and objectivity were identified
by 6 students as important. For example:
Yes [objectivity is important]. There's no point otherwise, is there? It's
important to be able to work in a group, though, because otherwise there's no
point, you've got to consider other people's opinions, or you're just going to
be wrong ... you need to be able to take other people's opinions [into
account]. (F1LPP)
I think there's a place for both [objectivity and subjectivity] ... because you
need to be able to see things, and sometimes you need to be able to see them
clearly, but sometimes you need to be able to look at them in a different
direction ... you have to be subjective as well as objective, you have to get a
balance. (F4LPP)
The general theme was the importance of recognising subjectivities - via group
interaction in the first case, or looking at your results from a different perspective in
the second - and how they affect science and then trying to eliminate them.
Others argued for both respecting and controlling nature:
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It depends on the experiment you do [whether you are respecting or
controlling nature] ... apart from the obvious, like nuclear physics which
would affect nature, most physics is of use to nature and is not necessarily
detrimental to it in any way. (F2LPN)
This highlights the problem with generalising about control or respect of nature, and
what they actually mean in practice. Note that control and respect are not necessarily
mutually exclusive.
A significant minority also argued that both reductionist and holistic models
should be used in science, depending on the experiment.
I think in physics ... breaking things down into constituent parts [is important]
... until electricity and magnetism unified ... they were two separate areas - you
look at an area then investigate it and then you come up with a few theories
and then, maybe later on, when you've got those theories you can ... group
them together ... I think it's necessary, if you're going to make progress, to
break the problem into constituent parts and then tackle it rather than tackling
the whole thing, it might just be too complicated, too overwhelming.
(M4LPN)
This student illustrates the way in which holism and reductionism in science are
interdependent, and how the two must interact in the interests of 'progress'. Although
this betrays a naivete about scientific progress depending on adding together the
constituent parts of knowledge to come up with the whole answer, an important point
is being made - reductionist scientific research design plays an important part in
science, asking questions which are not so large as to be impossible to answer.
Whilst the model that emerges in this section clearly has an empiricist
emphasis because of its stress on objectivity, there were other qualities which students
considered to be important which have no place in a positivist empiricist science, for
example intuition. Similarly, from this information it is impossible to construct any
clearly androcentric or feminine model of science, as both supposedly masculine and
feminine qualities were mixed together. What I would identify as the major features of
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an androcentric model of science - objectivity; control of nature and reductionist
models of the dominant constituent variable - and of feminine science - inclusion of
subjectivities and context in research; respect for nature's complexities; and complex
interactive models of a more holistic style - were intermingled.
Furthermore, the model that emerges is full of contradictions and ambivalence,
which, I would argue, represent to a degree the conflicts and ambiguities that the
work of the scientist involves. These include respect for and control of nature - it is by
no means clear from the data what these actually mean in practice. The elusiveness of
the goal of objectivity is also apparent in students' experiences and perceptions of
science; this is hampered by the biases and subjectivities which scientists hold but
cannot necessarily define. The methods scientists use are also difficult to categorise
based on the data; the two approaches of holism and reductionism were seen as
complementary rather that diametrically opposed.
7.2.5 Conclusion
Students viewed the influence of sex and gender on science as relatively
insignificant. Although there was an awareness of sexism, this was seen as
unimportant in shaping the content of scientific knowledge. Equally, although the
majority identified differences between men and women in science this was seen as
not influencing scientific knowledge. A minority did accept that science might be
gendered, but there was confusion about what this meant (whether it was in terms of
male domination, male world view, or essential male qualities) and how it affected
science.
In general an empiricist epistemology of science was favoured by students,
reflecting their training and education. Nevertheless there were some notable
contradictions: eg some students' emphasis on objectivity and subjectivity, and
reductionism and holism as being important in good science. Therefore students' ideal
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science cannot be labelled 'masculine' or 'feminine' (according to feminist categories
discussed in Chapter 3).
The final interesting result is the greater openness of male students to the
notion of science as masculine. Women students, I suggest, have more to lose from
labelling science masculine, as they were already under confident about their position
in science.
7.3 Changing Science
7.3.1 Solutions to Sexism
In this section I consider student views on how to challenge bias and sexism in
science. Here the predominant view was fairly liberal: students advocated getting
more women into science to add 'balance' via peer review, but also displayed a
general faith in the scientific method as able to eliminate any extreme biases. There
was a general optimism about increasing numbers of women in science. Sexist
theories in science were viewed as rare and therefore easily dismissed.
For example:
I think [bias is] unavoidable, but you have to be in a position to overcome that
bias ... in a way I see it as like some sort of verbal tennis ... you're always
going to have two biases, a man's bias and a woman's bias, but if you're
allowed to work together in equal numbers that would maybe come to some
sort of happy medium. (F7LZN)
Although bias was seen as unavoidable (science is therefore seen as subjective) there
is an implication in this quote that some biases are better than others - the 'happy
medium - being a 'balance' between men's bias and women's bias. At present,
therefore, science is seen as biased too far in men's interests, and as more women
enter, things will even out.
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The next quote illustrates a commonly held view, promoted by the way
science is taught, that the passing of time helps to achieve objective results as new
generations of scientists review old theories and eliminate biased ones. This was in
response to a question in the interview which gave an example of a 'sexist scientist'.
The students were asked if there was a scientist with sexist views on men and women
who was studying the difference between men's and women's intelligence, but was a
very thorough scientist who used objective methods, would his results be sexist?
Consider the following response:
Just going on past experience, similar things back in the late 19th Century ...
where white people were trying to prove that white people were cleverer than
black people ... and whatever methods they used ... whichever group they
were from, they always ended up that the group that they belonged to was the
best, at the peak, at the top of the evolutionary tree, and more enlightened
scholars have found that it was a load of toss ... I'm sure if somebody was
doing something along those same lines now he'd fall into the same trap and
prove his ideas, at whatever cost, maybe mislead into, but he'd probably
believe he was correct and producing something that was tangible and
provable, but within a few years someone else would say, 'that's a load of
rubbish' ... If the experimenter has a strong enough view then he's always
going to prove his view if he's doing an experiment like that [sexist scientist
example] and if he doesn't prove it he isn't going to publish it. (M9LZN)
OK. How do you think you might combat that? Do you think more women in
science would help, more science peers who were women ... or black...? (AK)
Yes ... in a perfect society there would be 50:50 ... but there aren't... but in
10, 15 years time when these levels are at equilibrium it'll be much better then.
(M9LZN)
The solution this student advocated is two fold - 'balanced' peer review which will be
achieved through increasing the numbers of women in science, and the passing of time
which will eliminate biased theories and mean that more women will go into science.
The general optimism about the impact of more women on science is
illustrated in the following quote:
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I think itll eliminate sexism in people who aren't scientists because they'll see
that more women are going into science, so that's good, whereas the scientists
that are already there - the male scientists -1 think you will still have to work a
whole lot harder to get the same respect from them as they would give their
fellow males ... (F5LZP)
What about the theories ... the ideas? (AK)
Definitely the more theories that women can put forward then the more
respect they should gain ... and hopefully, the more women that there are ...
eventually people won't look at scientists and see ... more men than there are
women. (F5LZP)
This is a clear argument for more women in science as they encourage other women
through example. Others had more confidence in the scientific method. Consider the
following discussion about sociobiology:
I really don't think that [sexist bias] exists, actually, in most science that I
know ... in fact it can be proven that, ... whether it's a man or a woman that
finds it out, it's just there, you can say it's one of the laws of nature, it's got to
happen, [sexist scientist example] Yes, I think that if he's a true scientist and
he's really trying, I presume that he would be if he's doing research, you do
try and separate yourself from the experiment, you wouldn't try and influence
it in any way, especially with biological experiments ... psychological
experiments as well ... you can influence the subject a hell of a lot, if he's
trying to do it properly he will try and remove himself from the experiment...
and maybe have some sort of control that he can apply. (F2LPN)
This quote illustrates a faith in the scientific method and individual scientists' ability to
eliminate their biases through application of scientific methods, such as the use of
control groups. There is also an appeal to the 'integrity' of scientists, who are seen as
unlikely to compromise their work with their biases.
Three students in this group also distinguished physics from biology in their
response to the sexist scientist example:
Well it depends on his facts. I'm slightly different... I'm doing physics ...
acceleration doesn't matter whether you're a man or a woman doing it, so it
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doesn't really apply to me ... if he's a good scientist and he looks at the facts ...
he shouldn't come out with [bias]. (F1LPP)
Here students were arguing that it is easier to be objective in physics because physics
deals with inanimate objects. Others displayed even more faith in the rigour of the
scientific method:
Do you think more women in science is a good idea? (AK)
Yes, if they want to, but I don't think ... I'm not one of these people who says,
'Oh look, there's more men, we should let more women in, or make more
women do it', if they don't want to do it they shouldn't. (F10LZN)
I think more women is definitely a good idea, because it's a male dominated
field at the moment and there's no reason why it should be. (M6LZN)
Do you think it would make the science better? (AK)
Well science will get better anyway, no matter who does it. It'll just make it
less male dominated and in that way ... in the future when women start coming
through as professors and lecturers, it might encourage more women into
science. (M6LZN)
This student was referring to the progress of scientific knowledge, ie new generations
of scientists disproving old theories and replacing them with newer and better
theories. All of these students were advocating the status quo of traditional science.
The implications of the student's naivete about the progress of women in
science and/or the rigour of the scientific method will be explored further later.
7.3.2 Solutions to Androcentrism
Students' openness to androcentrism and masculine influence in science,
illustrated in section 7.2.2, did not extend to the idea of a feminine method of doing
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science as a valid alternative - only one student accepted that there might be such a
thing. The overwhelming majority - 16 out of 19 - were against the idea completely
and argued that scientific methods should be neutral, not masculine or feminine. For
example, as above, one student's solution to 'masculine bias' was to keep science as it
is and try to be more objective.
Changing the ways of science ... it's distinguishing again between the groups
[men and women] which maybe isn't a good thing ... maybe it should be kept
to what it is and obviously the bias removed. (M4LPN)
Another student described how science should be neutral:
If you can think of a particular feminine method I think you might find that
men are a bit adverse, and vice versa. If you say this is a masculine way of
doing things and this is a feminine way, then surely that's no better ... [it
should be] neutral, yes. (M6LZN)
The main emphasis in all of these students' responses was on neutrality, a gender-free
science. This has much in common with feminist empiricist aims, and will be discussed
further later.
7.3.3 Reactions to a Feminist Science
In this section I consider student's views on the meaning and nature of feminist
science. First, I deal with their initial thoughts on what a feminist science might be,
and then I continue to look in more detail at their second response, based on a written
description presented as a reference sheet and including a brief description of two
'main ideas about a feminist science - Harding's liberal version of feminist empiricism
and her general description of feminist standpoint theory (see Appendix 2).
Students' initial view of a feminist science was, in the main, negative (11 out of
19). A small group of students said that they couldn't imagine what a feminist science
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might be (4 out of 19), and another group of 4 responded quite favourably to the idea,
although none were clear about what a feminist science meant and gave vague
answers, for example, that a feminist science might be more caring.
The negative view consisted of two main strands: the first was that feminist
science was the opposite extreme from masculine science, and that what was needed
was a balanced approach:
[Feminist science makes me think of] militancy ... if you're going to have
feminist science then you must have masculine science as well, you can't have
two halves and not make them whole, its not possible, science should be
neutral, it shouldn't be masculine or feminine ... people shouldn't try and
separate it. (F2LPN)
I can't see what difference a feminist science could be from ... what's the male
version of feminism? ... If you look at a lot of feminist writing it seems to be
[that] they're not trying to promote an equality of opportunity ... which is what
should be the case ... They're trying to promote reasons why one should be
better than the other ... people refer to it as positive discrimination ... I don't
think there's any positiveness about it ... I presume that a feminist science
would be pretty much the same approach to science ... Feminist science is only
if it's conducted in ... a non intrusive way, only allowed to be studied by
women ... and only women's papers can be published ... Science should be a
separate thing ... should be above, or below, depending on which way you
look at it, all these things. (M1LPP)
Here feminist and feminine were collapsed together, as were androcentrism and
masculine, and set as opposites with neutrality the happy medium.
A second group of students were against feminism for similar reasons, but
focus more on the characteristics of the comic book feminist:
I think it would be your raving feminists ... when you stand on the outside of
things screaming at people it gets you nowhere ... you turn men against you ..
you all have to be allies ... so if you have a feminist science then you're going
to have all the other areas that women are trying to get into against you ...
what it actually would be I don't know. (F7LZN)
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Do you think of a feminist science as feminine; do you think men could
participate? (AK)
I don't think it would be ... mainly because ... again you jump to assumptions,
generalisations, a feminist is someone who stands with cropped hair ... ears
pierced ... and you immediately think ... a masculine image, which is wrong ...
I suppose I'm a feminist but I don't go round telling all men what's what and,
'I'm right and superior to you', because that's just doing exactly what a man is
doing. (F7LZN)
The themes of balance also comes out here, and is mixed with a view of feminists as
unbalanced by anger.
Interestingly these initial views were followed by more detailed responses to
the two feminist approaches which did not involve a total rejection of feminism. There
were five groups of response to the two feminist versions of science. One of the
largest groups (6) favoured a mixture of a feminist standpoint and Harding's version
of a feminist empiricist approach, whilst a smaller groups (3) favoured a weak version
of feminist standpoint. Another larger group (6) favoured an empiricist approach,
which has little or no feminist input and only 2 favoured a stronger feminist empiricist
approach. There were 2 other students who favoured both a mixture of the feminist
standpoint and empiricist approaches, but also favoured a 'neutral' approach.
Consider the following example:
I'm just thinking about the top one [feminist empiricism], feminists should be
able to eliminate the bias [and] should become more involved in science ... to
police ... so in other words ... more women ... yes I agree ... but I do think that
society [doesn't] really encourage you in general. I don't think its the schools, I
think it's the general thinking in society, and I've no idea how you change that.
(F1LPP)
On feminist standpoint theory she continued:
I don't understand what they mean, what anyone means by a feminist
standpoint... then again I do consider science as physics, so I do consider it as
being values and equations. (F1LPP)
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I suppose it would mean, being a feminist and taking your values into the
science that you do. (AK)
Well I don't you see, I consider it completely separate ... if you do that then
there is going to be a bias ... and that's going to affect your science ... it
wouldn't be a fact. (F1LPP)
They take the view that all science is biased anyway. (AK)
True, yes ... so they say that we see science better, because we're not the
dominant group ... I don't agree with that at all, we're all the same, everyone
should be the same. (F1LPP)
This student was clearly expressing a feminist empiricist view, which was in
opposition to feminist standpoint theory. The second student used similar arguments,
but also argued that more women in science was good and that both men and women
should 'police' science, with neither having a better vision of reality:
One thing we're always getting hammered into us in lectures is that you've got
to ignore your own position in science. When you're looking for a theory its
got to be universal: any other observer on the other side of the world should
be able to see the same ... no one can have a better vision of reality. (M5LPN)
Again, quite how one effectively 'ignores' one's position in science was not explained.
The fundamental difference with the rest of the students' views was that the
concept of an unbiased position is seen as more problematic. However, as we shall
see, there was no radical departure from an empiricist philosophy. These students still
argued that an objective stance, no matter how difficult, should be the ultimate goal of
the scientist.
Those that advocated a mixture of both Harding's version of feminist
empiricism and standpoint theory tended to take the same position: knowledge is
grounded by the standpoint of the knower, but one must seek to eliminate that
grounding, and aim for an objective truth; neither sex has a better vision of reality -
everyone's vision is different and equal; and more women should become involved in
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science. However, there was disagreement about whether it was necessary for women
to police for sexist bias or for the scientific method to be more rigorous.
Consider the following view. This student has already studied feminist
epistemology, and originally gave a negative interpretation of feminist science as it
was the opposite extreme from a masculine science:
I can see how one of the approaches, the liberal view ... would work, but it
wasn't strong enough, because if all the claims were true just advertising for
more women, and [having] more models for women in science [would have
worked, but] it's not going to work. But then I thought the radical view was
too radical. It was as if it was man hating ... it was, 'science is completely male
dominated, science is a male way of thinking, is created by males, so it must be
male orientated' ... it was very ... anti- male. (F4LPP)
So what do you suggest, something in between? (AK)
Well, we definitely need the role models and all that stuff ... but we have to
change the view ... you can't hate men, you've got to work with them,
otherwise you can't work as a group ... you've got to get rid of the inferiority
that women have [about] being scientists. (F4LPP)
On feminist standpoint theory she continued:
I agree with the first bit, that all knowledge is grounded by the standpoint of
the knower ... I don't agree with this, that, 'women's position as the oppressed
gives them a better vision of reality,' it's not oppression ... if you're removed
then you can see something much better, rather than if you're in the middle of
what's happening, and I think that could happen with a man or a woman.
(F4LPP)
This student rejected the notion that women have a privileged standpoint, and argued
that being 'objective' in the sense of separating oneself from the object of study
provides a better vision of reality. Again, the concept of balance also emerged from
this students discussion of feminist standpoint theory:
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But the feminist scientists should do science from a feminist standpoint, that's
not going to be right... because then you're still going to have bias ... then you
just get the opposite of a male centred science. (F4LPP)
So, there is a mixture of views of feminist standpoint theory and empiricism here: the
student seems to be saying all knowledge is grounded but one should strive to find an
unbiased, neutral position (as mentioned earlier), through distancing oneself from the
subject. Empiricism is viewed as not strong enough and there is the feeling that more
should be done to encourage women into science, but feminist standpoint theory
needs to be more 'men-friendly'.
7.3.4 Conclusion
The majority of students I interviewed displayed a faith in the ability of the
present scientific methods to eliminate 'bias'. They were also optimistic about getting
more women into science and, in general, saw this as a positive goal. Their rejection
of a feminine method and a feminist science was based on the principle of balance and
neutrality: feminine/feminism was seen as the opposite 'extreme' from masculine or
masculinist science. The minority who were more skeptical about the notion of
objectivity, nevertheless wished to see it retained as the ultimate goal of science, and
countenanced a more thorough exploration of subjectivities in order to aim for such a
goal.
7.4 Conclusion
Students' views on science, sex, gender and feminism will be analysed in
Chapter 9. The most popular perspective was of a neutral and asexual science which
could be improved by more rigorous application of traditional scientific methods.
Although sexism was recognised it was seen as separate from the content of science.
Women were said to do some things differently, but these were separate from
scientific knowledge. The concept of equality between men and women was also
important, leading students to advocate more women in science, and to dismiss
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suggestions that science was gendered as sexism. It is especially interesting that it was
women who were more concerned to stress a lack of gendering of science.
A minority did make some connections between gender and science, but were
vague about the nature of any links. Students did not adopt the feminist labels of
masculinity and femininity on certain qualities in science. Moreover, certain
supposedly oppositional qualities which were associated with masculinity and
femininity in the feminist literature were named as important in science by students,
and viewed as complementary.
Students' perspectives on changing science reflected these views. Most
favoured a continuation of the present approach in science and stressed balance
between male and female, masculinity and femininity. Even those who were more
skeptical about the notion of objectivity being able to provide true, unbiased results,
wished to retain it as the ultimate goal of good science.
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Chapter 8 Practitioner Interviews
8.1 Introduction
This chapter is split into six main sections. The length of each reflects the
richness of the data, and is necessary to illustrate the inevitably complex and
apparently contradictory elements of practitioners' responses. In section 8.2 I
consider social relations in the scientific community. I also look briefly at social
relations between the scientific and wider communities. This deals with issues that
arose in relation to women's experiences of both informal (eg networking) and formal
(eg employment hierarchy) social relations. In section 8.3 I look more at the research
practice of science, in particular at the topics that scientists study and their methods of
study.
The main approach in these sections is descriptive. I aim to provide details of
how science functions normally and the place of women therein. I am concerned with
how gender relations shape all areas of scientific practice. Although these are two
separate sections the distinction is used for convenience only. It is not meant to
suggest that research practice can somehow be separated from the social relations of
science. I would argue that research is fundamentally shaped by social relations, both
within and outwith science.
The fourth section concerns the ways in which these women would like
science to change, and the extent to which their wishes can be currently fulfilled. This
covers all aspects of science already introduced in sections 8.2 and 8.3. It is worth
mentioning here that the extent to which the women themselves see social relations
affecting science shapes their analysis of the potential for objective value-free science.
Women who argue for the traditional positivist empiricist model of science do not
make a connection between social relations and research practice, whilst those who
are more critical do not make a separation.
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The fifth section concerns these women's views on feminist epistemology and
theory more generally, particularly its relevance and usefulness for changing science.
8.2 Gender Relations: The Scientific Community
8.2.1 Lifestyle
Around 12 of the women practitioners and critics commented on the lifestyle
of the scientist. The most common themes are about how women's lives do not readily
fit in with the large amount of time required of scientists in order for them to succeed
in science. This was attributed mainly to women's role as mothers and as members of
the community more generally.
Certainly women are traditionally, and I think that it is still true amongst
professional women, women are still likely to have responsibility at home for
the kids. Who makes the final decisions, I mean who sees it as their
responsibility to organise child care ... is more likely to be a woman, and in
that sense integration of their role as a scientist with other aspects of their
personal life is going to be different. And a telling example of that would be
looking at something like high energy physics [Sharon Traweek's work] ...
there is this notion of beam time, so the team have to get onto the accelerator
... [via] time share arrangements ... and that may mean working through the
night... The implications for women are huge. (C1B)
This is not only relevant to high tech laboratory work, but can also be used to isolate
women in a more direct way in any science:
I was doing work on gaits of animals, for example, and we have a Kinesiology
Department, and when I couldn't get a job I was really depressed because I
really like doing research more than anything in the world ... and two of the
people in Kinesiology came up to me and said, 'we'd let you use our
equipment if you come when no one is using it, or maybe in the middle of the
night', which I remember was a complete turn off and I just didn't think they
would do that to a man, they would say, 'Why don't you come and join our
research and we can get you something you want', instead of isolating me and
making it obvious I wasn't wanted ... but feeling that they had to do
something. (P2B)
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It was felt by this respondent that the men's offer would be more helpful for a man
than a woman. Another example illustrates how men can manage to deal with the
commitments expected of them in science more easily than women:
Men suffer from that too because they have families ... what Brian says I
guess, he's got a fixation about keeping to that role, if he shows any deviance
from that role this little voice in his head tells him he's not serious about
science if he spends time with his kids so he programmes a certain amount of
time for his kids, and that's it. He's heading for a crisis, you can't just run your
life like that. (P4P)
The corollary of this situation is that for women to fit into science they may choose to
adopt more acceptable standards of behaviour. In its most extreme form this can
involve setting up a disjuncture between their biological and emotional self as this
quotation illustrates:
I was driving to work one day and I saw a woman who was pregnant and who
was pushing a stroller and what went through my mind was, 'oh, what a
boring person'. And then myself being pregnant in the car driving by I thought,
'holy shit... I'm thinking about myself ... I couldn't any more see myself as a
man, or as an androgynous figure ... I really had to identify as a woman and
that was profound. (P8B)
The choice between a career in science and a family is still a problem for women in
science. All of this information suggests that success in science is related to
suppression of a life apart from science. This is, of course, widely acknowledged in
the women in science literature, detailed in Chapter 2, and has parallels in other
professions that are traditionally male-dominated.
8.2.2 Style of Interaction
A large majority (24) of women I spoke to mentioned the issue of style of
interaction amongst scientists. This can be subdivided into two main areas: support
and networking, and most significantly style of collaboration in research. Looking first
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at networking and support, a common theme of women experiencing a sense of
isolation from male networks emerged:
When I was in Graduate school, every woman will tell you this, I was the only
female in my class. OK for the first day the homework is due the boys are off
working together automatically and they would say, 'oh we're going to go and
do our homework', and they never asked me. So I played this trick, I used to
invite them to dinner... I mean is that classic or what? Eventually I just forced
my way into this group and I became pals with them but it was not automatic.
I remember another incident which I guess they all thought was wildly funny
and I came back from class one day and ... open on my desk was a Playgirl
centrefold - a naked man, which I was horrifically embarrassed about but I
didn't make a big deal about... it was just a real reminder, you can be pals with
us, but you're not our pal, you're different. (P9P)
This experience of isolation increases as women move up the hierarchy in science:
The further I've gone the worst its gotten. You think, 'Oh, I just have to make
it through this one hurdle, itH be OK, there'll be more women, women will be
coming along', ... and what I've found is that its got worse the higher up you
go. (P10P)
This can have serious consequences for women's success in gaining funding and
promotion:
There's nobody to look out for me to say that's the path I should take. Another
thing that's crucial particularly when you get in a tenure track position is that
none of the senior staff have ever said anything to me about what I should be
doing or how I could advance, or, 'maybe you should be giving that talk, or
writing that paper', no advice or anything like, 'gee, I think you're ready for
tenure'... The only mentoring we get is if we go up and demand it, which is a
hell of a hard thing to do, because these guys are not approachable. (P10P)
This woman continued to talk about her own involvement in feminism in science:
In my own personal case I've pissed off a lot of people in fighting for the issue
of women here, like protecting particular people here against particular things,
or fighting to hire people ... I've made a lot of men angry, so then how do I
turn round and say, 'gee can you give me some advice on how to advance?'
and I look around at my male colleagues and they ... have got protectors never
mind mentors, people who are holding their hands, both of them ... lifting
them! (P10P)
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So women's isolation for women can be exacerbated by involvement in feminism.
Another aspect of women's status in science concerns the reception of their
work by their peers and technicians:
I think when it comes to experimental design there's this kind of prejudice that
girls will not be as good at something that functions [like] machinery or
computers ... anything that's ... machine based. I think they expect us to have
more trouble. Things like I've done drawings for workshops to get things built
and [the technicians have] questioned me a lot more closely than they would a
male ... I think things like interpretation of data, data used and ignored, I think
that's got more to do with confidence than gender ... some of the other girls
I've seen, as well as myself, tend to be less confident in presenting results, and
therefore they sense that you're less confident and they question you more
closely. I don't think it's because you're a girl, I think it's because you're less
confident in presenting your data. (P12P)
However, I would argue, being a woman in a male dominated profession clearly
contributes to lack of confidence, so gender is a factor here. If women in science fail
to adopt standard confident and competitive behaviour their results can be subjected
to more scrutiny than is typical and may even be rejected - this clearly impacts on the
content of scientific knowledge.
Other women spoke of their adaptation to the competitive style of science:
What do you mean by male? Do you mean like male gender: aggressiveness,
competitiveness, curiosity, experimentation? These are just labels for
behaviour that culture calls male ... so if a woman wants to behave like this
she can go into physics, right? So she'll be culturally called masculine. So in
that sense, to take cultural norms, what are all the things we have to do? We
have to be loud, obnoxious, egocentric ... aggressive, competitive. (P4P).
Self aggrandising! (P5P)
Self aggrandising, articulate, verbal ... you know, all these things are
traditionally called male behaviour. In order to do physics, yes, you have to
behave like this ... I don't know how I could do it otherwise. I find that if I'm
going to a conference and unless I [raise] my ... little voice ... I get ignored.
Everyone is sitting there going, you know [puts on deep voice] 'let me show
you this graph'. (P4P)
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Another woman made a similar comment:
One of the things that you have to learn is a rather macho trait - you have to
be very tough, and just ... argue back ... I know the first time I got rude
comments made about a paper I was in floods of tears, I was terrible upset,
and my supervisor took me to one side and said, 'y°u just have to answer
back', and I thought, 'right, I'll answer back', and I duly did. I learnt that, and
then I got stroppy about it, and when you've learnt to get stroppy about it you
can always pick holes in the referees' comments ... But, it's a macho trait
undoubtedly. (C1B)
The competitive style of science shapes research as well as publications:
I think [women will] be more [oriented] towards groups ... there will be more
help, less fear of giving away information. A lot of men that I've come across
will... where a spread of information will be to the good of all, they will not
do it because it's to their own detriment. (P12P)
Restrictions placed on information have repercussions in the type of scientific research
that is done, and the conclusions reached.
A related issue is style of collaboration in research. Group work is the norm in
most experimental scientific research; although scientists in particular research areas,
eg animal behaviour, or with more theoretical interests, tend to work alone. Some
scientists can choose whether to work alone or in groups, eg when working in
materials science. Groups are arranged hierarchically and there are a range of
scientists within each group with different levels of experience, including PhD
students, postdocs, researchers and senior researchers, who are in control of the
project. Membership of groups can change with different research topics. Sometimes
groups collaborate and in some disciplines groups remain more stable. There is a
competition between groups, and inter and intra group competition between
individuals at the same stage in their career. Younger researchers tend to be
particularly competitive, as this is important in establishing their career.
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Twenty-one of my interviewees mentioned that the competitive and
individualistic values in the process of group work was at odds with the more
collaborative style that they favoured. Most argued that this was due to earlier gender
socialisation, which they saw as encouraging competitiveness in men and
collaboration in women. Non conformity to the stereotype was, however, noted.
Deviance from the typical approach in science can act to marginalise women:
I'm in this collaboration at the moment ... with one woman and two men ...
and the minute the men start the way they do, their ping pong game of this
idea and that idea, I just don't play that game, I play a different game ... I
communicate in a different style ... I find myself just shutting up ... so I know
in those collaborations I appear as if I don't know what's going on ... especially
in this one collaboration which was originally my idea ... I'm finding that
they're getting together without telling me ... I'm just more and more on the
side lines. (P12P)
Often women shed their collaborative style in favour of the dominant one in order to
evade marginalisation:
... there are some more collaborative instincts and less competitive instincts
that still come through [in women in science] but by the time you get tenure
you'd be lucky if it hasn't been beaten out of you ... I just think the whole
process is so self enforcing, so directing, it's very difficult to escape . (P13B)
However, adopting typical values in science still does not guarantee success for
women. The following discussion portrays the ways acceptability is defined according
to how 'appropriate' the scientists' behaviour is to their sex:
In high energy physics there are quite a few women who have gained
reputations for being obnoxious and so on ... when you're at the front of the
room giving your lecture and there's 300 men listening to you and they start...
saying, 'you're wrong, how can you put that up, how can you say that?'... a lot
ofmen seem to feel comfortable with this. I don't. A lot of the women who are
exposed to this, feel I think that they have to act the same way to be treated as
a colleague. However I think the problem is when women start acting
obnoxious and so on, they get these bad reputations. (P4P)
I've been called a 'pushy broad' to my face ... with a witness. (P6P)
169
Well there's this good example ... in high energy physics a woman had applied
for a job here a few years ago and she's from Harvard, and from what I
understand she was trying to get ENSERC funding for the grant but she went
to some meeting where ... the administrator for science and technology was
there, and she hoped, I guess, to convince him to get the money flowing her
way and he just looked at her and said, 'you're the most obnoxious person I've
ever met', and of course she didn't get the money. (P4P)
If acting feminine in the sense of being demure and quiet rather than
aggressive actually got you ENSERCs and attention and consideration, then
maybe we'd be acting more demure ... well it doesn't... so you end up acting
in a way which is closer to the already established way of behaving in physics
which is male. (P5P)
This is a classic 'Catch 22' situation: to succeed in science women (and men) have to
adopt a particular style of interaction. However when women do this they can be
penalised, even to the extent that they do not get funding or promotion, as these
characteristics in women are unseemly and, apparently threatening to men in science.
These women clearly perceive a link between stereotypical masculine values and those
expected in science. However, as is the case in wider society, when women exhibit
'masculine' behaviour it is seen as excessive and inappropriate.
Once more, the style of interaction amongst scientists can affect the content of
scientific knowledge:
Some feminists who don't challenge the basic view of science nonetheless run
their laboratories quite differently from the way men do. That in itself might
affect the science they do and the way the science gets done. I mean, if the
relationships are more open and other people have more of a role to play in
the formulation of questions and things like that, then I would think that
would clearly make a difference than if you had a very hierarchical top down
model. Again, which isn't to say that all women are non-hierarchical and all
men are hierarchical, but I do think in general there often is a difference. I
think that would impact on science even if women accept the reductionist
framework, so I think it's really a political issue, certainly not a gender issue,
except to the extent that gender is political. (C2B)
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The social relations that have an effect on scientific knowledge can come from
something as basic as the organisation of the laboratory.
8.2.3 Student Relations
The main issue, mentioned by 6 women, about the way scientists interact with
students was sexism. The most harrowing example of this is as follows:
I was the only woman in theoretical chemistry at the time ... I had a lot of
problems with sexual harassment on the part of a particular faculty member. I
had mobility problems at the time ... in the February of my first year [Masters]
he offered me a ride home and sexually assaulted me ... I didn't know what to
do. I decided quitting was not an option ... there was another student who quit
because of the same professor ... People would probably admit that this guy's
behaviour was inappropriate but no one was willing to do anything about it...
I did my best to avoid him .. in certain respects he stalked me ... to the point
that I was afraid to work in the building after hours, and that's pretty essential
when you're a graduate student ... The harassment continued, there were
phone calls basically saying that... he was chairing the Graduate Studies now
and my life would be a lot easier now if I got to know him a bit better ... now
the University has processes in place to deal with this kind of thing but in the
late '70s it didn't ... even when I was away from the University working I
continued to get phone calls from this guy. One day he was at the end of the
walkway [where I live] so I went to the Rape Crisis Centre and they helped
me do the spade work for a civil harassment suit and once I made it clear to
him that I was prepared to follow through then he stopped. (P14C)
In practice the existence of processes to deal with harassment are only a partial
solution. The repercussions of complaining are not to be taken lightly:
I think ... if you complain ... you just get a big backlash against you ... One of
my students was in a civil harassment case that happened in December ... it
really destroyed her next term and she didn't come back to University, so that
doesn't seem to be a good solution, and she won, many of them don't win, and
by winning they said they wouldn't rehire this sessional man who had been
harassing her. (P2B)
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Other women spoke about weaker degrees of sexism such as sexist comments and
reduced expectations from women students. However sexism at all levels of severity
still plays a role in excluding and isolating women science students.
Women may also be more inclined to support students, and organise their
laboratories differently to enhance the effectiveness of their teaching:
I was talking with a technician ... who has been working here for quite a while
... [and she commented] that she perceived me to be much more interested in
the educational aspects of running a laboratory [than a male colleague]. I think
she was also referring to the human connection ... I have a former PhD student
who's now postdocing with ... one of the world's top entomologists, and ... he
commented to me that I take a much deeper, more profound interest in the
welfare of my students ... it's generally recognised that in my lab the culture is
non-competitive. In fact that's quite difficult to do sometimes, because of the
nature [of the relationship]. When there is a senior person there is a tendency
to ... compete for attention and favour, and it's not always easy to prevent that
... But I think that I certainly don't try to enhance it, as a tool to get people to
work harder, or whatever. My sense is that what I'm talking about [is that]
there are differences in terms of the management of activity, the conduct of
research, and also in terms of the choice of problems and the manner in which
they're pursued. (P16C)
Interestingly, this difference in approach between male and female scientists also has
the potential to affect the content of scientific knowledge.
8.2.4 Scientists in the Wider Community
The third and final issue concerning the scientific community that a few
practicing feminist scientists talked about was scientists' position in the academic and
local community. As discussed in Chapter 3, scientists are an elite group with a vested
interest in maintaining a position of authority that seems to revolve around their
'neutral' stance. This woman described her experience of hostility to her involvement
in a course on Women's Biology that was considered sociology, not biology by her
male peers:
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People really do have this sort of belief that natural sciences are sort of above
and beyond ... they're neutral and objective ... and also ... I don't know what is
behind this, but politically scientists tend to be to the right of people in other
disciplines and so anything that seems to imply a sort of social participation
seems to be highly offensive on political grounds. (P17B)
In my view it might be that this hostility arose because social participation implies
science is social knowledge, as opposed to neutral and objective. The maintenance of
the image of the objective word of the scientist in the wider community is important
to scientists, and must be protected:
There's a lot of resistance [amongst scientists to increased public participation]
and many scientists say that the kinds of decisions that are made are too
technical and you need too much knowledge to make them accessible to the
general public. I disagree - I think that there are a lot of value judgments
buried in those decisions and that they are indeed accessible to the public -
especially informed members of the public as many advocacy groups become.
(P13B)
The reasons for scientists' desire to protect their neutral image are clearly related to a
protection of their status and power in society.
8.2.5 Employment Hierarchy
Roughly half of the women I spoke to mentioned the employment hierarchy.
This is a hierarchy of qualification and discipline: from Professor to research assistant.
Permanant (or tenured) positions are also more prestigious than temporary
positions.Teaching is also of less status and value than research as publication rate is
the main determinant of position as opposed to good teaching practice. The
disciplinary hierarchy, which is more informal but nevertheless powerful, places so
called 'soft' sciences, from sociology through psychology to biology in ascending
order, followed by chemistry and ultimately physics. The following quotation
illustrates this hierarchy:
There's really huge barriers, because whenever you talk about anything real in
biology then itk called sociology. I know that way back in 1978 at my very
173
first evaluation as a Professor when ... at that time I was one of two people
who had outside grants for doing biological research for the Science Council
and I'd done all my teaching ... and I'd done all the things I was supposed to
do and somebody put a black mark on my evaluation saying I wasn't really
doing biology I was doing sociology ... and at the time I was doing fungal
research on mosquitoes but they were mad at me because I was teaching this
course on Women's Biology. (P17B)
These barriers can also mean that the 'core' sciences remain the least 'contaminated'
with politics and social values whereas the more marginalised sciences, eg
Biostatistics, are more open to feminist influence and women scientists (P18P). The
history of women's involvement in crystallography is one such example (P18P). Note
also that in this case, although teaching is generally less valued than research,
'heretical' teaching is used here as a reason for denying promotion. The hierarchy is
flexible when it needs to be to maintain the status quo.
The main issue for women's employment in science departments in universities
is what (P18P) describes as the 'augmenting exclusion effect'. This is where the
numbers of women diminishes as one moves up the hierarchy. For women there are
several reasons for not moving up the hierarchy: women may not place so much
emphasis on a career in science. It is easier for women to opt out for a variety of
reasons like wanting to have children or, more likely, disillusionment with the high
work load and stress levels associated with working in science:
I think [men] feel the same way [about the structure of science] but I don't
think they ever think about opting out, whereas I think we think daily about
that... they say, 'I'm going to follow these rules because I have to, I'm going
to stay here, I need this job, this is my life', whereas women are saying, 'well,
this could be my life, but I can always opt out'. (PI IP)
Women are also, typically, less confident, and there is evidence that fewer women
than men are actually applying for senior jobs (C1B). This is also common in other
professional areas.
Although some women opt out others are clearly pushed:
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Now ... why is it [that women leave science]? I mean you can speculate - we
don't know whether they're choosing to leave, 'oh gee, I've just worked my
butt off for 5 years getting my PhD and now that I've had that much fun I
think I'll just go home and take care of the kids'. To me that just doesn't ring
true, I think it's just an excuse, but it's possible that women choose to leave
astronomy for some reason more than men, and it's possible because they're
not being offered the jobs. (P9P)
This is certainly a factor, as 10 of the interviewees argued, some of whom had been
actively discriminated against in gaining tenure, for example:
After gaining my PhD I got a job teaching at the University and everything
was going fine and I published a lot of papers, but then when I'd taught there
for about 4 years it came time to get tenure, and although I had about 20
papers at that time they wouldn't give me tenure, and I thought, 'this is weird',
because they were giving it to men with far fewer. (P2B)
Two other women were also denied a place on physics courses at university because
'women don't do physics' and opted to do chemistry instead.
The reasons behind this kind of discrimination are complex. One respondent
refers to the 'old buffaloes', or the 'high quality senior peers' if one is more polite, that
decide who gets promotion. These are the father figures at the top of the hierarchy:
[Science is] hierarchical, it's patriarchal, it's that old system of the hierarchy
where the access to knowledge depends on rank and the lower ranks know
less that the upper ranks and the information is carefully distributed ... by this
very broad system of teaching and by not considering any knowledge that is
not transferred in that hierarchy as valid knowledge. (P18P)
This also means that success is somehow dependent on similarity with those at the
top:
You need to get in a gate ... now there are gatekeepers and the gatekeepers
tend to let people in who are like themselves ... and this is very damaging to
science because what you do is you clone yourself. (PI IP)
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This club is not necessarily exclusive to men, because as we have seen in the previous
section women scientists can adopt accepted values:
I used to think that getting more women into science would change it, but it
hasn't. Not that there are lots of women in science, but many of the women
who join science, partly because of the very rigorous approach to tenure, by
the time they come out they think, 'well, I went through all of this shit', and
they develop a commitment to the system that exists because they are now
beneficiaries. (P13B)
This also means that women who get to the top in science do not necessarily see any
need to help other women at the bottom, they did it on their own, so why can't
others?
However, not all women get their politics 'beaten out of them' (P13B) as they
get through the promotion system, as 4 of the women interviewed demonstrated.
These women have a common experience: in order to get through the hurdles to
promotion they had to put their feminism on hold (P16C, P18P, C2B, P13B). It is
only once they achieved tenure that they began to bring their feminism into their work
in science.
Another interesting feature of the employment hierarchy is the way that
boundaries between different levels shape research science:
I had a similar collaboration, also led by a man who would not let
communication happen among the ranks. I had to go through him so that he
could contact this somewhat famous astronomer in Europe ... who was doing
a spectroscopy ... and he would not let me contact him ... and I was very upset
by this . (P10P)
But how could he stop you? (P11P)
He wouldn't give me his e-mail address! I was in Edinburgh and needed to find
out a part of the other project and ... under no circumstances was I to contact
this person ... that did affect the way the science was done because I couldn't
get the information I needed about what objects to select and so forth. It was
important that this fellow should be seen as PI [principle investigator], seen as
in charge of everything and in control of the flow of information, so it did have
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an impact on my science, and affected the collaboration ... there is an impact
on the science - the style has an effect on the science that's done ... in the
environment where this kind of hierarchical structure is imposed, it doesn't
allow me to think freely, to brain storm. (P10P)
Note that intellectual interaction in science is a crucial resource for developing new
knowledge, as well as for career advancement. The social relations of science, eg the
hierarchical structure, clearly affect the type of science that is done. As we shall see,
funding is another example of this type of interaction.
8.2.6 Funding
The premium on high publishing rates and correct results is an important
structural feature of science (P9P, P11P, P4P, P6P, P15B). In the case of publication
there is also evidence to suggest that papers with women's names are not valued as
highly as men's (research paper mentioned by P10P). However, interviewees tended
to talk more about funding, or the 'research rat race' (C3B).
Important features of funding seem to a preference for 'big science and big
grants', ie large grants for a small number of acceptable large projects (P19C, P13B,
PI IP, C1B, P17B). This means funding is highly competitive and requires a lot of self
promotion (C3B, P8B). Maintenance of this involves several interest groups:
I think that some of these vested interest are individual vested interests on the
part of some scientists who want to maintain their own careers ... of people
have invested ... a great deal of their life's work in a certain research field then
it& important to them that the credibility of that field be maintained and the
funding for that field be maintained, so there's an entrenched vested interest
there on the part of the academics who are already successful. But there are
also political and corporate vested interests that also operate on science
through funding ... so all those things act to maintain a fairly traditional
approach to science and that's where any resistance to any new approaches
[occurs]. (P13B)
The 'cloning' continues in the field of research funding as in employment promotion.
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It is also worth noting how funding is a key determinant in what research is
done. Some women I spoke to resented the way economic considerations determine
the science they perform:
Asking for money has totally changed the way its all done ... that's a problem
in all areas... economics has made the people that we serve different, we're no
longer serving nature and understanding, we're serving bureaucrats and
funders ... I think it's harder [to be creative now] because you are so busy
watching your professional profile. (P9P)
Also I think that you can't be wrong - that's part of the problem ... we have
fostered a way of doing science that you can't say outlandish things ... only
when you get to be that crusty old professor ... with an impeccable reputation,
then you can say what you want... if we started saying things that were a little
beyond the pale, our careers would be over. (P11P)
Publishing commitments also restrict the type of science that is done:
It's not just that, it's all the time - you have to publish so many papers a year
and if you don't spend all your time doing things that you absolutely know
inside out and have results [for] - in other words, not new or creative things -
you can't keep up that rate. (P10P)
Formal social relations in science also affect research practice in fundamental ways.
Scientists are very restricted ... people are very fortunate if what they are told
to do and what they are encouraged to do is in fact what their own interests
are ... and that pressure comes from within science ... people whose work is
considered interesting is funded ... people whose work is not considered
interesting is not funded. It's not just a question of quality for funding, it's
also what do people find interesting, or of value? (P19C)
This clearly restricts scientific research to particular projects, compatible with the
interests of the socially and economically powerful in society - a particularly small
group of white, upper class men.
8.2.7 Conclusion
There is a web of connections between all the issues discussed around the
social relations in the scientific community and beyond. The lifestyle of scientists,
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networking and style of collaboration and interactions with students and the wider
community, as well as the hierarchy of promotion, funding and publication, are all
interrelated and cannot be considered in isolation.
There is also important evidence to show how these social relations affect
scientific knowledge. This includes evidence that women scientists who are under
confident are more likely to have their work closely scrutinised, which has the
potential to affect the content of scientific knowledge; women who do not fit into the
dominant style of interaction can end up marginalised and their input into the content
of science will decrease; more generally the style of interaction in a group will affect
the choice of problems and conduct of research; the need to maintain hierarchical
boundaries can have a similar effect on scientific knowledge; funding is a key
determinant of what research gets done; and, finally, results are also shaped by the
pressure from the external funding bodies and the scientific community for new,
coherent and useful information. Not all of these issues are always gendered, but
gender clearly plays a part in as much as science is male dominated. Male scientists
appear to have more interest than their female colleagues in keeping things as they
are, as it is male scientists who reap the benefits.
From these interviews it emerges that a common thread binds social relations
in the scientific community - that is their association with characteristics of
competitiveness and confrontation and hierarchical structures. These are also
stereotypically 'masculine' values. Science is not gender neutral, and instead seems to
have a closer fit with a typical male lifestyle and 'masculine' style of interaction with
other scientists. Again it is shown that it is clearly easier for men to succeed in
science. However women can also succeed in science if they 'play the game'. In other
words these women can also adopt 'masculine' values throughout the process of
socialisation as a scientist. Women can 'buy into' the system; a process that can tend
to reduce support women might give to each other. However, women's acceptance of
masculine values in science does not necessarily guarantee success, as women can also
be penalised for breaking codes of acceptable female behaviour. Men as well as
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women may leave science if their behaviour is not legitimate. The male domination of
science also brings with it sexism directed against female students (and colleagues)
and generally creates a hostile environment for women. The issue of scientists
maintaining their position as an elite in the wider community is not directly gendered
in my discussions with these women, but the relatively powerful position in society of
predominantly male scientists must be recognised nonetheless.
There are clearly powerful traditions in science, that are reinforced through
generations of scientists. Male and masculine is still the favoured sex/gender of the
scientist. I now move on to consider gender and research practice. I hope to continue
to show that there are links between gender issues raised in this section and what
follows.
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8.3 Gender Relations: Research Practice
In this section I consider how gender relations might affect scientific practice.
This has several aspects, the most important of which can be grouped under the
following headings:
8.3.1 topics and questions
8.3.2 control of nature
8.3.3 objectivity/subjectivity
8.3.4 reductionism/holism
This involves a description of women's perspective on how research practice
functions 'normally', and of whether they practice science differently from men. What
is the role of gender in research practice?
8.3.1 Topics and Questions
There was a large amount of discussion about the topics and questions in
science (by a total of 17 women). The main subject was the way scientist's
background, specifically their sex and gender, affected science.
The majority of the women interviewed made a link between scientists' values
and the topics and question they focus on in science. For example, 2 practitioners
argued that women want to look at different problems in science because of their
upbringing:
Why would they not, out of their historical social experience, how they were
brought up, how they were trained, how their lives go, what their fathers and
their mothers give them, as an idea of their expectations, ask different
questions? (P18P)
Given the same set of information girls and boys will possibly identify different
problems - it's perhaps not surprising when we rear and nurture girls so
differently, that they have different world views, different concerns. (C6C)
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Others argued that any possible differences in the sexes' world views are limited by
the way science is organised:
In the biological sciences that I've seen I wouldn't have said that there was
necessarily a difference between women and men, I think where the difference
would arise is where those people that might question the scientific paradigm,
people like feminists, might ask a different set of questions ... things like
gender differences in the brain, or differences in homosexual brains ... I'm sad
to say there are a fair number of women who do that... my feeling is that, at
least for women, it's about.... that notion that you've got to take on board the
idea that you have to be a real scientist and think about these kinds of things.
(C1B)
Politics, which are not necessarily to do with gender, may be the driving force behind
some scientists' choice of topics, as this woman's story illustrates:
Much of the work I did in terms of energy transfer and damage was too
closely related to both atomic energy and the military ... for my liking ... and I
didn't want to do that sort of work even if I didn't apply for grants for the
commercially confidential or militarily restricted work. I've always been the
only one in my department that did not apply for anything that was sponsored
by the atomic energy commission or anything related to that or any branch of
the military. All of my other colleagues did that, and when those guys came
around they eventually accepted that I just would not go to the meeting. So
I've always worked with a very small research budget, but I began increasingly
to use the techniques of modern material science on ancient materials. In the
first place largely because it was a field which was absolutely impossible to
prevent in war terms because it dealt with the past... there wasn't a thing that
anyone could pervert into war [use]. (P18P)
Note here that the majority of the other scientists appear to be more apolitical than
consciously political about their work in military research. It is worth considering
further how funding shapes research topics:
In terms of the funding, the direction of funding comes from the white papers
and policy makers ... if they decide to put more money into defence then
projects which ask for money for defence are more likely to get funded ... I
don't think [that] in physics, it's very easy to separate the aspects of the policy
making from the individual aspirations. (P15B)
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I think that part of the problem is that people tend to go for research where
they can get funding ... hence Aids has been a good one and people who might
not necessarily do Aids research do it because they can get loads of money ...
my supervisor's like that - he has someone on an Aids project simply because
you can get money for it. (P20C)
Focusing on military research, as an example, there are a number of issues. One
woman explained how women are less likely to become involved:
I think men are more likely [to go into military research due to an interest] in
how much they earn ... there's a lot of money in it, most of the women I know
have deliberately avoided it. (P12P)
Three other women also said that they did not think women were as likely to do
military research (one of whom was a physicist). Four other physicists ( P3P, P2P,
P5P & P18P, quoted above) said they personally would not do military research
(although one was working in an area with potential applications - lasers) whilst only
one had worked in defence (P4P). The woman working in lasers spoke of her
disillusionment:
I must admit I'm finding it more and more difficult to motivate myself with my
work. What do I care if someday somebody makes a switch that's twice as fast
and we can send information down an optical fibre twice the speed we can
now? To me its becoming more important that I can work in an area of
physics where I feel it's going to make a difference to society. (P5P)
The problem for women in physics is that it is relatively difficult to avoid military
research, and some have to make compromises:
I didn't see anything bad in what I was doing ... I mean I wouldn't go out and
be part of a team that would build a nuclear bomb ... but tracking ships ...
that's more in case something goes bad ... its different from building a nuclear
bomb. (P6P)
For many women with a social conscience this is the kind of compromise they may
have to make to stay in physics.
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From these descriptions there is no clear association between topics in science
and the sex or gender of the scientist. Any differences that might arise from
upbringing are blurred by the compromises women make to stay in science. Political
sympathies, rather than gender, seem to guide a small minority of scientists into, or
away from, various research topics. The vast majority, however, appear not be
consciously political about their work, and are driven by a variety of reasons for
working in particular areas, eg available funding. It is difficult to draw a link between
topics and sex or gender in some branches of science that have relatively large
numbers of women - areas such as astronomy. Astronomy has no apparent link to the
living world, and tends to be highly impractical, so this cannot be used as a reason for
women's involvement. Neither is there any reason to assume any mystical link
between women and the stars. The reasons women have been in astronomy, as
opposed to the other hard sciences, in relatively large numbers, from the 18th century
onwards, is more likely to be linked to other factors, such as familial connections
(P10P).
However, topics in science may still manifest a 'masculine' world view (which
women in science and funders could also adopt):
What I notice is that the questions women ask are not readily covered by
existing research projects. Now that's terrific for me because it means I get to
think of all these interesting questions that they've never thought of because
nobody's ever talked to a worker ... and I get lots of money [mainly from
Quebec Unions] because they're original and exciting questions. But it also
says something about how science is run and how decisions are made about
what funding to give and what's interesting and what's not interesting ... [on]
funding organisations ... there is very little room for client participation ... For
example, you don't have groups of people who are represented on research
into social welfare. (P17B)
I think that Western culture isn't holistic in its approach and that certain kinds
of questions don't ever get asked ... the parts don't necessarily give you the
whole. (P15B)
The definitive features of Western society that shape the topics of scientific research
undoubtedly involve the capitalist economy and the way in which the powerful
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positions are dominated by men. However, as I have illustrated above, the majority of
scientists, male and female, are not in a position to be discriminating about what kind
of research they conduct. Only a strong political commitment will lead then to search
for particular fields that do not compromise their views.
8.3.2 Control of Nature
I have already noted that funding is a major factor shaping the aims and
objectives of science. Scientists' need to publish research, and the style of interaction
between scientists, also shapes the aims and objectives of particular scientific projects.
Here, I explore any other factors that might shape scientific knowledge. I have chosen
to focus on the popular feminist claim that the masculine desire for the control of
nature determines scientific practice. It is as a basic aim of research that 'control of
nature' might shape the entire content of scientific research (including the results).
Four illuminating themes are worth considering in some detail: the link between
control of nature and prestige in the scientific community; male ego and control;
different contexts of control; and the rhetoric of control, as opposed to the reality.
The first group discussion involved the first two of these themes:
It's my view that [science] somehow appears out there as dispassionate and
lacking human contact, because, and I think there is a gender difference here,
it has to do with conquering nature versus understanding nature. I think that
it's a product of ... male ego, the need to feel superior and on top of it and in
control of the situation that leads somehow to this male intellect that's
imposed ... and I will say this is not my experience. My experience of the way
I do science, and of many women that I know, and some men ... [is that we]
feel more in awe, more subservient, more in the service of understanding what
it is out there ... but I think unfortunately ... the ones who manipulate and
assume that role of power are the ones who get the funding, the promotion,
because its a sort of battleground out there. (P9P)
This woman is arguing that men need to control nature in order to feel superior, and
reinforce their fragile egos. She made a link between control of nature and control of
power in the scientific community. Another member of the same group of women
gave an example of how men in science exhibit this 'need' to control:
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I remember hiking once on a mountain in Tenerife, on a volcano, and we were
walking down there and there were these unusual snow formations, they were
spiky, funny little shapes. Instead of saying, 'Wow, that's really interesting', or
whatever, these guys were saying, 'Mmm, I think the sun shines from this
side...', or, 'No, the dust comes from this side', and they were virtually writing
a paper for Nature on the way down the mountain ... Over and over again, it's
all, 'Can we conquer this? Once we've defined it and explained it, I'm done
with it'. (P10P)
Here 'control' was equated with providing an acceptable explanation (in terms of
peer group evaluation) for natural phenomena. This contrasts with the views of one
woman in this group, who made a distinction between astronomy and other hard
sciences in terms of their ability to control nature:
About your biggest difference between astronomy and the other hard sciences
is ... we have no ability to really control our laboratory. It's basically out there,
and we can control how we measure it, but that's all we can control, and that's
really fundamental if you're trying to do experimental physics. (PI IP)
In astronomy there is a lack of control of nature via experimental design, but, the
above comments suggest control may be achieved through providing acceptable
explanations of natural phenomena.
Other discussions of control are less concrete. Two other women also linked
what they saw as men's 'need' to control nature with science. One (C6C) gave an
example of a woman who shut down her research lab after deciding that she no longer
wanted to work with her male colleagues in improving trees, and wanted to work on
how to preserve them instead. This interviewee also argued that the 'Master molecule
concept ... [is] related to men's need to control ... the way we rear boys into men
means that they have to be in control'. Another woman made a similar point 'men just
tend to think of themselves as being so far above ... in control of nature' (P20C). One
other woman, who has just had a child, made a similar argument and linked women's
understanding of nature with their biological sex:
I think [with] the process of pregnancy and childbirth, whatever you've
thought before, is going to have an effect on how you react afterwards to
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natural processes ... women are forced to be more involved with nature.
(P21P).
And ... have you taken that into your work as a scientist? (AK)
No .. not really ... I think I've always thought that it was better to work with
nature ... but on the other hand I also think it's important and exciting to go
out into space and there's an immediate conflict because progress requires
some manipulation [of nature], so I've accepted that virtue sometimes goes
with what they call the naturists, but on the other hand I think that we,
naturally as human beings, will take on the responsibility ... I would argue in
terms of responsibility ... whether men are more responsible than women
about controlling nature and how far they will go ... I think that perhaps the
fact that you're a woman and you're closer to nature ... means that you'll be
more cautious in the steps you take to control ... so I think there is a
difference. (P21P)
The theme of male need for control remains, but from a different perspective: men
have a more responsible approach to nature as a result of their alienation (in contrast
women are closer to nature, and 'less objective'). Note also that this interviewee did
not think that her 'closeness to nature' shaped her practice of science. In addition, the
conflict between good and bad aspects of control is also introduced, and echoed in the
following quote:
I don't think control of nature ... is ... necessary [in science] ... unless ... well,
that's a difficult one, because ... it's good if you're controlling disease, but then
... do you terminate a fetus that has a disease? (P12P)
Here the notion of technological control, as distinct from experimental control, is
introduced.
One of the respondents' views of the relationship between control and
understanding are also interesting. This woman argued that the idea of control in
science is unachievable, and distinct from understanding:
The idea of controlling nature, and the belief that we will ever get to that ...
[is] a consequence of the reductionist philosophy, and indeed, of the
reductionist methodology ... I have always wanted to believe that nature will
have the last laugh ... there's part of me that doesn't want the brain to be
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completely explained, and probably it won't ... because ... we have levels of
understanding and we're never going to integrate all of them. So ... I don't
want to be able to control nature completely ... understand it, but not to
control it. (C1B)
An interesting contradiction arises here. Initially control is linked with understanding
(the function of the brain) but later in the same statement a distinction is made
between understanding and control.
Finally, the links between masculinity and control may be rhetorical:
In the history of science I suppose [control has] become associated with
[masculinity]... in ... the sort of things Bacon wrote about, but it's also about
the rise ofCapitalism, so it's not exclusively a male thing, no. (C1B)
From these women's descriptions 'control of nature' in the context of scientific
practice clearly can have several different meanings. Notably, the links made
between masculinity and control, in addition to the links between understanding and
control, are flexible, and few of the comments are grounded in concrete examples of
practice. The implications of this will be discussed further in Chapter 9.
8.3.3 Objectivity
I now move on to look at one of the major themes in this thesis: objectivity. I
consider the main aspects of scientific practice: including research design,
methodology, data taking and analysis. Note that objectivity encompasses several
different concepts in science. 'Being objective' is thought of as being unbiased and
neutral when observing natural phenomenon, and is valued highly, as it is seen to give
better, more factual results. This is linked to keeping politics out of science, and also
separating knowledge from experience more generally, particularly emotion and
feelings (be it the experience of the actual scientist or the subject of investigation). An
impersonal and dispassionate approach is instead favoured. The women I interviewed
described science-as-usual in these terms. A particularly telling example was the
188
following anecdote where native Canadian elders' knowledge is contrasted with
scientific knowledge:
The native elders [in the Canadian Arctic] and the biologists disagreed [about]
the size of herds of reindeers ... derived [by the elders] from how much bark
was eaten off the trees and so on ... eventually the wildlife biologists went
back because the native leaders said, 'our science points to much larger herds'
... [the biologists] did the [calculations] again and the size was large ... in
terms that native elders had said ... That's the consequence of science being an
enterprise that separates knowledge from experience, and of course that's the
glory of science ... someone can learn to build a bridge from someone who's
never built a bridge [via a book]... But there are things that can't be treated
like that, and through the success of science we are now left with a body of
practitioners, most of them men, and all of them trained in that hierarchical
structure, and a set of unresolved problems because the methodologies they've
worked on were applied and applied and applied and the problems were
generated in order to make the methodologies work. (P18P)
Here the premium placed on objectivity by modern science is contrasted with more
traditional forms of knowledge, which rely on empirical knowledge and experiences.
The elders' tacit knowledge of the forest and the herd was seen to be important in
their analysis of the situation. In contrast, modern science was viewed as involved
with the application of set methods, based on previous research, for understanding
natural phenomena, and, in effect, a different kind of tacit knowledge, based on
scientific experience.
All of the women I spoke to maintain that the objectivity of science is a myth,
as scientific practice does allow values to permeate knowledge. Although there was
disagreement on the extent of this permeation, and the links between masculinity and
objectivity, all agreed that objectivity should be the ultimate aim of science. I now
explore these three themes in more detail.
The following discussion concerns the place of values in science:
Taking data and analysing I think are pretty objective - those are the tools we
learn, how to measure the spectrum, how to plot up the results - but there are
subjective parts at the ... beginning and the end which is the choosing of the
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problem and the interpretation of the results ... I think it's a shame that science
is portrayed as reductionist and somehow dispassionate because it is
absolutely subjective ... at the beginning and the end points, and whatever you
see up there in nature is going to be a product of what your eyes and brain are
able to see and interpret... I think that any scientist will say that it is, at a very
personal level, very passionate. (P9P)
This is an interesting view of scientific objectivity on three counts. First the objective
part of scientific investigation is viewed as the data collection, and statistical analysis,
whereas subjectivities are seen as shaping the scientific knowledge as they determine
the problem choice and the interpretation of the results. Second, subjectivities are
linked with personal emotion and passion for scientific research, ie the desire to find a
good answer for a fascinating question about how nature works. This passion shapes
scientists' questions and answers. Third, subjectivities are seen as personal in another
way - 'what your eyes and brain are able to see and interpret' - ability and personal
'quirks' in the way thoughts progress shape scientists' interpretation of their results.
In contrast, another woman argued science is concerned with objectivity and
this is no more associated with men than women:
I think whether one defined science as female or male depends to a large part
on what one understands science to be. I understand science to be simply
asking questions and finding out the answers in ways that are objective, and in
that case I think absolutely it is not male or female ... I'm just almost insulted
by that, because of course women can do that as well! (P9P)
As I have already argued it is important for women in science to stress that they can
be just as objective as men:
I hate to think that women wouldn't be as objective ... and I don't have any
evidence that they wouldn't be ... thinking of objectivity as the opposite from
emotionality ... I would be really upset if I found that women were somehow
more emotional, therefore somehow that affected their science, because I
guess we're so trained that you have to be objective to be a scientist. (P2B)
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The links made here between emotional suppression being necessary for objectivity,
also contrast with the earlier view of scientists' passion for their work.
Nevertheless, links between objectivity and masculinity were drawn by some
women. Once more, the main issue was emotional suppression:
If [objectivity] is standing back and separating oneself... one cannot do this ...
they're not recognising how a psychological, emotional factor is intervening
here, and I think separation is a psychological and emotional need for males.
But I don't believe the science they produce is therefore better. I think if one
recognises the self involvement in it then one is likely to be more objective, in
the way I think of as being objective, that is taking into account all the aspects
that are there. (C6C)
Objectivity was seen as a dispassionate approach to nature. This is taken to be a male
psychological need. But, such separation is viewed as impossible, and scientists'
attempts to deny their self involvement, are considered as contributing to bad science.
In contrast, the best type of science is perceived as being one that involves a thorough
exploration of all of the ways in which the scientists' 'self is involved in their view of
the natural world. Note that in a certain way the goal of objectivity is not entirely
rejected. Transparency in scientific knowledge claims is not unrelated to the notion of
impartiality. Once other scientists have all the information about what has shaped a
particular piece of research, a more 'objective' evaluation of the science can be made.
The theme of emotional suppression continues in the following quote:
There is desensitisation of the biologist as part of their training, how you have
to learn to pith the frog without showing any emotion ... Michael Lynch ... did
an ethnographic study of neuroscientists working with animals in the lab ...
and ... they never write about it of course ... the rather disgusting language ...
of jabbing a rat with needles and ... throwing it around and saying, 'oh, this
one's fucked', and so on. There are some fairly gruesome descriptions from
their verbal speech, which of course never appears in the written paper ...
[which] is full of euphemisms like sacrifice ... I've written some stuff on the
ways that [those] kind of attitudes are masculine ... they're part of the ...
macho cult that I think is undoubtedly there in the laboratory, I mean I've seen
it... if you can't stomach it you're being effeminate. (C1B)
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This woman viewed desensitisation of the biologist to the pain they inflict on animals
as part of their training to be 'objective' scientists. A link was also drawn between
machismo and lack of sensitivity.
Others were less sure of any link:
I guess I couldn't say yes to that [question, 'is objectivity male?'] ... the reason
is if you look at the women who are in science now, by in large they're using
the same methods. What it represents is not so much men and women but it
represents the way that science has been done in the past - there's been a
pretence of objectivity ... which isn't all bad ... many of the methods in
statistics that guard against bias are good ... I don't think they should be
thrown out... I would like to be able to say that this is the male way of doing
science and this the [female] way ... all you have to do is to admit more
women into science and it will change, but I don't think that's true ... I think
you have to change the way science is, I think that men and women have to
work together to change the way that science operates, and I think there's an
increasing number of men who would also like to see science opened up ...
Although you might want to associate the pattern of behaviour with maleness
rather than femaleness, I think it will require a big change in both men and
women's behaviour ... that will benefit both men and women. (P13B)
This respondent regarded the association between men and objectivity as historical,
and viewed it as unrepresentative of the situation today, given women's use of
objective methods. In a way, she wished it was as uncomplicated as science being a
male way of doing things and becoming neutral when more women entered, because it
would be easier to solve. However, women's adoption of orthodox methods and
some men's rejection of these methods complicates the situation. Her argument that
not all features of objectivity are bad, eg guarding against statistical bias, adds further
complexity to the picture of gender and science.
Another interesting interpretation of the links between masculinity and
objectivity was that it is rhetorical:
The idea that science is objective I'd say is pretty wrong, and it doesn't matter
if it's male or female doing it, it's subjective ... in that regard I don't think of it
as being objective and feminine as not being objective ... [and] emotional. But
the thing is how we do science and how science is defined has been done
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almost exclusively by men in our history and so its not surprisingly that men
define it as being objective and then women don't fit into that definition ... I
think that we are all fairly subjective, we try not to be, we try to be objective
in those final stages, but I realise all the while it's so common that people find
what they're looking for ... they find what they set out to find and they do it
well. (P11P)
Once more the subjectivities of scientists (both male and female) are seen as colouring
their interpretation of nature. The link between objectivity and masculinity was seen
as a deliberate attempt by men to keep science a male preserve.
Three of the respondents (P21P, P1B, P12P) also argued that the 'harder'
sciences are more objective in the sense of being gender neutral (primarily because
they deal with inanimate objects and it is more difficult to add a 'social' dimension to
such science); although respondents did concede that there is a problem in all science
of, 'finding what you're looking for' (P21P). In other words physics was seen by these
practitioners as more 'gender-objective' but not more 'scientifically objective'.
This information builds an elaborate picture of the complex nature of
objectivity in science and of the relationship between objectivity and masculinity.
Science is clearly not perceived to be objective, but to be bound up with subjectivities.
The emphasis on how passion for science and personal 'quirks' shape scientific
questions and explanations is important, as is the view that scientists 'find what they
are looking for'. Nevertheless, interviewees identified different 'levels' of objectivity.
Some of these levels may be more achievable than others, eg rigour in data collection
and statistical analysis to eliminate statistical bias. Others argued that different
disciplines of science may be more objective about certain factors, eg the 'hard'
sciences could be more gender-neutral.
The association of objectivity with masculinity is equally complicated.
Scientists' desensitisation to animal experimentation was linked with machismo and it
was suggested that the pretence of separation implicit in objectivity is a male
psychological need. The historical association between masculinity and science,
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especially the association made by male scientists in their rhetoric about links between
objectivity and masculinity (to keep science a male preserve), were also highlighted by
some practitioners.
8.3.4 Reductionism and Holism
Another major issue in research practice is reductionism and holism. To recap
briefly, a reductionist approach, or model, focuses on a small aspect of the whole, for
example this might be the dominant molecule in a group (the 'Master Molecule' as
Keller has labelled the concept) as opposed to focusing on the interactions between all
of the molecules. Reductionism can apply at different stages in research, for example
research questions or interpretation and analysis of data could be reductionist.
Reductionist models and metaphors might also be used. Reductionism is compatible
with a traditional interpretation of objectivity where the aim is to minimise context, eg
social and environmental factors, the 'noise' in the experiment. A holistic approach
concerns the whole picture - in the example this would mean looking at the dynamics
of the group of molecules and how this links with other groups or factors, which
could include environmental and social issues, depending on the level of complexity.
Holistic models and metaphors emphasise context and complexity.
There were two strands to the discussion. The first was the extent to which
reductionism is the dominant approach in science, and how it varies across particular
branches of science. The second issue was to what extent reductionism is masculine
and holism feminine.
Reductionism was perceived to be the preferred approach in science,
particularly the hard sciences.
Science does tend to ... in the sense that it is reductionist, and tends towards
mechanistic explanations, it is epistemologically loaded towards a particular
narrow kind of interpretive framework. And I think that does tend to constrain
people's thinking. (C1B)
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Note there was a link made between reductionism and mechanistic models and
metaphors.
In some sciences, for example astronomy, reductionism was considered a
difficult ideal to achieve:
The biggest difference between astronomy and other hard sciences is ... we
have no ability to control our laboratory - it's basically out there and we can
control how we measure it, but that's all we can control, and that's really
fundamental if you're trying to do experimental physics ... so we don't really
have the option of saying, 'well, we'll hold these other things constant and let
this one vary', if we could we'd like to but as I'm saying I don't think you can
understand the whole without understanding some of the pieces. (P9P)
A reductionist research design was seen as dependent upon manipulation of the
research objects (eg holding certain variables constant whilst altering another). Note
that a reductionist analysis was not considered to be dependent upon a reductionist
research design: the data can still be treated in a reductionist way, eg searching for the
dominant force as opposed to the complexity of interaction between variables.
Furthermore, as this excerpt suggests, holism and reductionism were not
viewed inevitably as mutually exclusive. This could be considered to be like an
hourglass - moving from a holism to reductionism back to holism. Note that a similar
point is made in Chapter 7. One woman astronomer explained:
There's an analogy both in philosophy and in science ... if you meditate on a
point you meditate on something infinitely small in order to achieve something
infinitely large ... and I don't think that one excludes the other ... that's a
philosophical analogy. In physics there is a whole mathematical approach
called a Fourier Transform which is essentially the same principle ... you
transform it from one plane to another ... and I think that it's the same question
in doing science, doing astronomy ... you want to hold down all the other
variables so you can get this one because then, when you release the others, it
tells you that one line out of the entire plane ... you need each line that makes
up the plane ... I know I'm speaking in hand waving terms but to me it's just
the same thing -1 don't think you can just narrow down ... and somehow you
are reductionist and missing the point ... you have to do that in order to get
the bigger picture. (P9P)
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The same interaction between holism and reductionism was stressed by others. This
example is of physiology:
[A female scientist] described the key to her success as [quote] 'a flair for
discovery ... achieved most often by simple, straightforward experimentation
backed up by good basic knowledge ... and perhaps more importantly by an
intuitive feeling for the cells or tissues with which she was working' ... I'm not
sure that isn't just a use of words, and that all of us, to be successful, can't sit
back and be totally narrowly goal-oriented ... I don't think ... physiologists
who are looking at ... isolated actions or tissues can be good physiologists
unless they have this overall approach of linking the tissue to what's going on
in the rest of the brain and the signaling from the tissue and organ up to the
whole body and the whole body down to the tissue ... that's what physiology is
about - it isn't biochemistry. (P1B)
The distinction between biochemistry and physiology is interesting - it may be that
some sciences allow for more reductionism than others. Once more, note that
research design, which is holistic, was still seen as constrained by reductionism.
Consider another example of physiology research:
The experiment that I'm doing right now involves people raising their arms
very quickly and I'm looking at... the muscles that are being activated during
that movement. If I took a truly holistic approach to it I wouldn't even bring
people into a situation where I told them to stand still and raise their arm. I
don't think I could learn anything. I think I could wander around with
electrodes attached to people and ... they would type and talk on the phone
and I would never learn about the coordination ... so I honestly think that we
have to constrain systems to a certain extent ... and so did Barbara
McClintock ... she didn't just watch corn grow, she made crosses, she
controlled the circumstances quite a bit. (P8B)
This suggests that reductionism and holism are not mutually exclusive. There is also
different weighting between the two, depending on the type of science. Moreover, the
perception of this weighting can vary within science - another woman had a different
view of biochemistry as more holistic than indicated above:
It's not true so much in my experience of biochemists [that they are
reductionist] - biochemists have to take a more sophisticated and complex
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view of issues in their science ... and I think that chemists I know and
physicists will look askance at that because they really prefer reductionist
models, they want to know what is the one thing ... isolate the one issue that
makes it tick. I'm much more conscious of trying not necessarily to always
explain by one theory. (P19C)
In addition, there were indications that science is changing, and becoming less
reductionist in some areas:
Some areas of biology [are more holistic] ... like ecology ... at the ecosystem
level, understanding functional and connected relationships. Other bits of
biology are heavily reductionist, like biochemistry, and certainly genetics.
Although ... I think there is evidence of changes a foot, and I think genetics is
becoming ... not so much [more] holistic but less reductionist in the sense that
there is now ... jumping genes and so on, there is a notion that it's much less
rigidly deterministic. That's not to say that sociobiologists haven't produced
some really crass theories about... the gene for homosexuality. (C1B)
This challenge to reductionist methods is not just confined to the life sciences,
although it is perhaps at it s strongest in this area:
[Physics] is being done in a non-reductionist way ... there are big debates
about that [between] condensed matter physicists and particle physics ... the
argument about reductionism is alive and well in physics, although the
overwhelming opinion, the received view ... is 88.8% [reductionism] ... it's
very dear to the hearts of physicists for all kinds of historical, political and
economic reasons. But more and more people have come to feel that the
future of particle physics is limited ... and that's provided an incentive to think
in less reductionist ways. (C5BP)
To summarise briefly, reductionism was viewed as the dominant paradigm in science,
but it was argued that it cannot be considered as divorced from holism, as the two
approaches are often complementary, or even in conflict, as the last example shows.
The weighting of reductionism and holism was perceived to vary across different
scientific disciplines and to vary within scientific disciplines, depending on the project.
There were additional examples of a small shift towards more holistic methods in
certain traditionally reductionist sciences - particle physics and molecular genetics for
example.
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Is reductionism masculine? Seventeen women explicitly made a link between
reductionism, holism, and sex or gender. These links are similar, but differ in their
configuration, especially around the issue of gender and sex. Only 3 women were
prepared to argue that women were typically more holistic. For example:
Well, I think this reductionist aspect... slicing off these other things and saying
they have nothing to do with science, which is something I don't really go for,
that seems to be more common among men. (PMC)
The majority supplemented their responses, which indicated a link between
masculinity and reductionism, with a more cautious analysis. This was based on
arguments about socialisation of males and females, but there was a strong emphasis
placed on the potential 'overlap' between the sexes and their approach, eg males
taking a 'feminine', holistic approach in their science; and females taking 'masculine',
reductionist approaches. The link was between reductionism and the cultural
stereotype of masculinity not maleness:
There is something culturally and stereotypically masculine about science, and
the way it's thought of in our culture, and indeed the way it's done, the sort of
macho behaviour in the lab ... which can alienate women more easily ... so
maybe women have to face bigger hurdles to get to learn the way of thinking
that is called scientific. I don't think that that's the prerogative of men -1 think
women can learn it just as easily [although] they might have more qualms
about learning it. (C1B)
I don't think my answer to that question was ever an essentialist one, that ...
it's because women are biologically different therefore we just intrinsically do
things differently, I don't think I ever believed that. But I feel more strongly
and clearly now than I did then that this has to do with the fact that women
and men really are so different because our socialisations are so different and
that makes a difference. That doesn't mean that women who are trained in the
standard ways of doing science and feel comfortable with those ways do
science any different from the way men do it, and I think that some men have
less reductionist ways of looking at things than others, and ... some women
feel comfortable in the ... accepted reductionist framework. So I don't think it
has to do with men and women, it has to do with a world view. (C2B)
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What we're talking about is the male role ... in North American and European
culture one of the things that strikes me is ... if you have a class of people in a
culture who are permitted to lead their own lives by being served by other
people it will probably be more natural for them to be more narrow in other
respects, to be more satisfied with a highly reductionist approach, and to see
no need to do otherwise, so that for me what is being labelled as male is
flowing out of the organisation of the culture ... [there is a] distinction
between sex and gender. (P16C)
This 'world view' was seen to be shaped by gender socialisation not biological sex.
There was also evidence that the challenges to reductionism in science do not always
come from women - men in science may also becoming less reductionist:
[Socialisation and training means] ... little boys [are] taking a part toy cars
and little girls [are] getting used to the idea of focusing on the relationship
between people ... I think there is still a tendency for people to grow up
learning different sorts of skills and looking at the world [in a particular way].
I don't think that's absolute, I think it's changing - young men that I teach in
class are much less rigid these days that I think they used to be. (PC4B)
Reasons for the women's affinity with holistic methods, and men's with reductionism,
were attributed to the sexes' role in wider society.
Again, men's dominant role in this culture was seen to afford them a more
reductionist viewpoint. This is, of course, one type of explanation among many. It
could also be argued that men's reductionist approach is a result of their desire to
control and manipulate - a holistic approach is much more 'in tune' with a less
interventionist approach. Another argument was the following:
I do think the models we use are sexist in their hierarchical nature and their
omission of vital parts of human beings, because women identify more, and
have identified more, with emotion ... leaving those things out of the way we
talk about science helps to leave women out. (P8B)
This suggests that men are more reductionist and narrow minded because of their
separation from emotion and feeling in their role in public domain. Women may be
199
more 'holistic' because of the way their lives are organised which means they must
cater for a range of emotional and physical tasks.
There were various other explanations for why women seem less comfortable
with reductionism in science. The first example comes from a physiology teacher
(who also gave the last quotation):
I get to hear a lot of complaints about the way science is... students are very
outspoken, and it's more of the women than the men who complain about
reductionism ... in the sense of ... 'but in this study they didn't include ... how
could they not include' ... and also ... I think this is a really critical filtering
point for the students ... I think women more often have a hard time buying
into the kinds of models that are taught in physics or in chemistry because
they're so stripped down ... I think to some extent it has to do with men
students' perception that this is their system, that in order to succeed in it all
they have to do is stay on and believe ... I think the boys can buy into the
system easier and ... go along on faith and then it will fill in for them, whereas
for the women, or the girls, they will say, 'well, I don't see why they do that'.
(P8B)
Women students being taught science appear to this teacher to be less willing to
unconditionally accept the information provided. This is perhaps a product of their
strangeness to the system - their 'outsider' status as women in a traditionally male
domain gives them a more critical perspective than the 'insiders'.
Male scientists may also adopt reductionist strategies deliberately because they
are more oriented to a successful career than women:
There's this element of men thinking more carefully ... [and having] their eye
to the main change and this applies to writing things up as well... I said to a
[male] colleague ... 'we've had this paper rejected because the chap, I assume
it was a chap, couldn't cope with the fact that in the real life of the experiments
there were some things that increased and some that decreased and he
couldn't handle this variation' ... and he said, 'the authors haven't found out
why this happens' ... there may be something in the way I wrote it up that
wasn't good enough" ... [my colleague's] immediate reaction was, 'yes, well, I
suggest that what you do is write up the results that go one way in one paper
and get it published and then put the results that go the other way in another
paper'. So you might interpret that as saying that women take a more holistic
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view and men focus on detail ... but you could also say that they have learnt
good strategies for succeeding! ... I feel now ... at a pretty late age ... that I've
learnt some of the strategies and am able to incorporate the conflicting results
in the body of the paper and get it published. (P1B)
This theme of insider status of men and 'outsider within' status of women is carried on
when other women talked about how this creates a more holistic perspective:
I certainly myself have trouble with reductionism and objectification ... this is
definitely an effect of gender ... I don't feel like I'm part of the establishment, I
don't feel as if I'm accepted, I'm not treated as if I'm accepted, I feel
uncomfortable ... and therefore because I'm marginalised I ... don't feel that I
have to do everything that I'm told, so I don't feel like I have to belie my own
experience and transform my own experience ... or my own perceptions about
my own data ... I have a feeling it's probably to do with being marginal than
being a woman. (P17B)
This woman scientist works in a non-traditional area of biological research, which
combines biology, ergonomics and sociology to study occupational health. The work
is also mainly funded by worker's organisations, and starts from the questions that
workers themselves ask about their health, as opposed to questions that management
or traditional scientists might ask. The work is therefore marginalised by fellow
biologists in more traditional biology, who associate it with sociology, and therefore
consider that it is not 'real science'. The relationship between this women's
marginalised status and her non-traditional holistic research methods goes two ways.
Part of the reason for her marginalisation is her research design, and part of the reason
for her research design is her lack of association with traditional science, ie her
marginalisation. This woman went on to argue that it might be that women are more
comfortable with ambiguity in results and men more attuned towards certainty:
I think there is something in the question of being comfortable with ambiguity
that has to do with how women are brought up in our society ... I'll give you
an example of when I was first classifying my yeast cultures I was supposed to
classify them as resistant or sensitive to a particular toxin and I brought the
plate to my supervisor and said, 'none of these are either resistant of sensitive,
they're sort of all in between', and she said, although she was a woman, 'well,
classify them all as resistant or sensitive otherwise we'll never get a paper out
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of this'. I think that its true that in science you learn to dichotomise, you learn
to do away with the grey area in between. (P17B)
Despite the fact that this woman's supervisor was herself a woman she perceived their
standpoints to be different, depending on their experience in science. This is related
to the previous examples concerning holism, and some women's 'outsider within'
positions affording them different perspectives.
Others noted that reductionist methods and models in science are also an
attempt to find a clear and simple answer. They argued that scientists are aware that
complexity is difficult to model and untidy models and theories are not publishable:
If it can't be made into a model and be packaged up in a nice little [bundle]
then it's not worth anything. (PMC)
We're all affected by that - looking for what we expect to find. It takes a
constant relooping and saying, 'OK, so I've proved myself right today, I'm
going to prove myself wrong here'... you alter it - you prove yourself right,
you prove yourself wrong ... and it's so easy to go, 'oh, that's a nice graph.
Call it a write up!' ... a big fat famous physicist makes a prediction and
everyone thinks he's God and he's finally made it ... he said there were these
vortex rays and everyone went and looked and looked and [one scientist]
eventually found them, but they only had ... 0.3 ... like a salt shaker. I've been
trying to tell them that's not right... a lot of people are like that... it's because
he went looking for what he was expecting to find ... when he found it
everyone thought, 'Ah, that's great.' They didn't think [he] could be wrong. It's
easy to do that ... now they've done a little more experiments on this to see
what happens with a 0.3% ... they've discovered that it ain't so ... The last
conference I talked with the guy and he said, 'well, why don't you do the
experiment yourself, and it's an extremely expensive experiment to do and he
did it a long time ago and the results sit, they're quoted as canonical... they're
in text books everywhere. (P6P)
A similar example follows from another woman in the same group:
This is a problem in atmospheric science as well. I'm ... looking at a regional
transport model doing the chemistry part and I'm finding ... this area is very
well funded compared to other areas but virtually all the funding is in the form
of short term contracts that are targeted at a very specific problem ... and the
whole area is a morass of grey literature ... and what you find are numbers out
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of thin air, or you find a number that everyone seems to be quoting ... I met
somebody at this conference and I said, 'OK, I've been trying to track this
down', and she said, 'well, it's like this... someone phoned me and asked what
I thought this was and then the next thing I knew ...'. This was a number that's
sort of part of the canon in atmospheric chemistry that has its origins in a
casual phone call! (PMC)
This suggests that there is a tremendous pressure on scientists to come up with results
(especially when they are on short term funding):
You can't be wrong - that's part of the problem ... we have fostered a way of
doing science that [means] you can't say outlandish things ... only when you
get to be the crusty old professor and you're 70 and everyone around the
world knows you and you have an impeccable reputation, then you can sa{
anything you want ... if we started saying things that are a little beyond the
pale, our careers would be over. (P9P)
It's not just that, it's all the time - you have to publish so many papers a year
and if you don't spend all your time doing things that you absolutely know
inside out and have results, in other words, not new or creative things - you
can't keep up that rate ... It's very damaging, and you say this to the
gatekeepers, the people who are judging your hiring and promotion, and they
just have no patience for it, they think it's a complaint from people who can't
cope. (P10P)
As I'm listening I'm thinking a lot of this is not gender specific, but I think
what is different about it... I'm going to go out on a limb here ... and say that I
think women are more sensitive to the pain they feel, men I think, are trained
to cope with pain - don't feel it, get in the back and take the next tackle - this
is the way it is, you've got to do it. And it is painful ... my goal is to try to
understand some things that are plaguing me ... and it's painful for me to
watch this just dying on the vine while I go peddling away [writing papers].
(P11P)
Women's 'sensitivity to pain' may be more acute because of their 'outsider within'
status in the scientific community.
The picture of reductionism and holism in science and how this is linked with
gender is complex. There is clearly no simplistic association between women and
holistic methods. Instead the data suggests reasons for women's limited use of holistic
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method that link methodology with scientists' status, marginalisation and their study
area. This shall be discussed in more detail in Chapter 9.
8.3.5 Conclusion
There are two strands to my conclusions about interviewees' perspectives on
control, topics and questions, objectivity and reductionism. The first is that
generalisations about science involving particular approaches of control, objectivity
and reductionism are problematic. Moreover, there is a vast array of different topics
and questions raised in science. As I have shown, there are different contexts of
control in science, which are not necessarily related to any meta-aim of control of
nature. Similarly the role of objectivity in science also requires contextualisation.
Science is clearly subjective, but the extent and type of subjectivity varies depending
on the scientific discipline and the particular research practices. Finally reductionist
methodology is not monolithic. Although perceived as the dominant paradigm, in
opposition to holism, there are variations in the use of reductionism depending on
different scientific disciplines. There is also an interaction between holism and
reductionism - they are by no means mutually exclusive.
The second strand to my conclusion concerns the links between masculinity
and science. Once more, there is no simple interpretation. There is no clear
association between topics in science and the sex or gender of the scientist. Any
differences that might arise from upbringing are blurred by the compromises women
make to stay in science. Political sympathies, rather than gender, seem to guide a
small minority of scientists into, or away from, various research topics. The vast
majority, however, appear not be consciously political about their work, and are
driven by a variety of reasons for working in particular areas, eg available funding.
Links were drawn between male ego and suppression of emotion, and control,
objectivity and reductionism. However, there was also a significant amount of
material concerning rhetorical as opposed to literal associations between masculinity
control, objectivity and reductionism. Different approaches by women and men in
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science were also related to their social status within science, in particular the extent
of their marginalisation. This is discussed more fully in Chapter 9.
8.4 Changing Science
8.4.1 Changing the Scientific Community
The women I interviewed wanted to change many aspects of the scientific
community. They wanted more flexible working patterns; a more collaborative style
of interaction between scientists; changes in teaching to include social aspects of
science; a more democratic science; changes in the hierarchical employment
structure; more women in positions of power; and changes in the funding of science
that would make science more consistent with feminist aims; and a more creative
enterprise. There were a small number of comments about changing the place of
science in academia. In a sense, earlier negative comments about the scientific
community imply that these women would advocate changes whether they speak
explicitly about such change or not.
In terms of lifestyle more flexibility was advocated. The following views were
expressed:
People should work more flexible hours - traditional marginalisation of women
could end up enabling for feminist research - eg job sharing (P18P);
There should be a cut in the number of hours people should work in the labs -
the situation now stifles creativity (P2B);
More flexible career paths and less time demands would benefit women (P9P,
P10P, P11P);
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More open ended careers and generous about people taking time out and
having families is necessary (P13B).
For example:
The way scientists work has to be altered, and this is very reflective of the way
I think all society has to change. I think it has to have a more open ended entry
to the career, so that people who are older than 30 and who've had delays in
their careers ... should still be eligible to enter the field ... and I think that once
scientists start to work they have to be more flexible in terms of the way they
work. Right now the tenure system pretty much guarantees that during the
first 5 years when you're on trial you have to toe the line to get tenure and that
means you have to work full time, you have to limit any outside involvement
you have in your community or in your family life, and you have to do things
that will be publishable in acceptable journals, which will get funded, and
which will get support from the department which ultimately decides your
fate. If you spend 5 years doing these things so you get tenure it's hard for you
then to open out again, you become locked into a career path, and so that has
to change ... there also has to be a different acceptance of ways of working in
terms of when you want to put your time into your career... There should be a
really generous approach in terms of people taking time out, or working part
time ... I think these are very real impediments to women in science, and
they're impediments to people maintaining connections with the outside
community while they do science, and in this way scientists become isolated.
(P13B)
The main emphasis is on change to a more collaborative style as opposed to a
competitive one, and a more 'listening' and nurturing research environment. The
following changes were advocated:
A more collaborative way of working (P19C, C6C, P16C, P2B);
A more collectively oriented way on interacting (P18P);
Less competition (P15B);
More open, less competitive interactions; more cooperative and open minded.
A nurturing environment (P9P, P10P, P11P);
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Scientists should be able to publish results that were failures (PMC);
A slower pace, not so competitive. Scientists should be allowed to report
negative results (P8B).
Women also gave the following examples of how they had instigated such changes:
Team work is based on collaboration and constructive criticism. Egalitarian
running of lab (P22B);
Provision of support networks for women in science departments; female role
models, mentoring (P3P, P4P, P5P);
Running of lab collaboratively and encouragement of students (P15B);
Running of department on feminist principles - deal with women's difficulties
as a supportive community (P17B);
Relationship with staff more supportive (C2B);
Interact with people more collaboratively. Increase awareness of women's
status (P19C);
Work collaboratively - fostering cooperation (P8B).
Note that competition in science is not only between groups but amongst group
members:
If they could just interact [in a] more open minded [way] and with more
consideration for the people they're talking to, maybe they can still have their
egos but do they have to be so critical? (P3P)
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I myself want more. I want to be able to work in a nurturing environment and
I don't think there are many men who can fit in or provide that sort of
environment ... I mean an environment where you can exchange ideas with
people without fear of being judged, it's like working with friends ... I find
women, if you want to talk about science with women, they're generally more
supportive. (P4P)
Another woman expressed similar frustration:
In terms of the scientific culture, well, there's a lot of things I would change ...
one of them being ... this whole idea of competition ... not that competition
isn't a good thing ... it's the idea that one always has to present oneself as
being an expert and that one's own work is very good, it's the best, it's better
than anyone else's work [that I reject]. I think, on the one hand, although
people like to say that they encourage collaboration, on the other hand they
like to put down other ... people's work ... I find that very discouraging.
(P19C)
This is related to another comment about changing the restrictions placed on what
counts as valid knowledge in science:
I think I'd start almost with social relations of science if I could design science.
It would be slower, not so competitive, when you got negative results, or you
had doubts about what you were doing, or something didn't quite turn out ...
you could report that and actually get it published, whereas now it's cut and
dried. Meetings would be a lot more fun because people would be coming
together to share ideas instead of to put one another down. (P8B)
Another interesting point concerns scientists collaborating with other academics. The
following suggestions were made:
Historians and sociologists should work with scientists (C5BP);
Science departments should be organised like literature departments - with
critics and practitioners (C3B);
A feminist critique of science should be encouraged (C5BP);
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One version might be:
I'd also like to see science departments ... organised more the way our
literature departments are. The English department, for example, has a
component which consists of people who are actually creative writers,
playwrights, and poets, but it also consists of a much larger part of people
who are essentially literary critics - they have a period and genre that they
study ... so they are critics of the products these other people are creating ...
This is really an idea that Sandra Harding proposed with an exchange with me
in print. What she suggests is that, and I think she's right about this, science
departments don't work like that, they don't commune with [science critics],
nor do they want to, they're actually hysterical about the science critics ... so
one way I'd really like science to change is to have departments who were
doing the enterprise and other people, who were sympathetic to the enterprise,
but were also critically looking at it, in both historical and contemporary
context. It would create a very different kind of teaching. (C3B)
The interaction of scientists and critics could also take other forms. However, the
point is clearly made in this quotation - the critique of science as socially shaped is as
important as the science itself.
This can also be communicated to the future generation of scientists via
teaching. The following suggestions were given:
Teaching scientists have to work to understand science is political (C2B);
Science students should be taught about the social implications of science
(P21P);
An awareness of sexism into science curriculum (P16C).
Several of the respondents have organised such courses and encouragement of
students. For example:
Drawing attention to women in science, and different methods; emphasising
problems unresolved and unaddressed (P18P);
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Teaching courses which combine science with critique (C3B);
Mentoring (PIOP);
Encouraging under confident women students (P15B);
Teaching courses on women and biology (P17B);
Teaching courses on feminism and biology; setting up open discussion groups
(C2B);
A change in scientists' relationship to the community was another important
issue. Consider the following proposals:
Less clear boundaries between people who do science and don't do science.
Scientists are responsible for discussing their ideas in the community (PC4B);
Scientists should interact with community to promote a feminist science -
science outside the lab (CIB);
Scientists have an obligation to communicate to the community what science
is, and what science isn't. Scientists are part of community (PMC);
Break down the 'mystique' of science (P19C);
Challenge the alienation of women from science (C6C);
Science should be more accessible to people's democratic interests. Science
should be more integrated with people - encourages more cross fertilisation of
ideas and research projects (P13B);
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Examples - Involve community in research - eg a bird breeding or Carbon
monoxide study where the public collected data (P18P);
Example - patient involvement in health care decision making bodies (P13B);
Example - Public-led research projects (P17B).
As we saw earlier a small number of women described the elitist role of the scientist in
society. These women would like this to change and for the scientist to be more of an
equal member of the community. For example:
There would be less clear boundaries between the people that do science and
the people that don't do science ... the scientists would have a very clear
responsibility in discussing their ideas and their research and their processes
with the larger community. (PC4B)
There is a feeling that there is obligation on the part of scientists to the public, as
described by this woman:
I feel we have a responsibility as a scientist to communicate, when I have the
opportunity ... what science is, and what science isn't... When I was working
20 years ago in the Maritimes reports were starting to come out [about the
future of the cod fisheries] and the fisheries companies were putting up their
own set of experts against these other experts ... at the time they won the day.
To me that was a case of the people who were making the decisions for
fisheries policy really not understanding what the nature of scientific
investigation really was ... what was the nature of scientific proof. So I feel I
have a responsibility to make it clear what science can say and what science
cannot say. (PMC)
This responsibility is to provide the public with information about the pros and cons
of science, not simply to provide so called scientific 'facts'.
In all of the three areas of employment, funding and publishing the women I
spoke to advocated changes which would promote the place of women in science.
The following suggestions were made:
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Hierarchy and top down approach needs to change (C2B);
Science should be less hierarchical and open to people from different
backgrounds (C3B);
Change the hierarchy to be more egalitarian with technicians etc (C1B);
Widen the types of people doing science; encourage multiculturalism (C2B)
Get more women into science - men in science need this to be better educated
(P12P);
Get more women into science - develop a critical mass (PC4B);
Change the power structure - let women into science and powerful positions
within science (P15B);
The whole tenure system has to change - it forces conservatism during
assessment years (P13B);
Appoint more women (P16C, P3P, P5P, P7P);
Support projects that aren't necessarily high profile (P19C);
Also need to inquire into the behaviour of funding groups (P18P);
Change the granting system to collaborative research funding (P2B);
Change the structure of funding - not just about number of papers (P3P, P4P,
P5P, P7P);
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Develop longer term funding arrangements - to allow scientists not to be so
focused on outcomes (PMC);
The funding organisations which study life problems should have
representatives from people with experience of those life problems (P17B);
Science should become more decentralised - more room for diversity in
scientific endeavor. Encourage diversification (P13B)
Politics of funding should be made more straightforward. Money should be
made available for more creative science - so scientists can be less career
oriented (P15B);
Feminists should support research which is consistent with equality of
opportunity (P16C);
There should be more funding for science which would consider the
environment, global poverty, medical research for men and women (P5P,
P6P);
Example - Funding committees should include representatives of the general
public. Breast Cancer Survivor's Group (P13B).
Note that this does not necessarily involve women's success on men's terms but could
involve fundamentally restructuring the hierarchies in employment, publishing and
funding. In relation to employment several women spoke about change, with 3
referring to promoting women into the power positions in science. The rest of the
changes advocated concerned funding rather than publishing. Practitioners advocated
more small scale grants and a decentralised, longer term approach to scientific
questions with less emphasis on successful results but more on the process of doing
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science (which would presumably be reflected in journals and promotion). For
example:
[Science] has to somehow become more decentralised - so that there is room
for more diversity in scientific endeavor - the tendency now is for it to become
more centralised, to have large research teams, headed by eminent individuals
who then sit on the journal's editorial boards and ... on the funding committee
... and so you have a kind of closing up of the varieties of endeavors that are
being funded and published. Instead we need an opening of that kind of
variety, we need a diversification. What this probably means is smaller grants
to more people to do lower tech things (P13B)
One other women also suggested that the behaviour of funding, promotion and
publishing bodies should themselves be studied (P18P).
8.4.2 Changing Research Practice
The main areas of change to research practice discussed by my interviewees
were changes in topics of study and methodologies, specifically objectivity and
reductionism/holism. However, as the previous section illustrates, discussion about
changes in these areas also has implications for changes in the whole of research
practice, as the processes are so interlinked. This is also related to change in the
scientific community.
Changes called for in the topics of science were as follows:
Science should not be seen as separate from politics (C2B);
Multiculturalism would mean different questions were asked in science
(C2B);
Women's view of the world should be included in science eg primatology
(P1B);
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There ought to be more diverse topics (PI IP);
In biology there could be more respect for research subjects and objects -
scientists should evaluate ethics of research (C2B);
No animal experimentation (C1B);
The ethics behind animal experimentation must be addressed (P17B);
Science should reject the manipulation of animals and make ethical
considerations mandatory (P23B);
People should think more about the consequences of what they're doing in
science (P20C);
Science should address all questions reductionist science has left out -
interactive, multivariant, complex problems (P18P);
Proposed study of energy interaction with organic materials (P18P);
Example - Science arising from worker's own interests, not interests of
researchers. Work in interdisciplinary teams with sociologists and biologists
(P17B).
These changes fall into three broad areas: more diversity; more ethical considerations;
and more non-reductionist questions. Diversity in topics was related to diversity in
scientists:
Being more respectful of other human beings and widening the number of
people, the kinds of people, from which science are drawn ... would certainly
change science. Now, that's certainly part of the feminist enterprise but it's not
exclusive to the feminist enterprise ... the sorts of notions about
multiculturalism that other people would bring other kinds of questions ... you
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[also have to be] more careful that you don't use the need for expertise
automatically to exclude other kinds of knowledge, the kinds of traditional
knowledge that are certainly useful ways of looking at nature and explaining
nature ... I think all of that needs to be included in what science should be like.
(C2B)
The main ethical concerns were expressed about animal experimentation. One woman
explained her growing disillusionment with animal experimentation, despite her love
of biology, and interest in feminist research on sex difference. Her first research
project concerned premenstrual tension:
I changed my interpretation of what constitutes a feminist question, and,
looking back into the seventies I now think I was being frightfully naive.
Nonetheless it was as a feminist that I asked the questions. What I did for my
PhD was stuff around hormones and behavioral changes with the oestrous
cycle ... one of the things that was being much discussed at the time was
premenstrual tension and whether or not there are behavioural changes in
women with the menstrual cycle through hormones ... it was as a feminist with
an interest in women's biology that I began to approach the question. (C1B)
The next feminist question this woman raised concerned Depo Provera - an injectable
contraceptive mainly used in the developing world:
And then I became more interested in the critique of biological determinism
and I got more removed from that... The next major topic that I started also
started from a feminist project, but from a different place. I knew that Depo
Provera was being injected into women throughout the world, even during
lactation, and nobody knew what the effects would be ... So I set up a project
which was going to look at the effects of oxyprogesterone, which is Depo
Provera, on the development of young animals, rats, if it had been injected into
the mother ... [to see if] it was getting through the milk. And it does, it has
effects on their behaviour ... their physiology, their reproductive capacity.
(C1B)
This led to a growing disillusionment with biological determinism:
The next set of questions [I asked] as a radical biologist... an antivivisectionist
biologist. In a sense all of those [previous questions] were asking reductionist
questions ... and I puzzled about how on earth I could move away from it.
Then I started to think around the stuff about whether there are more than just
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hormones involved in creating sex difference ... it's a big presumption in the
literature on sex difference in animals that if you find a sex difference in a
population it must be due to hormones, and there's lots of evidence, including
some that we did, that shows that mothers discriminate, and what you get is
an evolution and change of a social system. So I began to look at that, which,
again, for me, is a set of radical questions, a more holistic way of looking at
how alleged set differences develop rather than get determined. (C1B)
Finally, the issue of animal experimentation became paramount:
And then I finally stopped that, partly again because of the animal issue ... I
was beginning to feel even more qualms at this point ... I wouldn't think a
feminist science would accept the use of animal experiments as readily ...
maybe we'd accept some, there might be something that we'd negotiate, but
certainly not the way it's done now, large numbers of animals are used for
sometimes relatively trivial questions and are not properly looked after. (C1B)
This story is interesting on two counts. First, it shows the variations in what feminist
questions can be, depending on the evolution of feminist scientists' political beliefs.
There is no static set of prescribed questions. Second, the ethics of research can be in
tension with questions that feminists would like to explore. For example, an
examination of the social component of animal sex difference tends to require some
experimental work because of the difficulty in purely observational research in the
natural environment. On the other hand, a feminist science might not always be anti-
vivisectionist; in certain circumstances animal experimentation might be acceptable to
feminist scientists.
The main area of discussion concerned objectivity and reductionism/holism (as
we have seen above, this is also related to topics and questions in science). The
following comments were made concerning objectivity:
Scientists should aim to be objective but be aware of subjective issues to aid
them. Feminists should raise awareness of sexism so that people question their
perceptions (P12P);
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Science should accept and explore how subjectivities affect knowledge
(P19C);
Scientists ought to reject the supposedly 'neutral' stance and admit
subjectivities, but retain rules and critical discussion (PC4B);
An acknowledgment of ideas' social context ought to be part of the process
of doing science (C3B);
Scientists must not lose nature in being aware of the social construction of
scientific knowledge (P15B, C1B);
Science must aim for objectivity but acknowledge that ideas are socially
generated (P1B);
Scientists could try to bring in subjectivities and awareness of assumptions
into their practice of science (P15B);
Scientists should bring in emotion and should not ignore context (P17B);
Scientists should state their biases (P8B);
Science ought to be contextualised (P8B);
It is important that scientists position themselves in the research (P23B);
We need to make people aware of how their opinions affect science (P20C).
Interviewees favoured a retention of the aim of objectivity to eliminate subjectivities,
but with more emphasis on thoroughly uncovering subjectivity. However they rejected
the idea of separating knowledge from experience and politics. Instead these women
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argued for uncovering bias and subjectivities, in the sense of grounding knowledge
back in experience. For example:
I think there's different kinds of objectivity, and I think the objectivity that
most of us were attacking is an objectivity that says I am nothing to do with
this thing that I am studying and this great distance between this truth that's
extracted from all human life and my ability to perceive what is going on,
which is just sort of an empty screen ... a more honest approach is certainly to
admit that we're involved in the process of knowing the world, so there's a
subjectivity you necessarily bring to any kind of science, that you bring to the
kinds of questions that you want to raise ... and for that matter ... to the
process of getting sensitive answers ... now at the same time that doesn't mean
there are no rules, no tests ... I think the whole process of testing and
confirming and debating and investigating and comparing results is going to
go on. (PC4B)
This is advocacy of a revamped version of objectivity rather than a total rejection.
Changes in the current reductionist framework in science were also very
popular. Consider the following suggestions:
Biology would be less reductionist if there was more concern for the ethics of
research (C2B);
Scientists should look at different factors impinging on behaviour of
individuals (rather than just hormones) (C1B);
Science should be properly contextualised in a multifactorial way - eg the
discipline of ecology not biochemistry or genetics (although becoming less
reductionist) (C1B);
'Master Molecule' theories should be rejected (C5BP);
Scientists should try to take into account complexity (P2B);
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More respect ought to be given for different types of explanations which are
not traditionally considered as science (C2B);
Scientists must learn to listen to what the material is saying. However, they
also have to constrain the system to a degree to get meaningful results (P8B);
Scientists ought to use the most suitable methods to get answers. This varies -
so long as they are ethical - each method is valid (P12P;)
Reductionism and holism are both necessary - they just should not be over
used (PC4B);
There is room for both reductionism and holism if answering questions
properly (P13B);
The emphasis should be on prevention not cure - scientists should look at
indicators to diseases, and put knowledge in its proper historical context
(P13B);
More interdisciplinary work is necessary (P13B);
For example, research subjects could participate in research on energy
interaction with organic materials - a non reductionist research design. Physics
needs similar parameters to health research. Another example might be
research subjects in mental health - patients participate at same level as
doctors; or women's health subjects participating in research by keeping
records (P18P) ;
Example - non-reductionist zoology research (P22B);
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Example of feminist research into women's biology. Conflict about role of
animal experimentation (C1B);
Example - the aim of science is to answer certain questions so take whatever
tools are available; eg take more contextual view in example when looking at
blood cells (P17B);
Example - holistic protein model (P19C);
Example - uses non reductionist methods (P17B);
Example - scientists should think more when applying standard procedures to
data eg 'controlling for sex' (P17B).
A call for a more cautious use of reductionist approaches and more exploration of
holistic approaches was made, with the proviso that the two should be
complementary, and intermingled in some cases to produce the best tools for the job.
Consider the following example of how this might change one particular research
project:
The one area that I've thought about working in this is the area of proteins and
a protein model ... perhaps this is just one way of describing how one can
present a different or alternative way of viewing ... one of the interesting
things about proteins ... is that there's an assumption, a hypothesis, that the
one dimensional structure of the proteins ... the amino acid sequence,
determines what its 3-D shape will be, and its 3-D shape is directly related to
its function ... there's been a lot of work in theory to try to predict what the 3-
D shape of a protein will be given its amino acid sequence and the one thing
that struck me was ... that you can predict just from the amino acids ...
although its clear that proteins are stabilised ... by just a few kilocalories ...
there's a lot of talk about what the dominant force that governs what the 3-D
shape is and I think that's a really misguided approach, because it strikes me
there's a real sensitive balance between a whole number of forces and that it's
not possible to talk about a dominant force in that way. (P19C)
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This more holistic and open approach to analysis also fits in with a more objective
approach in the sense of openness about biases and influences.
An openness to different methods (the right tools for the job) can also mean
the choice of a holistic approach:
I think you want to find the answers to certain questions and therefore you
take whatever tools are available in the field of biology ... and yet I know
perfectly well in another part ofmy brain that we don't do things the same way
... when we look at blood cells, one of the things that we saw and that we
criticised could have come straight out of Evelyn Fox Keller ... everybody was
treating these genetic studies of blood cells as if they were sort of isolated
from a human organ ... they were on petri dishes when in fact they were part
of living systems that had certain interactions, and we've now published papers
on this subject which is very different from what everybody else is publishing
... it's about a feeling for the organism ... so my data are contradicting my
hypothesis ... so I guess this is why I'm feeling troubled about what is a
feminist biology. (P17B)
Holism clearly plays a major role in these women's visions of a feminist science.
However, we must also bear in mind that there are certain research topics and
questions in science that are more suitable for a holistic treatment. Equally, holistic
questions are not necessarily feminist.
8.4.3 Successes and Barriers
There is a large gulf between these women's ideal sciences and their
description of science as it is now. Although some women have had limited success in
changing the relations in their own sub-community of scientists and, to a lesser
degree, their research practice, they perceived strong barriers to change.
Some women gave examples of how they run their lab along more egalitarian
lines:
I try to be cooperative and work collectively wherever possible. I work with a
group of people, largely women, who share data and ideas in a constructive
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(often combative, but constructive!) atmosphere. We do have our egos, and
must work hard to make the atmosphere work, but it does generally. Also my
lab is run as egalitarianly as it can be, given that I have power over them. We
concentrate on process and insist that people, whether male or female, listen
to each other, make space for people's ideas etc, and allow each other to make
mistakes and grow. (P22B)
Another woman was part of a department that works cooperatively:
When you work with women ... you have to live with women's condition ... so
we are having to deal with women's issues like pregnancy and day care and
what do you do when the kids are sick ... we have battered wives... and all of
these things are part of our lives on a daily basis and because we're all women
they become visible ... and have to be dealt with ... so in that sense a feminist
approach is part of our daily lives. And we would feel like jerks, I suppose, if
we did all this work on women's condition and the women that we worked
with didn't profit from it. (P17B)
Several of the women I spoke to had also been involved in setting up and teaching
courses on women's biology or incorporating a feminist critique into their teaching of
biology. Others told of actively mentoring and encouraging female students. There
was also one example of a move towards a more democratic science:
We have here ... a special set up ... there are agreements between our
university and three trade unions ... there's also another arrangement between
the university and women's groups and both of those types of agreements
provide that if the groups ask for research or activities then the University
system will provide those sorts of activities ... So, for example, the first time
that I was asked for in this way was when a health centre asked for a course in
women's bodies instead of giving four or five hours of regular teaching of
undergraduates ... I've also been quite involved with women's groups,
particularly in the trade unions, and particularly around issues of women and
work. What I've noticed is that the questions that women ask are not readily
covered by existing research projects. (P17B)
This type of client participation in scientific funding and research projects more
generally is one way in which ordinary women (and men) could have an input into
science that was relevant to their lives. This would obviously alter research topic and
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questions, ie research practice. In particular, this would lead to less reductionist
science.
More space for holistic approaches appears to exist in the biological sciences,
and 3 of the women I spoke to gave examples of how they have taken holism into
their work in biology, for example a zoologist states:
My science is not controlling. I allow pieces of the nervous system to interact
freely. This is hard, because one doesn't know who is doing what and the
methods for discussing and analysing the data must be completely different.
The language I use is also completely different. It utilises the language of
feminist processes, namely, consensus among the parts, where the parts are
equal, there being no controlling elements. The brain, for example, is then
viewed not as being at the "top" but as being simply another part ... the
behaviour of the "system" emerges from the parts coming [together, to]
consensus. (P22B)
Interestingly, this type of holistic approach occurs in a laboratory run collaboratively
(see above quote).
Nevertheless, the processes involved in changing the wider scientific
community are daunting. The most obvious starting point for a discussion about
changing the culture of science is the problem of treating scientific culture in isolation
from the wider culture. When one accepts instead that the culture of science and the
wider culture are closely intertwined, the project of changing the culture of science
becomes a project to change all male dominated culture. One woman expressed this
clearly:
I think it's very hard to expect scientists to be way ahead of their culture on
this. The rest of the culture will have to be more respectful of other ways of
looking at things before scientists are likely to do that. Scientists are ordinary
people and they're ... pretty elitist people, they're people who've had a lot of
education and are by in large privileged people and that they would trade some
of this privilege any more than other people who are in business or in law
seems unreasonable. I think we're talking about major social changes. (C2B)
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It is this level of immense 'technical, cultural and cognitive inertia' (C5BP) that
prevents change.
More specifically, there remains a difficulty in envisaging a feminist research
practice in physics (as experienced by 5 of the interviewees). Nearly all of the
examples of change involve the biological sciences. Only one woman talked about a
feminist physics - giving the example of research on the interaction of radiation with
organic materials (P18P). However, this research still involved human subjects and is
seen by others as 'not really physics' (P4P, P5P).
There was little discussion of how physical research involving inanimate
objects could be made more feminist (barring the example from theoretical chemistry).
This can be imagined as happening indirectly - changes in the scientific community
would involve the physics community, and have implications for research practice.
However, it is easier to construct and imagine a feminist biology. This requires further
investigation (see Chapter 9).
The project of getting more women into science also requires immense
changes to promote more women as well as changes in the gender ideology of science
and society at large. With the increasing numbers of women leaving science as they
move up the hierarchy feminist face an uphill struggle (P18P). This is a slow and
tedious process - only women who have reached the top are in a position to
successfully mentor other women (and feminists) (P18P). Middle and lower ranking
women are pressured to remain silent and uncritical (for fear of losing the support of
their male colleagues, or, ultimately, their post) (C3B). The present funding squeeze
in the US has also resulted in the cut back of affirmative action programs, which are
casualties of the general low level in recruitment (P16C).
More women in science was clearly viewed as fundamental to any
consideration of a feminist science. Others argued that feminists must also seek to win
over the support of hostile scientists, especially women (as noted by C5BP, C6C), by
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challenging their vested interests in denying the link between social relations and
science (C3B). There is undoubtedly a backlash against scientists who question the
traditional notion of objectivity. This appears to be because such a suggestion
threatens the existing power base of scientists, which relies heavily on their privileged,
supposedly neutral, position (C2B). Bringing in the idea of subjectivity and suggesting
that male and female or black and white scientists will do science differently is also
rejected by a lot of women and black scientists (C5BP, P2B). This appears to be
because they feel this can be used to disempower them further in science (see student
data Chapter 7).
There are also many barriers to change in the funding of science, not least
because of the structural hierarchies in all of society. The military-industrial complex
links science and capitalism primarily through funding and commissioning research.
This is undoubtedly an important driving force behind the emphasis on publishing of
new (and coherent) results. These research projects must also be of value to the
capitalist enterprise. The present funding cut backs make the competition for awards
more ruthless and limits the types of projects receiving funding. The importance of
such a relationship cannot be underestimated as it plays a powerful role in the
maintenance of the existing structures in science (P18P, C2B).
Changes on a more modest scale are also difficult to achieve. Science
departments are generally hostile to unusual approaches to science, or involving
politics in science courses. Women scientists who are feminists find it difficult to
succeed in science and are unable to 'come out' as feminists until they have secured
permanent positions in science (C2B, P18P, C3B). This is a long process and can
mean, as we saw earlier, that women either become disillusioned and leave, or change
their politics to survive. As one woman argued, it will take generations to affect any
real change in the numbers of women in science (P21P), let alone the numbers of
feminists.
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Only 3 of the women I spoke to felt that they have been able to study feminist
research topics in science - these include studies of female hormones (C1B) (see
above) and more applied research on women's health (P16C). However, this research
is very rare and often at the expense of a successful career in science, if it does not fit
in with established ideas, as illustrated in the case of one woman in particular (C1B).
Two others also discussed trying to adopt new standards of objectivity in science, by
thinking about a research problem in its social context (C3B, P8B). The extent to
which this new approach to objectivity is possible in science as it is at present is
limited. Both these issues of topic and objectivity are linked, as the following
comment illustrates:
Well I do [apply redefined objectivity] in the sense that I study the social
context out of which the question has arisen and I know about its history, I
know about how these ideas have come to be ... [and where] my ideas are
situated in regards to ... the mainstream ideas, ones that are further out than
mine, what I'm manoeuvering through ... but I'm a lonely person I don't have
much ... money ... so its a little bit different from ... if I were negotiating
through the NIH [National Institutes of Health, USA] or something like that.
(C3B)
Clearly, the existing practices in science do not allow for such unorthodox approaches
on anything other than a very small scale, and women find instead that, although they
get to think about these issues and maybe even talk to other like minded people about
them, securing funding or finding a venue to publish (the most significant medium of
scientific knowledge) is difficult.
In the case of holism, as we saw earlier, it is not always possible or desirable in
all of science (C1B, P19C, P13B). For example:
Sometimes it would be a different tool that would be used, and a different
question that would be asked to get at the same problem ... looking at breast
cancer ... Rather than looking at whether radiotherapy or chemotherapy are
more effective at different stages of disease, maybe you do a very reductionist
analysis of which population is exposed to which chemicals and carrying which
body fat proportions have been ... most afflicted with breast cancer so that's
still a reductionist approach but it's asking very different questions, it's asking
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why do we get breast cancer rather than what do we do once we've got it.
(P13B)
In this case the research design was reductionist, but feminist questions were asked.
8.4.3 Conclusion
For these women changing science meant changing the social relations of
science in terms of interaction between scientists, interaction between scientists and
the wider society, and research practice. More flexibility in work patterns, diversity,
collaboration, democratisation, ethical considerations, decentralisation, and grounding
of knowledge in experience and context were all advocated. Although some examples
of change on a local level were given, it was recognised that changes on a more wide
scale level are hampered by discrimination, 'cultural inertia', including hostility
amongst scientists to change, funding cutbacks, and the links between science and the
capitalist economy more generally. Even on a more modest scale most other scientists
were experienced by interviewees as suspicious of political involvement amongst their
peers, and resistant to new methods of teaching and research.
However, the situation is not all gloomy. Just as many of the women I spoke
to would like science to become more flexible, they were also flexible about how
science could change. There was no one particular methodology advocated (eg
holism); instead there was a desire to see a more creative use of different
methodologies, including reductionism, where this was appropriate to the research
questions. Moreover, as changes in the community and content of science are
interlinked, modest changes at one level can be expected to have repercussions at the
other, eg change to a more collaborative style of working would in turn alter the
research practice. Significantly, there was no rejection of science being based on
empirical findings, which means that, in this respect, change would be continuous with
existing research practices.
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I now move on to consider the practitioners' responses to feminist
epistemologies and theories of science. I am interested in whether feminist
epistemologies and theories reflect the criteria for change detailed above, and if and
how they are a useful resource for women in science.
8.5 Feminist Epistemology and Theory
8.5.1 Responses to Feminist Epistemologies
This section deals with the women scientists' responses to feminist
epistemology and theory about science. Women's views are related to their familiarity
with the literature. There were a substantial number of women - 11 - who were
unfamiliar with the majority, or all, of this literature. A typical position was the
following:
I guess I'm pretty much unfamiliar [with the feminist epistemologies]. I would
classify myself as a strong feminist in the sense that I believe in equal
opportunities and I'm beginning increasingly to see the need for some positive
effort to help women achieve those equal opportunities, but I'm very badly
read in feminist books, and I'm only beginning to read some, the odd book by
Hilary Rose ... so I'm beginning to understand what the feminists in science are
saying ... I don't see an application for that in my particular subject. (P1B)
This also meant that the majority of this group (8) were perplexed about what a
feminist science meant, as they associated science with objectivity, a feminist science
was therefore an 'oxymoron' (P24B), particularly in the hard sciences, for example:
The idea of a feminist physics ... it's ... impossible ... I think feminist science is
a misnomer. I think the core of science is ... there is no gender ... I think it's a
few levels up, at policy, decision making ... that says what kinds of problems
we want to solve and what kinds of experiments we do as humans ... I think
it's a misnomer in science itself, I don't think it's a misnomer in science
education. (P21P)
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This illustrates a profound gap between these women's experiences of feminism (or
their promotion of women in science without the feminist label) and feminist
philosophers and theorists of science.
Their more detailed responses were therefore based around my descriptions of
various feminist epistemologies, also used in the student interviews detailed in
Chapter 7. It turned out that their views were very similar to those expressed by the
students. Again, the majority of this group favoured an epistemological approach that
tried to be objective, by uncovering bias, but did not involve the privileging of any
particular perspective, and all advocated getting more women into science as an
important step in eliminating bias. There was also an acknowledgment that scientific
knowledge is affected by subjectivities, and that these should be made explicit.
The others (19) were more familiar with the feminist theories and
epistemologies of science (if not with individual theorists, at least with the general
concepts and debates in this area). These women were critical of feminist
epistemologies and theories. Several mentioned their discomfort at the problem with
essentialism in some of the theories.
This is worth mentioning as it may give an important insight into the
ambivalence, and/or hostility, of other women scientists to the project of a feminist
science. The idea that women do science differently, as argued earlier, can act to
disempower women in science because marking them as different from the majority
(men) might be equated with marking them as inferior. Some were also uncomfortable
with the label and concept of a 'feminist science', and, for example, argued instead for
a feminist critique of science (C3B, C5BP). Finally, the emphasis on feminist
epistemology in feminist criticism of science was seen by another small group as
somewhat misguided. For example:
I don't care [about feminist theories in some ways], that's another issue ... I
read articles ... there's a whole issue about whether women think differently
than men, whether they act differently, and whether there's a feminist way, and
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somehow I think I don't care, I want to be able to do science and I want other
women to be able to do science -1 don't think they have to do it like me ... it's
not important to me ... defining it doesn't seem to me a useful way of doing it,
or changing the situation of women ... it doesn't seem productive, even if it's
possible, which I doubt. (PI IP)
Nine of these women also made more general comments on this apparent gulf
between philosophers and social scientists on the one hand, and natural scientists on
the other. The strongest view was the following:
I think you must be enormously aware of the problem of disciplinary division,
of the Grand Canyon across which one has to shout when one tries to
communicate between the natural and social sciences, and on the one hand I'm
fascinated by this area in which you're studying, and on the other hand I'm
enormously frustrated by what I see as ... a superficial approach on the part of
my social science colleagues who have no understanding of science ... I hear
science is awful because it's competitive and hierarchical, and it's taken out of
context, and there are many respects in which I agree those are probably
issues ... but I think it's time we moved beyond those labels and started asking
really serious questions and doing the research to go beyond that. (P16C)
Other women made similar, if less forceful, comments:
In conversation I feel that people from the outside when they criticise science
... they often criticise ... from political points of view ... 'how nasty it is to
think like this', or, 'how contemptuous it is to look at women in this way', but
they don't pick up on the methodological areas, which is completely
understandable, but some people will spend a lot of effort denouncing a
scientific piece of work without realising that it is also erroneous, so the time
shouldn't even be wasted on whether it's nice or not ... because it's just
wrong. (P17B)
There appear to be two strands to these women's criticisms: the first is that the critics
of science in Philosophy/Social Science/Women's Studies do not always understand
science, and the second is that they are not always sympathetic to science, and that
these qualities are necessary for an effective critique of science. There are also
empiricist overtones in this type of response, ie a belief in the ability to evaluate the
errors in science.
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One woman argued that the different feminist epistemologies can be used,
selectively in different contexts (of discussions with scientists):
Well I think one uses them all in different contexts. I become a feminist
empiricist when I'm dealing with some, yet another round of crap, for want of
a better word ... there was a book a couple of years ago ... about the brain ...
and sex difference and it was just appalling ... 'feminists have got it all wrong
and misled everyone else ... and there really are huge differences in the brain'
... And so when I'm dealing with people like that I think one has to be a
feminist empiricist, has to stand up and say, 'but there is scientific evidence
against this, and what we really need is a more true science', and I say it
tongue in cheek . (C1B)
What about standpoint theory? (AK)
I think that it's got it's usefulness, I think that I wouldn't be a feminist if I didn't
believe that women had some degree of commonality ... otherwise ... there is
no physical grounds for feminism at all. And I think that's important, and it's
important for me as a lesbian, but that's not to deny there aren't important
differences [amongst women] too. Standpoint is also important in relationship
to the way I think about animals ... a lot of postmodernist writing ... it's all
fracturing of identities ... within the human realm, so that nature remains some
sort of fixity, some sort of other to which we are opposed ... then it rests
paradoxically on a kind of standpoint, a human standpoint. (C1B)
This woman also argued that the place of nature in feminist epistemology required
negotiation:
We actually have a neat way of supporting biological determinism while we
support social constructivism ... we deny any biological [component] to [the
behaviour of humans] ... we'd say social construction, right? We don't mind
admitting that we have ovaries which secrete hormones, or our bodies are
biological, they're biologically constructed, so we keep that dichotomy
[between the natural and social]. When we talk about animals, if we do it at
all, then animals, of course, are purely biological ... So, given that there will
always be a ... cross fertilisation ... between how we see human societies and
how we see animal societies ... there will always be someone who will make
that jump ... it's going to generate biologically determinist hypotheses. What
we should be doing, to counteract that is to say, 'but we shouldn't be
biologically determinist about animals either, who says it is all down to their
hormones? Why can't they have a social and biological interaction? Who
defines what biology in the first place?' (C1B)
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There are two tensions in the feminist science theories illustrated by these comments.
The first is a tension between the natural and the social, which includes a tension
between empirical evidence and social construction of evidence, and that between
animals and humans. A second issue of difference amongst women and commonality
also arises. These will be explored further in Chapter 9.
More specifically, other comments illustrated the problem with 'translating'
from feminist epistemology and theory into scientific practice. One example concerns
a revamped notion of objectivity, promoted by Harding and referred to as 'strong
objectivity':
Oh [ideas about strong objectivity] are probably not practical... I don't know
that people are necessarily capable of being open about their biases, or to
know what their assumptions about the world are all the time. Sometimes you
know and you can lay them out, one, two, three, four, five ... but often you
don't really know until you're confronted by something that is different from
you or antagonistic to you. (PC4B)
Another scientist turned feminist critic also made a similar point about Donna
Haraway's 'situated knowledge':
I really like Donna's paper on situated knowledge very much ... its not so far
from my own thinking about perspectival accounts of scientific knowledge ...
but... these are not concepts that would be operative ... in the work of science
... how would you translate that? What kinds of questions would you ask ... I
laid out ... 3 levels of concern ... the questions one asks, the methodologies
one employs and the explanations one finds ... try to translate situated
knowledge into the questions one asks or the methods one employs ... maybe
it would be easier in terms of the explanations one finds satisfying but let's
have some examples ... what would a situated knowledge question in the
development of biology ... I have ideas about how to approach ... the kinds of
questions I would like to see, the kinds of methodologies, the kinds of
explanations ... they're not unsympathetic with some of the things Donna has
argued, but the notion of situated knowledge, I wouldn't begin to know how
to translate it. (C5BP)
233
This gap between theory and practice is very real for those scientists and critics who
are familiar, with the feminist epistemologies, as well as those who are unfamiliar.
This suggests that it is more appropriate to question the theoretical premise of
feminist epistemologies, rather than the understanding of feminist and women
scientists.
There is also the issue of the lack of social mechanisms to support a feminist
epistemology:
I don't think [the feminist standpoint theories are practical] ... that's the short
answer ... obviously there is a very simple [interpretation] if we allow that
women might bring different life experiences [into science] then anything
which opens up science more to women would make that possible, with in the
kind of general, broad remit of standpoint theory. But we don't have the
creches ... we don't open it up ... to women specifically in that kind of way.
There are more women in science than there used to be but they do have huge
problems. (C1B)
Changes in the organisation of science are clearly seen as preliminary to
epistemological change.
However, this discontent does not totally invalidate the project of a feminist
epistemology of science, as 11 of the women I spoke to argued. It was pointed out
that feminist epistemology should not be used as a blueprint for a feminist science, but
more as a 'mirror to reflect against' (P10P), for women who are in science. The role of
some of the theories is therefore to 'push the discussion' around feminism and science.
For example, one woman talked about Donna Haraway's work:
She's wild and woolly isn't she ... it's visionary ... I've gotten to the point
where I can enjoy it, that was a good step. A student of mine said, 'read it as if
it's performance art, as if she's just standing up and spouting this stuff off, I
get that, it's a real trip ... save the world through cyborgs, I doubt it, it's not
my predilection, but it's wonderful to see, it's performance art to me, I can
appreciate it, I don't therefore think I'm going to do it. (P8B)
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Of course, some of the theories are more at the 'performance art' end of the spectrum
than others. One comment concerned a fundamental difference in the aims of these
different theories:
Well they don't all call for things to be put into practice. I would say ... the
philosophers ... are probably more focused on scientific practice for the future
and Donna [Haraway] more on analysing scientific practice, although if you
take her analysis and if people doing science started to think analytically in the
way she does that probably would change their practice. (C3B)
Moreover, not all of the women felt that the difference between philosophies and
theories has to do with training as a scientist, but depended on understanding and
sympathy for science, as noted earlier:
There are two parts where one deals with the activity of being involved in
science. One is doing science, in actual fact, doing measurement in the lab ...
and one is understanding science, that is really being able to understand the
meaning of the scientific result, of the new fact, of the new observation, in the
narrow and in the broad sense. Now these two things are in many ways
separate strands. There are some people who are excellent scientists and don't
understand science at all... in its impact. ... There are a lot of people who are
among the very good science writers and the odd scientist who both does
science and understands it ... but when you go to people ... who are
philosophers you have to look at what sort of understanding they have. The
very fact that they aren't working in the lab doesn't disqualify them, just as the
fact that many people in the lab couldn't write two paragraphs about the
philosophy of science. (P18P)
8.5.2 Conclusion
It appears that feminist epistemologies are not a good match with the
expectations and aspirations for change expressed in section 8.4. There was ambiguity
about what a feminist science means and about its utility. A lack of communication
between scientists and theorists may be a reason for this gulf. There was a feeling that
feminist theories need to be more sympathetic and understanding of the scientific
endeavor.
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Tensions in the feminist epistemologies between commonality and difference
amongst women and between the social and the natural realm are evident in this data.
Problems of 'translation' from theory into practice are also highlighted. Questions
were raised about the mechanisms for the expression of subjectivities and the kinds of
questions a feminist science would explore. Social changes necessary to achieve a
feminist science were also discussed. This has implications for all of the feminist
epistemologies of science.
Despite these problems the feminist epistemologies were perceived by some as
playing an important role in stimulating thought and debate. The temptation to
amalgamate all of the theories together must therefore also be avoided - some are
more focused on practical change than others. There are many differences between
the feminist theories that this section has not explored fully. I conduct such an
exploration in the following chapter.
8.6 Conclusion
With respect to how science is gendered in practice, considering the role of
social relations in the scientific community and research practice, the practitioners'
experiences confirm that the lifestyle of scientists, their networking and styles of
collaboration, in addition to their interaction with students and the wider community,
and the hierarchy of promotion, funding and publication, are all interdependent, and
shape scientific knowledge. I illustrated an association between scientific practice and
characteristics of competitiveness, confrontation and hierarchy - all stereotypically
masculine. A scientific career is clearly more conducive to an archetypal masculine
lifestyle and style of interaction.
The structure of employment in science is hierarchical; and male domination is
perpetuated by the hiring and promotion system where 'like favours like', ie men
favour similar men. Funding also goes to big projects and big research; prompting a
high level of competition and the funded elite at the expense of smaller projects. The
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data suggests that women are disadvantaged via the structure of science, because the
'cloning' of those at the top of the funding and promotion hierarchies tends to exclude
women.
The data illustrates how the social relations in the scientific community that
affect the content of science can be gendered. These include a more critical approach
to women's work and marginalisation of women who do not communicate using the
dominant style. Both criticism and marginalisation affect the influence of these women
on the content of science. Competition and confrontational interactions, which I have
identified as stereotypically masculine, also affect scientific knowledge. Other social
factors that heavily influence the content of science are external pressures from
funding bodies, and internal pressures from the scientific community, which prescribe
the topics to be studied, and shape the frequency and results of research because of
the pressure for new, coherent and useful information. These social relations act to
limit the opportunities available to women scientists, in contrast to their male peers.
More generally, the practice of science is shaped by wider political and economic
considerations.
Research practice and gender relations are more difficult to model. The data
shows that there is no monolithic research practice. Instead I found the aim of control,
levels of subjectivities and use of reductionism, varied in different contexts of
scientific practice. Although some women argued that these are tied to deep rooted
masculine traits, others identified a rhetorical, as opposed to literal, association
between masculinity and control, objectivity and reductionism. Different approaches
by women and men in science were also related to their social status within science, in
particular to the extent of their marginalisation. For example, women's position on the
margins of their community may allow them to pursue more unorthodox approaches.
This is another example of the interaction between the scientific community and
scientific content. However, this relationship can also be mutually reinforcing in such
a way as to suppress unorthodox approaches and the promotion of women in science.
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I intend to use this empirical material, on how the practice of science is
gendered, to inform my discussion and analysis in the following chapter. The main
goal of my research is to suggest a practical framework for a feminist science. I have
stressed that a fuller understanding of how science is gendered is necessary before
such a framework can be constructed. What does the data mean in the context of
achieving a feminist science? What are the likely starting points and strategies for
working towards a more feminist science? What are the obstacles and how might they
be overcome? The answers to these questions will be explored in Chapter 9.
The second important aspect of practitioners' experiences and views concern
changing science more directly; it dealt with interviewees' aspirations and
expectations of change and reactions to feminist epistemologies. Practitioners
advocated a change to a more supportive environment in science; a better position for
women in the structure of science (this may mean changing the structure); a more
equal and democratic distribution of funding; and a more equal place in the
community. In research practice, more social responsibility and the opening up of the
process of scientific investigation to explore bias and context was favoured. The goal
of objectivity was not entirely rejected; making subjectivities explicit was important
precisely because it provided scientists with the opportunity for a more impartial
evaluation of scientific results.
I found that such changes in scientific practice have been achieved on a limited
scale, by individual women scientists, working on small projects, or by groups of
women scientists who have formed their own networks. However, the barriers to
larger change are strong and complex. The data suggests there is an inertia to change
in science. Scientists have a vested interest in maintaining their position of power in
science, and therefore contribute to this inertia. Moreover, the scientific culture does
not exist in isolation from the wider culture, for example the importance of funding in
science cannot be underestimated, and any massive changes in science require, and
may even have to be set off by, a corresponding change in wider society. The
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implications for a feminist science of this information require further investigation.
There is a need to identify the barriers to change and consider positive strategies.
The feminist epistemologies do not entirely match with practitioners' vision of
an 'ideal science'. The reasons for this mismatch may be related to the isolation of
academic subjects such as philosophy, social science, and women's studies, from the
natural sciences. This can create a gap in understanding and sympathy for science,
which in turn can create unreliable analyses of science. However, for balance, it was
also noted that there is nothing to guarantee understanding of science inherent in
being a scientist, as many scientists do not seem to have an understanding of what it is
they do, in the broader sociological sense. Furthermore, there is also a role for
epistemologies, not as blue prints for practice but as mirrors for reflection for
scientists, to develop the discussion about feminism, gender and science. However,
the problem seems to be that such a mirror is not accessible to the majority of women
in science and the technique required to use the mirror are often alien to women and
feminists working as scientists.
A proper evaluation of the different epistemologies is still necessary, and will
be conducted in Chapter 9. The tensions in the theories - between the natural and the
social realm, and commonality and difference amongst women; in addition to
problems of translation - require further exploration. This will be derived from the
data on how science is gendered in practice, and on women scientists' aspirations,
expectations and strategies for changing science.
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Part 3 Synthesis of Theory and EmpiricalMaterial
Chapter 9 Discussion and Analysis
9.1 Introduction
My main aim in this thesis is to suggest a practical framework for a feminist
science. The first step in this process is to acquire an understanding of how the
practice of science is gendered. The second step involves developing the concept of a
feminist science in relation to scientific practice. And the third step involves exploring
practical strategies for change. Here the theoretical analysis in Part 1 is combined with
data on the experiences and perceptions of science students and feminist practitioners
from Part 2, in order to address these aims. In synthesising theory and data, I aim to
provide a more robust analysis of the relationship between gender, feminism and
science than that offered by theory or data alone.
My treatment of interviewees' recollections and perceptions reflects my own
concerns about the relationship between masculinity and science and the possibilities
for a feminist science. I do not uncritically adopt interviewees' comments about
gender, feminism and science, but choose instead to deconstruct responses, looking
for contradictions and comparisons. I focus in particular on concrete examples and
places where respondents, especially women, spoke about their ambivalent position in
science. My concern to uncover the complexity of the practice of science leads me to
focus on variations in practice, especially differences in practice because of subject
matter and research questions.
First, in section 9.2, I consider how the practice of science is gendered. I
address the male domination of science and the ways in which gender influences
science more broadly, looking at how it shapes choice of research methods and
scientific knowledge. I am especially interested in interviewees' perception of the
relationship between gender and scientists' actions and rhetoric. I explore social
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relations in the scientific community and in scientific methodology, highlighting
variations in practice in different contexts. I then discuss how characterising science as
a male domain might be a useful way of understanding the relationship between
gender and science.
In section 9.3 I combine a consideration of interviewees' suggestions for
changing science with the notion of science as a male domain. I address questions
raised by my earlier critique of the feminist epistemologies of science and suggest a
'best version' of a feminist science - ie a workable version of a feminist science which
can be promoted from within the existing scientific institutions, but does not forfeit a
commitment to radical change in the process. I explore what constitutes the 'best'
kind of feminist scientists; feminist questions and methodology or methodologies;
organisation of a feminist science; and the relationship between a feminist science and
the wider society.
The next section, 9.4, concerns strategies for achieving this best version of a
feminist science. I emphasise the importance of integrating three key strategies:
getting more women into science; feminising scientific methodology; and challenging
the organisation of science. The dialectical process of change within the scientific
community and outside, in the wider society, is also highlighted. This includes an
exploration of some first steps for change. I then consider how a feminist science
might be taught.
9.2 Gender Relations in Science
9.2.1 Male Domination
The practitioner data on women's place in the scientific community, outlined
in Chapter 8, is a detailed exploration of the male domination of science, introduced in
Chapter 2. Women reported finding it difficult to fit into the typical lifestyle of the
scientist. Interviewees felt that male scientists dominate the important networks of
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communication, hold the powerful positions within science, and deliberately or
inadvertently favour other male scientists and students. These male 'invisible colleges'
(see section 3.3) appear to provide essential channels for promotion of male scientists
and their work. The empirical material also enhances understanding of women's
attempts at assimilation into science. As described in Chapter 8, women scientists may
adopt so called 'masculine' behaviour and some enjoy successes equivalent to their
male colleagues. However, adoption does not necessarily guarantee success, and such
women may be penalised for displaying 'uncharacteristic' gender behaviour. Other
women are marginalised from the important areas of science, which tend to be more
male dominated. The situation is especially bad for feminists who are often penalised
for bringing politics into the supposedly neutral realm of scientific research and
teaching.
The material gained from interviews with students further illustrates the taboo
nature of politics in science, and how this is instilled via science education. Moreover,
students tended to resist suggestions that science was influenced by sex or gender
(note that no clear distinction is made by students between sex and gender), on the
basis that such suggestions compromise the integrity of the scientific method. I believe
that female students tended to be more dismissive of suggestions that sex and gender
influence science than male students because they associated such suggestions with
sexism, and therefore perceived them as a threat to their position in science. Their
position is similar to women scientists seeking to conform to the accepted protocol of
science as outlined in Keller's analysis of women scientists' hostility to feminism (see
section 3.6).
The data in Chapter 8 also supports the concept of institutional norms,
conventions, barriers and invisible colleges in science, from the sociology of science
(section 3.3), bringing sex and gender into the analysis. For example, the notion of
gatekeepers, who 'clone' future generations of scientists, was described by some
practitioner interviewees. This process of replication was also implied in students'
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adherence to an overtly empiricist characterisation of science.27 Women respondents
suggested gatekeepers tended to be male, and to 'clone' other male scientists in their
images. Patriarchy - male rule, traditionally passed from father to son - is therefore
involved in the institutional processes of science. Scientists' general resistance to new
approaches, and entrenched vested interest in continued success, which involves
denial of the political and social content of science, was seen by some interviewees as
leading to discrimination against women in science, especially feminists who are
experienced as a threat to the established conventions in science. From the data
presented in Chapter 8,1 would argue that this is certainly true in the case of scientists
with feminist sympathies who seek to challenge the 'old boys' network'. Perhaps
women scientists also have less to lose by breaking with convention, considering that
their marginalisation from important scientific areas and centres of power might
already be established or imminent. Other women, who might not actually be a threat
to convention, can also find themselves marginalised. I suggest that marginalisation
occurs because they are perceived as a threat by their male colleagues, precisely
because they are female and expected to be at odds with a system which so blatantly
favours men. The forceful denial of sex and gender influences on science, particularly
by female students, might be a strategy adopted by some women to deflect male
scientists' perception of them as a threat.
The interview material demonstrates that these types of social relations in
science cannot be divorced from scientific knowledge, even though this is an implicit
notion in much of the feminist literature detailed in Chapter 2 and in many of the
students' and a minority of practitioners' responses. Women felt that their work is
more closely scrutinised because they are perceived as less confident by their male
colleagues. Women have been side-lined in groups and their contributions ignored.
Those women who are less ambitious are less likely to guard information than other
more ambitious scientists. And some women scientists organise their laboratories in
27
Perhaps the strength of students' defence of empiricism is an indication of the way
in which scientists who teach students pass on the rhetoric of empiricism which
students then mimic.
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order to maximise cooperation and minimise competition. In other words, in such
cases information is more freely available where women are involved. Levels of
scrutiny and availability of information clearly shapes the content of scientific
knowledge. Whilst this is by no means purely an issue of gender, gender nevertheless
comes into play given the marginalisation and stigmatisation which women in science
experience.
9.2.2 Masculinity
I argued in section 3.4 that there is undoubtedly a mutually reinforcing
relationship between the male domination of science and the perception of science as
masculine. However, I questioned the nature of masculinity and its influence on the
practice of science. I criticised psychoanalytic theories, such as object relations
theory, for being overly deterministic about the role of psychology in shaping gender,
and prone to problematic generalisations. I argued that social factors also contribute
to gender identity, and that there were many different 'masculinities'. In this vein, I
noted the powerful role of rhetoric about the masculinity of particular scientific
methodologies in guaranteeing support and funding for science. I argued that rhetoric
could also have a role in concealing and reinventing the actual practice of science, to
garner political and financial support. For most scientists, it is now politically
unacceptable to define methodologies in science as masculine, yet the association
continues in popular perceptions of science. Is there some concrete foundation to the
perception that science is masculine?
Section 3.4.1 documented the suggestion by Hubbard and Bleier that the
topics and questions of science might be shaped by masculine values, given the male
domination of science. Although I recognised the importance of dispelling the myth
that science is value-free, I did raise problems with any simple equation between male
domination and masculine influence on the topics and questions of science. Similarly,
whilst interviewees recognised the shaping of scientific knowledge by scientists'
beliefs and values, and emphasised ways in which scientists find what they are looking
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for, they did not tend to argue that science reflected a 'male world view'. Instead,
links were drawn between questions asked in science and gender socialisation of
scientists, men's domination of positions of power in government, and funding of
research into certain topics in science, as promoted by Western capitalism. The
political influence on the topics and questions of science was highlighted: for example
policy makers and funding bodies with certain political priorities determine the broad
priorities of what science gets funded.
This provides a more complex array of explanations for the topics and
questions explored in science than the notion of a 'male world view' shaping research.
Rather than privileging one of these explanations over another it seems more
appropriate to recognise the way in which each of these factors interact in shaping the
priorities of science. Science's links with 'systems of domination' - capitalism,
imperialism and patriarchy - and gender ideology of/in science, as discussed in section
3.2, were raised by interviewees. Links were drawn between individual scientists'
priorities and those of funding bodies - a major point of commonality between these
groups being their sex. Note that scientists in the higher levels of the employment
hierarchy interact with policy makers and funding bodies in determining initial
research priorities and vetting subsequent research proposals. This takes place either
formally, via consultation committees and peer review, or via informal meetings and
conversations. Here the notion of male dominated 'invisible colleges' is also
appropriate for these coalitions amongst policy makers, politicians and scientists.
Nevertheless respondents noted that the emphasis in science (as documented
in sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4) is to ignore or deny these various political influences. In
addition, the data suggests that many junior scientists must make compromises
between their political values and the political values associated with their research
(for example militarism). Both scientists' denial of and compromises about the
political aspects of their topic of study makes it difficult to see with clarity how
scientists' views impact on science. It is only the overt political commitments of a
minority of scientists (including feminists) which are seen to guide their research. Not
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surprisingly, this type of political work is reported to be stifled and marginalised in
science.
So, although these is no simplistic male world view manifest in science, the
intersection of external and internal political forces determining research questions
and topics cannot be divorced from men's position of power, both outwith and within
the scientific community. Nor can men's power be isolated as a single causal factor in
determining scientific research, as capitalist and imperialist influences cannot be
ignored.
Practitioner interviewees provided a variety of descriptions and explanations
of the relationship between gender and practice in science. Men's need to separate
from nature, which they experience as threatening and alien, was given as a reason for
their rhetoric about, and attempts to control, nature. Similarly, men's need to suppress
emotion was seen by some as a reason for their attempts to separate emotion from
knowledge via so called objective methods, while others linked it with the use of
reductionist methods in science. Gender socialisation was given as a reason for men's
behaviour in science, especially for competitiveness and reductionism, although it was
noted that there is an overlap between the sexes' gendered behaviour. These are all
common themes in the feminist critique outlined in section 3.4. Other respondents
nevertheless rejected the literal association between science and masculinity, instead
favouring a rhetorical association, as introduced in section 3.4. Here respondents
viewed 'masculinity' as a label on certain behaviour, eg competitiveness and
aggressiveness. It was also suggested that the reason for masculine labels on
important features of scientific practice was to exclude women from science
There is further evidence from the student data, detailed in chapter 7, of an
association between masculinity and science and of the perception of differences in the
practice of science by men and women. The differences between men and women (in
areas such as patience when doing laboratory work, and empathy) identified by a
minority of students may be evidence of gender socialisation. Nevertheless, whilst
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some of the topics and approaches in science are perceived as masculine by the
majority of practitioners and a minority of students, there is no single explanation for
the association: types of social interaction and methodologies in science have been
variously associated with men's fear of nature and need to create a sense of control,
and with gender socialisation. Students who drew a connection between gender and
science also gave a variety of examples and explanations of the influence of
masculinity in science. This reflects an ambiguity about the relationship between male
domination; essential, social or rhetorical links between masculinity and science; and a
'male world view'. Rather than seeing this as a weakness in respondents'
understanding, I prefer to argue that this indicates a complex relationship between
masculinity and science. The complexity is increased when these qualities are put into
different contexts of the practice of science, which I now consider.
9.2.3 Science in Particular Contexts
What other factors, apart from gender, shape the practice of science, and how
are they related? How do such factors and the way they relate vary depending on the
subject area, aspect of scientific research - from research aims to analysis - and in
different research situations? And how are control, objectivity and reductionism
related to their supposedly opposite qualities - respect, subjectivity and holism?
Another explanation for the dominant practices in science, which challenges
the emphasis on child development and gender socialisation in the previous section,
was also offered by respondents in Chapter 8. Other motives, including prestige,
camaraderie and careerism, motivate scientists. Scientists (especially male scientists)
were seen by some practitioners to have vested interests in career promotion and
securing future funding. It was suggested that, in order to achieve success in science,
scientists' work must fulfill the criteria of 'good science'. This was described by some
interviewees as meaning results must be tidy and 'publishable', in addition to being
seen as untainted by political and social factors. Perhaps scientists therefore utilise the
rhetoric of control and objectivity, to garner credibility for their research. In addition
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to adopting particular explanatory frameworks, scientists might also adopt certain
methods with the aim of obtaining 'good results'. I suggest that reductionist research
designs and methods are especially suitable because of their tendency to limit the
scope of investigation and generate neat, single factor, causal explanations.
Practitioners outlined the way in which reductionism is invariably a highly functional
research design or methodology. Most importantly, this line of analysis suggests that
male scientists have a greater tendency to be focused on success than female
scientists. This implies that they are more likely to adopting this rhetoric or approach.
The extent to which these values in science are applied literally or remain
rhetorical also depends on the particular context. For example, in certain subject areas
reductionist research design and/or reductionist methods are more acceptable, or
more easily applied. Astronomy is a good example of a science where reductionist
research design tends not to be possible, but where reductionist techniques for
analysing data can be applied. Clearly qualities such as control, reductionism and
objectivity have different meanings in different contexts. For example 'control of
nature' might involve experimental controls, coming up with an explanation and
appearing 'in control' in a social group, or it may have a broader meaning like
controlling the world's population. Objectivity also has several layers of meaning. For
example, some research projects are more objective than others in the sense of being
more thorough and accurate, in their use of proper statistical controls. Moreover,
especially in the case of reductionism, there is no clear boundary between the
supposedly opposite sides of the dichotomy which feminists argue informs the
philosophy of science - the dichotomy between masculinity and femininity and its
association with reductionism and holism, control and respect of nature and
objectivity and subjectivity. Rhetoric and practice in science can involve both sides of
this dichotomy; for example, rhetoric about controlling nature need not be distinct
from rhetoric about respect of nature. Equally, reductionist methods may be a part of
a holistic research design. The data from the student interviews - when they argue that
qualities such as intution and rationality should both be included in 'good science' -
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further confirms the combination of qualities related to the supposedly opposite sides
of the masculine-feminine dichotomy in science.
In sum, particular contexts clearly alter the application and configuration of
particular research techniques.This evidence further emphasises the point made in the
previous section - it is over-simplistic to argument that science is masculine because
objectivity, reductionism and control of nature are masculine - as it highlights the
different meanings and manifestations of these concepts in science. There are several
meanings behind each of these concepts, not all of which fit in with the feminist
critics' emphasis on emotional suppression. Scientists who adopt a particular rhetoric
or approach are also motivated by the desire for successful scientific careers.
Moreover, the dichotomy between these supposedly masculine traits and their
opposite feminine traits, is not always manifest in practice, as the combination of
reductionist and holistic methodologies in science shows. In the next section I attempt
to integrate the points made here with those in the two previous sections, in order to
develop a preliminary theory of the relationship between gender and the practice of
science.
9.2.4 Science as a Male Domain
Is it possible to tie together the male domination of science, different
explanations of masculinity in science, and properly contextualise this in an
understanding of scientific practice? I suggest that characterising science as a male
domain might prove a useful starting point in understanding the complexity of this
relationship.
'Male domain' highlights the male domination of science in terms of numbers
and sphere of control and influence. The emphasis on the word 'male' as opposed to
'masculine' is not meant to imply that masculinity is an essentially male quality, a
position which I have criticised throughout this study. Rather it is intended to
highlight the importance of the material reality of male domination in science, and to
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use this as a starting point for understanding associations between 'masculinity' and
science. Perhaps by starting from a full appreciation of the male domination of science
the relationship between gender and science will become more clear.
Science is a male sphere of influence and control. It is women who must adapt
to the typical lifestyle of the scientists and the prevailing style of communication.
Men, on the other hand, are much more likely to fit in with the 'protocol' of science.
There are male gatekeepers who perpetuate male domination. Women seem to be
experienced as a threat and can therefore find themselves marginalised or stigmatised,
particularly if they are feminists. The reverse is also true, some women scientists are
on the margins of science because they have no interest in a conventional scientific
career. It may be that the unconventional nature of these women's work and criticism
of science is experienced as threatening by conventional scientists. The 'Catch 22'
situation - where women are penalised for conventional behaviour which is seen by
male scientists as unsuitable for their sex as well as being penalised for unconventional
behaviour which may be viewed as suitable for their sex, but is unsuitable in terms of
scientific protocol - is further illustration of their apparent threat to the male domain
of science.
I suggest that this notion of science as a male domain can be used to better
understand the mechanisms by which science is perceived as masculine. Although
appeals to male psychology in the feminist critique of science cannot be explored
directly, the data obtained in Chapters 7 and 8 does challenge the primacy of their role
in explaining 'masculinity and science', as it introduces other explanations of motives
for certain behaviour in science, which are nevertheless associated with stereotypes of
masculinity.
Values integral to success in science - confidence and ease with the combative
style of communication and competitiveness, and the appearance of lack of emotion -
are thought of as masculine in popular culture. Although partly based on a gender
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socialisation and child development, the association between gender and particular
types of behaviour is not necessarily entirely literal, and may also be rhetorical.
Historically, the rhetorical links between science and masculinity acted to
exclude women from science, and to garner political and economic support for
science. Now, scientists no longer use the rhetoric of gender associations, but favour
a rhetoric of neutrality; it is feminists who now make links between gender and
science. Perhaps thinking of masculinity as a label placed by feminists and other
women in science on certain activities will help in understanding the relationship
between gender and science.28 This is a way of putting Keller's argument that 'gender
is the label a culture places on sex' (Keller, 1992a, p46; documented in section 3.3)
into the particular context of science. I am arguing that there is not just one label or
culture but many labels which different groups in particular cultures place on the
sexes' practices.
This analysis is not mean as a slur on feminist theory. There are good reasons
why feminists and other women concerned about science adopt this approach. The
notion of the masculinity of science draws attention to the sexist double standards in
the 'Catch 22' situation described above. The extension of the analysis to consider the
masculinity of the methods of science also challenges the virtual neglect of this aspect
by mainstream sociology of science and the notion that scientific methods are value
free. Moreover, to associate this behaviour with male child development or gender
socialisation, and to see it as embedded in the actual methods of science, provides a
neat explanation for the persuasiveness of the association between maleness and
success in science.
28 Richards and Schuster (1989) make a similar argument when they discuss the way
in which feminist discourses about scientific methodology, and serve as 'flexible
rhetorical resources in the social process of knowledge construction and negotiation
of knowledge claims', (p697), although they argue that such narrow methodological
discourses are unhelpful for feminist intervention in science. As I explain more fully in
the main text that follows, I take the view that when used explicitly, and within a
wider theory of the organisation of science, such discourses can be positive.
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Nevertheless, in my view this type of 'catch all' analysis has more
disadvantages than advantages. Most significantly it alienates many women scientists,
making them hostile to feminists' attempts to understand the gendering of science. It
also masks important dimensions of the practice of science - the 'rich diversity of
meanings and practices' that Keller refers to (Keller, 1992a, p48; see section 3.43) -
on two counts. First, it underemphasises the historical role of scientists' rhetoric about
science and gender. Second, it hides other reasons and motives behind scientists' use
of particular methods and rhetoric of neutrality.
Instead I propose that the labelling of science as masculine by feminists
should be made explicit, and qualified in the following way, in the particular context
of the male domain of science. Particular behaviour in science has been labelled
masculine by feminists and women in science because it is mosdy displayed by men. In
contrast, when women in science display the same behaviour, for example
competitiveness, they can be stigmatised or marginalised.
It is also important to recognise that there are different versions of masculinity
associated with science. I have given examples of macho bravado amongst male
scientists involved with animal experimentation and at conferences in my empirical
material. Perhaps this is a case of the reinforcement of masculinity in the work place
(drawing from Cockburn, 1985). Note that versions of masculine bravado are not
necessarily uniform across all scientific disciplines. It may be the case that different
sub-communities in science have different forms of masculine behaviour. There are
other stereotypes of masculinity in science, eg 'computer nerds'. Traweek has
documented the different cultures of theorists and experimentalists working in high
energy physics, including their dress code (Traweek, 1988). In each case, the shared
masculine culture has the effect of promoting male camaraderie which women can
experience as alienating. There is also the possibility of similarities between different
masculine cultures in science which contribute to a general sense of camaraderie
which male scientists from different disciplines share.
252
Objectivity, control of nature and reductionism cannot be considered to be
masculine in any simplistic sense. These qualities, in various forms and configurations
with other supposedly 'feminine' traits, for example intuition, remain important in
science today precisely because of their rhetorical force or practicality for scientists'
wishing to advance their careers in science. Although women scientists can adopt the
values of objectivity, reductionism and control of nature, those such as feminists, on
the margins, who adopt unconventional approaches to science are likely to reject
them. This enhances feminists' association of objectivity, reductionism and control of
nature with masculinity.
The concept of the male domain of science can also explain why other women
scientists and students reject the masculine label on science, especially when it is
applied to methodologies. Perhaps these women's denial of and even outright hostility
to the notion of science as masculine is because of their interest in a successful career
in science, which depends upon either being part of or, at the very least being
tolerated by, the male domain of science, an important feature of which is the appeal
to science as value free knowledge.
In sum, the male domain of science incorporates the concept of male
domination of the numbers of scientists and concept of males' sphere of influence in
science. It provides an explanation for the perpetuation of male domination in science:
male scientists' 'cloning' of male junior scientists; and their repeated use of certain
methods and adoption of certain behaviour necessary for success. There is no simple
or single association between masculinity and science. I continue to accept that there
is a way in which the perception of science as masculine is reinforced by male
scientists' adoption of these approaches and vice versa. However, while object
relations theory and gender socialisation may partly explain male scientists' behaviour,
I have chosen to develop the other side of this relationship - the way in which
perceptions of masculinity are related to the powerful position of men in science -
which I have argued is neglected in the feminist critique of science. I focus on the
rhetorical links between masculinity and science, the social oganisation of science and
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the requirements for success within it. Although the association with masculinity is
now denied by most scientists, the criteria for success in science remain broadly
similar. It is useful to think of 'masculine' as a label feminists and other women
scientists place on behaviour and methods in science because they are developed and
perpetuated by men for the purposes of prestige, camaraderie and mutual support.
Women must adopt this behaviour to succeed, but can also be penalised for so doing.
This can be related to the use of unorthodox methods (eg a greater emphasis on
holism) by marginalised women in science, especially feminists. There are undoubtedly
several different types of 'masculinity' in science depending on the particular context.
Other women, aiming to be successful on the same terms as men tend to deny the
association with masculinity and science, particularly between scientific methods and
gender. I suggest that this is necessary for them to avoid hostility from the male
domain.
The concept of the male domain of science is only a starting point for
understanding gender in the practice of science. Three major questions remain. First,
the way in which early child development, gender socialisation, and the construction,
or rejection, of gender labels within science interact, requires further investigation, ie
the mutually reinforcing relationship between masculinity and science, which functions
within and outwith science, in the wider society. Science is clearly a powerful
institution in the wider society, which has male domination in common with other
powerful institutions. Second, the questions raised in Chapter 3 about scientists' use
of language as a rhetorical device have not been adequately dealt with here.
Nevertheless the emphasis on rhetoric and labelling in this preliminary analysis might
provide a way of developing a future analysis of practice and language. Third, the
complexity of the scientific enterprise has only been touched upon here. Answers to
the important questions raised in Chapter 3 concerning the difference between pure
and applied research and between scientific workers and the elite scientists have yet to
be incorporated into the picture of science and gender. Nevertheless, the complexity
of the interaction between sex, gender and science has been established, and any
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explanation based on single causal factors rejected. The importance of particular
context and rhetoric has also been established.
9.3 Feminism and Science
9.3.1 Feminist Scientists
The main questions explored in this section are, in the 'best version' of a
feminist science, who could be a feminist scientist and what do feminist scientists need
to have in common for such a feminist science? The answers are drawn from a
consideration of the data detailed in Chapter 8, that is the views and experiences of
feminists and women sympathetic to feminism who are either critics or practitioners of
science. I contend that these women, while not necessarily labelling themselves
'feminist scientists', do give pointers to what the best criteria for feminist scientists
might be.
As noted in section 9.2, a significant number of these women felt marginalised
in science, either through choice and a desire to adopt an unconventional approach, or
as a penalty for their lack of conformity. Many of the women who were or had been in
such a position were in the life sciences. Women with experience in the physical
sciences appear less able to adopt radically different approaches, and were more likely
to show their feminism in more conventional ways, encouraging and supporting
women in science. Different women in, or close to, science hold different views on the
extent and nature of the 'masculine' influence on science. Their feminist politics are
also different - some placing greater emphasis on getting more women into science,
and others being more concerned to transform the methodologies of science. In
addition, their positions in the employment hierarchy and disciplines of science varies.
However, these women have in common their exclusion, albeit to varying degrees,
from the male domain of science.
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Two features of respondents' views require further consideration. First, their
calls for more women in science and for a greater diversity of scientists shows that
they view diversity in science as a strength. Second, the concern with explaining the
relationship between gender and science in feminist theory was viewed as irrelevant by
some respondents. Others took the view that it was important. What does this call for
more diversity, and the amount of actual diversity in views in relation to gender and
science, mean for feminist epistemologies of science?
I highlighted the tension between the views of the individuals and the
community view in my initial analysis of feminist epistemologies of science when I
rejected feminist standpoint theory as a flawed basis for theorising about a feminist
science (see sections 4.3 and 4.4). An important aspect of my critique was the
importance of avoiding an overly-determinist essentialist position, which would
alienate women and men in science and lead to a relatively powerless feminist science
on the fringes of mainstream science. I contrasted Haraway's views on coalitions of
interest amongst feminists, ie shared politics which would form the basis for their
evaluation of their knowledge claims, with Harding's emphasis on a more permanent
commonality, formed on the basis of a set of well defined priorities and shared views,
ie a more consistent basis for judging knowledge claims, and asked if the two were
incompatible (see section 4.4.4). To what extent is commonality in views likely and
desirable in a feminist science? A similar question arose concerning feminist
empiricism: the evaluation of knowledge cannot be purely based on community
reflexivity, and must surely require some individual reflexivity - how are the two
related?
From Chapter 8 the point of commonality which the respondents share is their
exclusion from the male domain of science and their commitment to equality in
science, in terms of numbers of women and access to power and influence. This
underpins their views about an 'ideal science'. There is a diversity of views on how to
achieve this, and the extent to which the traditional methods of science should be
altered, but this diversity is not viewed as problematic by the women I interviewed.
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There was a strong emphasis on collaboration, diversity, egalitarianism, democracy
and creativity in their responses to questions about an ideal science - all of which are
qualities which nurture diversity within the bounds of a shared common goal of a
better science.
In my view this balance between commonality and diversity in interviewees'
views provides useful pointers for thinking about the criteria in the 'best version' of a
feminist science for feminist scientists. Diversity of opinion is not necessarily a
hindrance to a workable feminist science, when opinions are shared in a community of
scholars who value creativity and democracy. The extent of commonality in
respondents' views allays my earlier concerns about Haraway's 'coalition politics'
(Haraway, 1986). On reflection this position appears to be a workable solution to the
problem of a feminist science based on a feminist standpoint. In contrast, my earlier
criticisms of Rose's, Hartsock's and Harding's feminist standpoint are mainly
reinforced by my empirical findings. A feminist standpoint is simply not relevant for
the majority of feminist practitioners of science, whose versions oftdeal science' make
little reference to a feminist standpoint as a guiding principle in their Ideal science1.
Furthermore, a significant number of responses on questions about epistemology
criticise feminist epistemology of science in general for being unrelated to the practice
of science, especially for being over analytical about orthodox science being based on
a masculine or male standpoint - a component of feminist standpoint theory . Others
argued that feminist epistemology was too concerned with defining a feminist way of
doing science based on women's way of knowing, which is important in feminist
standpoint theory. More importantly though, diversity of experience and perspectives
highlighted and valued by respondents, is not allowed for in feminist standpoint
theory. In my view, the mixture of views which might evolve from an emphasis on
diversity would constitute an important strength of a future feminist science -
generating both creativity and an openness to different perspectives. Diversity would
be compromised by an emphasis on scientists adopting a feminist standpoint, and the
potential for the growth of feminist science would therefore be hindered.
Nevertheless, the notion of many feminist standpoints, rooted in different experiences,
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is still valid. Moreover, Collin's' notion of the feminist scholar's perspective being
based on their 'outsider within' status has empirical weight when considered in the
context of women's marginal position in the male domain of science. These are two
positive ways of using the notion of a feminist standpoint in science which I did not
anticipate in my earlier critique.
I suggest that the best criteria for feminist scientists is inclusion in a feminist
science community of people from a variety of backgrounds who hold a range of
views, but who are united by a common goal of equality for women in science (and,
as I shall show later, a corresponding goal of equality for women in all of society).
Given my rejection of a feminist standpoint and its essentialist overtones, there is no
reason to suggest that feminist scientists would only be women. Men who held these
views could also be feminist scientists. I can envisage various feminist 'interest
groups' working in coalition with scientists with similar concerns (eg around
environmentalism or anti-militarism). There would be, as there are now, groups of
more 'liberal' feminists who emphasised equality of access and others who were more
concerned with changing the methods of science. Crucially though, as I shall go on to
show, a commitment to equality in science depends upon rejecting the notion of
'value free' scientific knowledge which is an important feature of the current male
power structure in science.
9.3.2 Topics and Questions
Choice of topics and questions in conventional science were viewed by
interviewees as limited by the constraints of funding and scientists' careerism. For
example, investigation in certain fields was seen as shaped by scientists motivation to
'blaze a trail' with new research, or to work in 'trendy' areas where funding is readily
available. The lack of research into questions of interest and importance to ordinary
people, especially ordinary women, was criticised by interviewees. Emphasis was
placed on research which would act to empower the community.
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A variety of alternatives to this current situation were put forward by feminist
practitioners. A greater diversity of topics was called for, as was more consideration
of the ethics of research, especially in relation to animal experimentation. There was
not, however, one set approach. As one woman's account of the history of her
various different research areas suggests, questions of interest to feminists can even
involve conflicting ethical positions, in this case with regards to animal
experimentation.
Questions which orthodox science has failed to address were proposed by
practitioners as important areas of study. These might involve consultation in the
community to identify important concerns of less powerful groups. In addition,
questions which addressed the complex problems often ignored in today's science,
with its emphasis on reductionist research design, could be addressed. This might
involve interdisciplinary research, eg collaborations between physics and biology on
studying the effects of radiation on organic materials.
One problem with these proposals is the predominance of health-related
questions. Although this would not necessarily only involve the biological sciences -
interdisciplinary research with the physical sciences could be fruitful - the lack of
suggestions for research topics in the physical sciences raises an important difficulty
with the notion of feminist questions in science. Are feminist questions in science
solely related to women's life in society (health being an important aspect of life dealt
with by scientists)? In what way is extending the topics and questions of science to
take account of issues important to the community 'feminist'? Can feminists 'lay
claim' to these topics of investigation?
Perhaps a starting point for answering these questions is a consideration of
how the basic aims of feminism - equality for women - can be extended to a
philosophy of equality in society generally. This would involve challenging the power
structures which perpetuate inequality by driving scientific research in directions
which do not empower, and can even do harm to, ordinary people - eg imperialism
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and capitalism. However, in my view it would be wrong to argue that this was an
exclusively feminist aim and therefore that these are exclusively feminist questions.
The radical science movement in particular placed an end to inequality as a central
element of their aims and practice, although a commitment to sexual equality is not
given such a strong priority as it is by feminists. Instead I argue that it is more useful
to think of the 'best version' of a feminist science as exploring questions of interest
to feminists, in all their diversity, given their common commitment to sexual equality
and their various links with otherpolitical interest groups in and outwith science.
I now move on to consider the case of feminist methodology of science,
bearing in mind these questions about whether such a term is appropriate in the 'best
version' of a feminist science.
9.3.3 Methodology
Choice of methodologies in science were also criticised by interviewees in
Chapter 8 as too limited - in particular the overemphasis on reductionist approaches.
Crucially, the claim that science is objective was rejected by the majority of feminist
practitioners, and the rhetorical force of this claim in orthodox science was
acknowledged. Scientific knowledge was viewed as socially shaped by the priorities
of funding bodies and policy makers in addition to scientists' own subjectivities:
emphasis was placed on scientists 'finding what they are looking for'. The importance
of scientists' passion for their work in shaping the questions they asked and the
answers they found was highlighted. Different 'layers' of meaning of objectivity were
exposed, not all of which were rejected by practitioners, for example statistical
approaches to reducing 'bias' were described as important by one interviewee. The
role of control of nature and reductionism was also shown to vary depending on the
particular context, as discussed in section 9.2.3 - for example reductionism can apply
to research design or methods.
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More holistic methodologies were favoured by feminist practitioners, although
not at the expense of reductionist methods where these were more appropriate.
Clearly methodologies cannot be divorced from the questions asked by feminists -
what is important is to find the right methodologies for the task of answering these
questions. A commitment to objectivity in terms of the ultimate aim of an accurate
reflection of nature was evident in practitioners' 'ideal science'. Rules for scientific
investigation and critical discussion were viewed as part of this process. Significandy,
other aspects of 'traditional' objectivity were rejected - particularly scientists'
attempts to distance themselves from the object of study. A thorough investigation of
subjectivities which shape knowledge was viewed as part of the process of being
objective, in the sense of being more accurate. More awareness of biases which might
affect science, and scientists' acknowledgment of where their background ideas and
assumptions and the social context of their work affected their results, was advocated.
How does this position square with the feminist critics' earlier treatments of a
feminist science and the later feminist epistemologies of science? Does it help in
answering other questions raised in my critique of these epistemologies concerning
the criteria for evaluating knowledge claims? Should evaluation of knowledge claims
be based on appeals to 'closeness to nature' or 'better polities'? What would be the
process of critical evaluation of knowledge claims? Should feminists promote a
feminist science via exposing the 'myth of objectivity' or should they utilise it where
appropriate for the extension of their own ideology of equality? And what is the
possibility of the 'reverberation' of change through different scientific disciplines?
There is no simple answer to any of these questions, neither is it possible to
answer them completely with the data provided. The answer is instead a general one,
which takes as its basis the tension between objectivism and relativism evident in
practitioners' responses to questions on methodology. In my view this resonates with
the treatment of objectivity in the feminist critics' initial formulations of a feminist
science, detailed in Chapter 4, and the later feminist epistemologies of science
(detailed in Chapter 4). In particular, Fee's treatment of objectivity is a highly
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appropriate way of understanding the case made by interviewees (see section 4.2). To
recap, Fee argues that objectivity is 'sufficiently vague to carry with it a multitude of
meanings' (Fee, 1982, p 17). Fee rejects what she calls the 'hierarchy of distances' in
objectivity, which is manifest in four ways: the treatment of the production of
knowledge as separate from its social use; the separation between scientific rationality
and emotion in the language of science, which she argues is a 'pervasive and powerful
aspect of the mythology of science' as scientists are often deeply committed to their
work (Fee, 1982, p 18); the distance between the subject of study and the object of
study, which legitimates the domination of nature; and the view of science as separate
and distinct from society. Fee's main point is that all of these aspects of objectivity are
false, and that science is political and emotional, and not separate from nature.
Fee also highlights positive meanings of objectivity which mirrors
respondents' rejection of relativism, favouring the:
constant process of practical interaction with nature; willingness to consider
all assumptions and methods as open to question ... idea of individual
creativity subjected to the constraints of community validation through a series
of recognised procedures (Fee, 1982, pl6).
In addition, the importance of understanding and respecting the independence of
nature was stressed by interviewees, in a similar way to Rose's and Haraway's
arguments for a type of 'constrained realism' in science.
My initial treatment of this tension between objectivism and relativism,
developed in my review in Chapters 3 and 4, is challenged by practitioner's responses
to questions on methodology. I now argue that my earlier focus on resolving the
tension between objectivism and relativism was flawed. Instead I favour a recognition
of the necessity of such a tension in scientific practice.29 This tension functions on
three main levels.
29 A similar position is taken by some scholars in technology studies. For example,
Williams and Edge describe a position of 'modified realism'(Williams & Edge,
forthcoming).
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At the epistemological level feminist practitioners of science are both
committed to the most accurate representation of nature and to locating this
representation in the particular context of their beliefs, values and assumptions. In
their view the tension between objectivism and relativism remains a fundamental
feature of the practice of science, whether it is made explicit - which they favour - or
not. This tension is fundamental precisely because neither a 'true' representation of
nature or a thorough uncovering of the subjectivities of research is ever entirely
possible. On the one hand, nature is always viewed through social lenses. There are a
range of different lenses through which we view science, based on our values and
beliefs about the social and natural world. It is not only difficult to represent nature
accurately because of our political standpoint, but also because of the complexity of
the natural world, which we can only represent in crude models. These models can
never be proved, only disproved. On the other hand, our beliefs and values are equally
complex and the social processes of knowing can never be entirely transparent.
Philosophers and social scientists share with scientists the inability to ever prove their
theories of knowledge.
In a second way the tension exists for scientists when justifying their research.
This is especially true in the case of feminists operating in the hostile male domain of
science. Feminists might appeal to realism and objective methods in certain
circumstances, eg when criticising sexist science for 'bad' methodology, but in
different circumstances might emphasise the importance of the political implications
embedded in certain research, either as a strategy for promoting or dismissing certain
results. In other words, on the one hand feminists appeal to better empirical
representation of nature, and on the other to better politics in certain scientific
knowledge.
Third, the tension between objectivism and relativism spans the different
subject areas and research questions in science. As I have already argued, objectivity
is related to the particular context of scientific research. For example, a commitment
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to thorough statistical analysis of data is typically used in orthodox science to reduce
the potential for 'bias' in results. Whilst this by no means guarantees objective
scientific knowledge, I would argue that it does function in reducing certain types of
error, and therefore contributes to a more 'accurate' representation of nature. These
methods are clearly more appropriate in answering certain research questions than
others. Similarly the chance of a clearer understanding of the political content and
implications of science may vary depending on the research area. For example, in the
area of research where comparisons are made between the sexes, the political
implications may be more obvious than in 'less contentious' research where political
and social subjectivities are less transparent. The existence of these levels of
objectivity and relativism in the context of variations in scientific investigations points
to a complex picture of the relationship between different disciplines. It implies that
without a clearer understanding of similarities and differences in scientific disciplines,
in terms of subject matter, research questions and levels of objectivity and relativism,
it is not possible to 'map' the process of change towards a feminist science
throughout these disciplines.
This characterisation of the tension between relativism and objectivism in a
feminist science has parallels in practitioners' preferred role for reductionism and
holism, and control of and respect for nature in science, as documented in Chapter 8.
Perhaps then it would be helpful to also think of reductionism and holism, and control
of and respect for nature, as in another productive tension in this 'best version' of a
feminist science. The tension can also be thought of as existing on three levels - in
terms of epistemology and how this is put into practice; in feminist scientists'
s
jujtificatory strategies; and as depending on the particular context of science.
Epistemologically, feminist scientists could locate reductionist understandings of
nature in the wider context, that is in a more holistic understanding. Control of nature
and respect for nature are also inter-related. As in the case of objectivism and
relativism, in both these cases, no component is ever either entirely possible (or
entirely desirable). Second, feminists might appeal to reductionism or holism, and
control of or respect for nature, depending on the aims of their research or their
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audience. And third, the choice of particular methods or approaches is always located
in the particular context of the subject matter and research questions of science.
Does this treatment of the tension between objectivism and relativism,
reductionism and holism, and respect for or control of nature, in this 'best version' of
a feminist science constitute a feminist methodology or feminist methodologies? As in
the case of questions that might be tackled in a feminist science. I do not consider it
appropriate to call approaches and techniques which feminists might employ 'feminist
methodologies'. In particular, the recognition and exploration of the tension between
objectivism and relativism is not exclusive to feminists, or the natural sciences.
Indeed, many researchers in the social sciences now consider a recognition of this
tension as fundamental to good research design (eg Jensen & Janowski, 1991). This
means that the term feminist methodologies is more problematic than helpful in
defining the 'best version' of a feminist science. Rather it is more useful to describe
the 'best version' of a feminist science as involving a set of methodologies which
recognise and explore the tension between objectivism and relativism/reductionism
and holism/control of and respect for nature in the three ways outlined above: in
terms of epistemological commitments; justificatory strategies; and in the particular
context ofdifferent subject areas and research questions.
9.3.4 Organisation
The formal organisation of science, such as the employment hierarchy, and the
more informal organisation, such as communication networks, are dominated by men,
and are an important feature of the male domain of science. Feminist practitioners
wanted an end to these exclusionary practices. They advocated more flexible working
arrangements, and a more collaborative and supportive environment. Egalitarian
organisation was favoured instead of hierarchy. Some also called for science
departments to be organised differently, involving a critical evaluation of science
alongside the practice of science in a similar way to English Literature departments. In
addition, feminist practitioners advocated more support for female science students
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and training science students to be more reflexive and aware of social and political
issues in science.
In Chapter 4 I criticised feminist epistemologies for an inadequate
consideration of the organisation of science but singled out Longino's and Nelson's
feminist empiricism as being concerned with organisation. Feminist practitioners share
their concern and an awareness of the necessity of organisational changes if other
changes are to be realised. They also criticised the gulf between philosophy and
science, especially the difficulty in translating epistemology into practice, as do
Longino and Nelson when they speak of treating science as practice not product. The
lack of consideration of organisational change in the bulk of feminist epistemology is,
in my view, the single most significant contributing factor to this gap between theory
and practice.
I would go so far as to argue that re-organisation of science is fundamental
to the development of the 'best version' of a feminist science. Key to a workable
definition ofa feminist science is the ending of the male domain of science ie an end
to male domination in terms ofnumbers and power. This, in turn, requires an end to
the formal and informal organisation of science which is a central element of such
domination. The way in which this re-organisation is related to criteria for feminist
scientists, and questions asked and methodologies adopted by feminist scientists is
explored further in section 9.4.
9.3.5 Science and Society
Longino and Nelson highlight the importance of change both within and
outwith science in the promotion of a feminist science. This is underlined by the
empirical material. The interaction of the role of funding agencies and governments
with the male domain of scientists determines the type of research that gets done. The
methodologies adopted are also indirectly shaped by this relationship. For example,
scientists' aiming to develop a career in science will partly base their choice of
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methodologies on what they view as acceptable to the coalition of interest between
the male domain of science and the funding bodies and policy makers, ie
methodologies which will provide 'good' and publishable results. The rhetoric of
objectivity is another important feature of the male domain of science. As I have
previously argued, appeals to objectivity are part of the protocol in the male domain
of science - as objectivity is highly valued scientists seeking kudos within the male
domain of science will utilise this rhetoric. This also applies to scientists in their
interactions with the wider community - clearly appeals to objectivity garner political
and financial support as well as authority amongst the lay public.
Feminist practitioners advocated a more democratic science, in which
scientists fulfill their responsibility to the wider community. They argued that
scientists should be more responsible for communicating the reasons behind their
research to allow people to make decisions about what type of research gets done,
and to properly evaluate the results. Part of this process is a breaking down of the
myth of objectivity, and thus the authority of scientists: feminist practitioners saw
scientists making their exploration of the subjectivities which affect their work
transparent in the wider community as well as the scientific community as an
important part of this responsibility. Smaller, longer-term grants, which allowed for
more creative science, were also favoured. Clearly, for this to happen, changes in the
public domain, governments and funding agencies alongside changes in the scientific
domain are necessary. This challenges the notion of a feminist science disembodied
from society, highlighting the importance of feminist values in science depending on
feminist values in the wider society, as stressed in Chapter 4.
Feminist scientists' concern to promote equality in science takes as its
necessary corollary a concern to promote equality outwith science. This is highlighted
in the discussion of topics and questions in this 'best version' of a feminist science -
where empowerment of women in the community in addition to a general
commitment to equality was an important theme. Similarly, a commitment to equality
in the wider community would be necessary to sustain increased numbers of women in
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science; and challenging the male domain of science, a central feature of the feminist
re-organisation of science, would require a corresponding challenge to the male
domain of funding and policy making bodies. As illustrated in section 9.2, 'coalitions
of interest' between scientists and funders are marked by their male domination. In the
same way that male domination in and outwith science is mutually reinforcing,
promoting a feminist science from within the existing scientific institutions and
promoting equality in the wider society, are mutually reinforcing. In other words, to
reformulate Fee's and Longino's arguments which suggest that a feminist science is
impossible without a feminist society, and start from the premise that a feminist
science is dynamic rather than static, the process offeminising science andfeminising
society are interdependent.
9.3.6 Feminist Science
To recap on this section the criteria for the various components of this 'best
version' of a feminist science are as follows:
1. The inclusion of people from a variety of backgrounds in a feminist science
community who hold a range of views but who are united by a common goal of
equality for women in and via science.
2. The exploration of questions of interest to feminist scientists, in all their diversity,
with their common commitment to sexual equality and their various links to other
political interest groups in and outwith science.
3. The use of methodologies which recognise and explore the tensions between
relativism and objectivism, reductionism and holism, control of and respect for
nature. This is manifest in feminist scientists': epistemological considerations;
justificatory strategies; and guides their approach in the different contexts of
scientific practice.
4. A re-organisation of science in ways which challenges the male domain of science.
5. A corresponding challenge to inequality in the wider society, in particular the
intersection of the male domain of scientists, policy makers and funding bodies and
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a recognition of scientists' responsibility to communicate the subjectivity of science
to the wider community.
I suggest that Longino's notion that a feminist science is the science that feminists do
(Longino, 1988) is a useful way of thinking about this best version of a feminist
science that I propose. This deceptively simple concept is appropriate on three counts.
First, it involves a recognition of different 'feminisms' and particular contexts of
science. Second, following on from this, it places no prescriptions on the topics or
methodologies involved in a feminist science. Moreover, these are seen to be
intimately linked with each feminist scientist's brand of feminism, and their own
subjectivities, and grounded in the particular context of the science which they
practice, eg the particular subject matter and research questions. Third, it avoids the
problem of 'appropriating' topics, questions, and methodologies already important to
other groups and traditions in science, and calling them feminist.
Unfortunately some of the more detailed questions raised in Chapter 4 cannot
be answered in this best version of a feminist science, for example, the potential for
the reverberation of feminist change throughout scientific disciplines has not been
established. This is due, in part, to the reliance placed on feminist practitioners'
imagination, and the 'broad strokes' which go to make this picture of a feminist
science. Nevertheless, this is a useful starting point in discussing a practical
framework for a feminist science. This linking of feminist epistemologies of science
with an understanding of the practice of science makes three main contributions to the
project of feminising science. First, it highlights the importance of organisational
change, as discussed by Nelson and Longino. Second, it makes explicit the necessary
tension between objectivism and relativism which is implicit in all of the feminist
epistemologies and introduces two other similar tensions - between reductionism and
holism and between control of and respect for nature. Third, it favours diversity over
restricted definitions of practice and recognises the powerful role which this diversity
could have in strengthening moves towards a feminist science. This does not mean
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that a feminist science is without established procedures and likely to be
dysfunctional. This commonality is based on the four points outlined above.
In the next section I consider the processes involved in moving towards this
ideal vision of a feminist science. This is an important part of this study which starts
from the premise that a feminist science must be practical and achievable from within
the existing institutions of science. Many of the questions raised in Chapter 4
concerned, not the content of a feminist science, but the processes necessary to
achieve such a science. I hope to provide answers to these questions by drawing on
the empirical data and, thereby, to suggest practical strategies for change.
9.4 Feminising Science
9.4.1 Integrated Strategies
There are five main processes involved in promoting this 'best version' of a
feminist science. The first is encouraging people who are from a variety of
backgrounds, and who hold a range of views but are united by a common goal of
equality for women in and via science, into the feminist science community. The
second is exploring questions of interest to feminist scientists, in all their diversity and
with their various links to other political interest groups in and outwith science. The
third is developing methodologies which recognise and explore the tensions between
relativism and objectivism, reductionism and holism and control of and respect for
nature, in epistemological considerations, justificatory strategies, and in particular
contexts of scientific practice. The fourth is reorganising science to challenges the
male domain of science. And the fifth is challenging inequality in the wider society,
especially at the intersection of the male domain of scientists, policy makers and
funding bodies. When thinking about how to achieve such changes, it becomes clear
that the processes of change are interdependent. In my view, organisational change is
the 'lynch pin' of this process. Without organisational change other changes - in
practitioners, topics, methodologies and links with the wider community - cannot
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follow. The organisation of the male domain of science currently operates, informally
and formally, to limit change in each of these categories. I now consider the process
of encouraging more feminist scientists and sustaining feminist practice of science, to
illustrate this point. I then discuss how promoting methodologies favoured in the 'best
version' of a feminist science which I suggest is linked to other changes. Finally, I
consider the relationship between the different disciplines of science and how this
shapes the process of feminising science.
Feminist science requires feminist scientists. This, in turn, requires more
women in science, and means promoting feminism amongst both female and male
scientists. The present processes of getting more women into science are described in
the women in science literature, reviewed in Chapter 2. Increasing the numbers of
women in science requires developing girls' interest in science, encouraging women to
study science at university, and providing a good working environment for women
once they are in science. This latter issue requires challenging the working patterns in
science, and the exclusionary practices of the male domain of science. Feminists
already in science have joined together to start this process (Zorra and Baltimore
Women in Astronomy are two examples). On a more local level, change in the work
environment of the laboratory can be instigated by senior feminist scientists by
encouraging more collaborative practices.
Nevertheless an important criticism of the women in science literature is its
implicit acceptance of the notion of value free knowledge. Whilst I am advocating a
diversity of feminists with a range of interpretations of feminism and science, an
acceptance of the subjectivity of science is central to dismantling the male domain of
science and promoting a more egalitarian and democratic feminist science. The male
domain of science relies on the rhetoric of objectivity to sustain its authoritative
position in the community, and the rhetoric of objectivity has an important function
inside the male domain of science - as a resource to garner support from senior peers
and to dismiss science, such as science practiced by feminists, as biased and therefore
weak. Therefore, for the topics and questions in science to be made more relevant and
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accessible to ordinary men and women, for a more open and creative approach to
knowledge to be encouraged, and ultimately for an end to the male domain of science,
the myth of value free science must be exposed and rejected by feminist scientists.
Organisational changes such as changes in funding agency boards (to include members
of the public) and more small scale grants for longer periods of time are also required
to facilitate the development of a feminist science community. These changes involve
dismantling the male domain of science and thus discrediting their appeals to
scientists' expert role in creating 'objective facts'.
It is important to overcome the present hostility amongst some scientists,
especially women scientists, to a feminist science. I suggest that characterising science
as a male domain might be a fruitful approach. This avoids problematic associations
with essentialism and the focus on male psychological needs, which are greeted with
hostility from many scientists (male and female). I suggest that the emphasis on the
constraints placed by the organisation of science on scientists' practices, as opposed
to explaining masculinity and science, will have more resonance with scientists' own
experiences, and will therefore be more relevant and, hopefully, more acceptable.
Instead of perpetuating the rhetoric of masculinity and science, an emphasis on the
rhetorical quality of claims to neutrality might be more meaningful and less alienating
to working scientists. Moreover, in my view, the corresponding emphasis on
feminising science - ie ending the male domain of science, in favour of a more
egalitarian, democratic and socially useful science which, crucially, does not abandon
the search for better knowledge, the use of reductionist methods, or the aim of control
(eg where this is not at odds with caring for nature) - will also be more agreeable than
the more Utopian claims of feminist epistemologies.
The promotion of feminist science also requires organisational change. A
forum for discussion amongst scientists is necessary for the message to be heard. This
relates to changes in teaching practice, which is discussed further in section 9.4.3, and
a challenge to the authority scientists gain from being viewed as 'fact makers'. If a
feminist science is to be successful, scientists need to become more reflexive about
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their work, and aware of the critiques of science coming from the social sciences and
feminist movement. This awareness depends upon cross-disciplinary seminars, and
meetings, in addition to a change in scientists' public role, as I shall show in the
following section. Feminists in the social sciences and philosophy could play a more
involved role in feminising science if they took part in this type of interdisciplinary
forum. Their work would also benefit from more understanding of scientists' practice
- as this thesis hopefully shows. I take the view that social theories about science
benefit from grounding in practice - this makes them more accurate, more accessible
to scientists, and more useful in precipitating change (if that is part of their agenda).
Although feminist epistemologies of science at present play a role of 'mirror for
reflection' for a minority of feminist scientists, their saliency would presumably be
increased if they were more accessible and relevant to a larger audience.
The move towards the suggested 'best version' of a feminist science, would
involve recognising and exploring the methodological tensions outlined in point 3 of
section 9.3.6. At present a minority of feminist scientists are developing
methodologies in this way in the life sciences. Others have ideas for feminist research
in the physical sciences. How might feminists further develop methodologies along
these lines?
In approaching an answer to this question, it is useful to consider why feminist
research in the life sciences is more developed. This is related to the numbers of
women in the life sciences, and the corresponding number of feminists in addition to
the immediate relevance to women's biology. The feminist critique of the biological
sciences, especially human biology, and research into sex difference, undoubtedly
proved to be a resource, or focus, for alternative feminist methodologies to develop.
The small numbers of feminists and the lack of feminist suggestions for research
topics in the physical sciences, in addition to the tendency for the feminist critique to
'write off these sciences as fatally masculinist, is likely to be related to lack of ideas
for alternative methodologies emerging in these disciplines. Nevertheless, I take the
view that, as there is nothing intrinsically 'masculine' about these sciences, there is no
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reason for why feminists cannot explore and develop new methodologies in them too.
Because changes in methodology depend on a greater diversity of scientists and a
commitment to creativity not seen in the present science, when more women and
feminists enter the physical sciences, and the organisational changes necessary to
sustain their numbers and facilitate new methodologies are implemented, feminists'
development of new methodologies in the 'hard' sciences will be boosted.
Perhaps the different context of the physical science makes alternative
approaches more difficult. As I have already argued there is insufficient knowledge
about the relationships between the various scientific disciplines and subject areas to
map the potential for similar research methodologies to be developed. Nevertheless,
feminising science could involve interdisciplinary research, and collaboration more
broadly. Instead of simply looking to the subject matter of the disciplines of science, it
is again important to consider organisational change. Networks of feminists will also
be crucial in developing interdisciplinary feminist research via facilitating cross-
fertilisation of ideas. It is therefore central to the project of feminising science to re¬
organise science, especially to increase the numbers of women and challenge the male
domain of science in all of the scientific disciplines. The next section addresses
another important element: the dialectic of change within science and outwith science,
in the wider society.
9.4.2 Internal and External Change
There are three main ways in which the process of feminising science is
necessarily linked with changes in the wider society.
First, a more democratic science involves democratic changes in the wider
society. Clearly for scientists to be properly involved in the community the community
must support such involvement. At present communities' interest in science tends to
arise around specific issues which might impact on them. In normal circumstances an
ambivalence to science is more prevalent. Although scientists' involvement in
274
community issues is a good way to generate a more lasting interest, this general
ambivalence to science must nevertheless be tackled. More fundamentally, the notion
of community must be addressed. To what extent do people feel part of a community
or many communities? People require education about science, but also a stake in
their community - ambivalence can be related to peoples' wider feelings of
powerlessness. This is not only true about science, but all areas of the political
economy. Democratisation of science cannot therefore be disassociated from more
fundamental democratisation which would involve the re-creation of communities.
Nowadays scientists tend to live in more affluent areas. Advocating their participation
in their community therefore means the affluent areas will benefit, whereas the more
economically disadvantaged communities will remain unaffected. A democratic
science therefore requires a fairer society, ie a more equal distribution of wealth and
privilege.
Second, funding for feminist research requires changes in the funding bodies
and their distribution of money. This is related to the above point about democracy.
For people to be involved in a meaningful way on the boards of funding bodies the
elitism of the establishment must be confronted. Similarly, government priorities are
directly related to the extent and distribution of science funding. Only a government
with similar priorities to feminist scientists would distribute research money in a
favorable way.
Third, changes in the workplace in science are related to changes in other
workplaces. This, once more, requires government initiatives and legislation for
change, eg proper nursery provision, paternity leave, job sharing. There is no reason
to assume that science workplaces will change faster than those in other institutions.
These three examples of the inter-linking process of feminising science and
changing society illustrate the need for wider political and economic change to
support a feminist science. This is perhaps the greatest barrier to change. It is
therefore crucial that feminist scientists support and work in collaboration with
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feminists and others advocating democratic change in the wider society, and vice
versa.
9.4.3 Teaching Feminist Science
The third and final strategy for feminising science is teaching a feminist
science. Students' naivete about the place of women in science and the social and
political factors which shape scientific knowledge was illustrated in Chapter 7. I
suggest that this can be challenged by a radical overhaul of the way science is taught
and, more realistically, by the promotion of courses on women in science, or women's
biology, as taught by some of the feminist practitioners I interviewed.
Ideally science students would be taught to be critics of science as well as
knowledge producers. Courses would involve the social and political history of
science, and encourage creative thinking about how to address new, unanswered
questions in science. In addition, the social responsibility of scientists would be
emphasised. The development of this kind of science teaching will develop as a result
of changes in the scientific community and knowledge production, outlined in section
9.4.1.
In the meantime feminists' interest and concern about teaching their students
is a positive step in the right direction. Their development of courses and, more
informally, their interaction with students in the teaching laboratory and classroom,
contributes to students' better understanding of the nature of science.
Teaching students about the male domain of science might be an effective
way of conveying the male domination of science in terms of numbers and power, in
addition to addressing ways in which this shapes the practice of science, and the
knowledge produced. I argued previously that this might avoid hostility to the
feminist critique of science or theories about a feminist science in the case of women
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scientists, because it shifts the emphasis away from intrinsic differences between men
and women. The same might also be true for science students.
9.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I have developed theory concerning the male domain of science
as an initial step in understanding how the practice of science is gendered. This
emphasises the importance of male domination and the way in which it is reinforced
with the use of particular communication styles and methodologies. The importance
of interactions between the male domain of science and men in other powerful social
institutions, eg funding bodies and policy makers, was also discussed.
I went on to argue that the 'best version' of a feminist science is based on a
commitment to ending the male domain of science. There is no one set of feminist
questions and methodologies, but many. A constructive tension between
understanding the social construction of scientific knowledge and a commitment to
better, more objective forms of knowledge, in the sense of a commitment to more
accurate knowledge, subject to peer review. A similar tension between reductionism
and holism and control of, or respect for, nature was identified. Increasing the
numbers of women in science and promoting organisational change which will provide
a decent working environment for women scientists, in addition to promoting changes
in the wider society as well as changes within science are other important,
interdependent, features of this version of a feminist science. More importantly, the
processes of reaching this ideal feminist science, involve an integrated approach to
organisational, methodological and societal change. This constitutes a practical
framework for a feminist science.
In the final chapter, which now follows, I discuss these findings in the context





In this final chapter I address the main conclusions of Chapter 9 in the context
of the thesis as a whole. In section 10.2 I reconsider the notion of science as a male
domain, asking whether it solves the problems I identified in the feminist critique of
science as masculine. More generally, have I provided a theory that might help to
'bridge the gap' between women scientists and feminist critics of science? Does the
notion of science as a male domain have the potential to alleviate women scientists'
hostility to the suggestion that science is intrinsically masculine, without losing
appreciation of the subjectivity of science emphasised by feminist critics of science? I
take a similar approach in section 10.3, this time addressing the 'best version' of a
feminist science, in addition to the strategies for achieving such a science, suggested
in Chapter 9. Do I provide sufficient detail and clarity of meaning as well as adequate
consideration of how to operationalise a feminist science? In each of these sections I
appraise the strengths and weaknesses ofmy suggested theory. In section 10.4 I move
on to consider the overall methodology and research design of the thesis. I reflect on
what I see as the strong points of the thesis, as well as its limitations. I discuss the
notion of 'linking theory and practice' in particular, a guiding principle in my research.
In section 10.5, I discuss future research areas raised by this work. I end in section
10.6 by contemplating how the process of research has changed my own thoughts and
feelings about feminism, about science, and about social research.
10.2 Science is a Male Domain: a critique
I developed the notion of science as a male domain after a preliminary review
of the women in science literature in Chapter 2, and the feminist critique of science as
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masculine in Chapter 3, followed by empirical investigation of science students' and
practitioners' experience and views on gender, feminism and science. I criticised the
women in science literature for implicidy accepting the notion of science as being
value free. Although I recognised the pervasive association between science and
masculinity, as outlined by feminist critics of science, I identified the following three
problems: over-general and excessively rigid and deterministic definitions of
masculinity; lack of consideration of the way in which rhetoric and practice interact;
and insufficient exploration of the variety of contexts of scientific practice.
The notion of science as a male domain was an attempt to unite the
understanding of sex, gender and science from these two literatures, and to overcome
their weaknesses. I argue that I achieved this in three main ways. I combined the
emphasis on the organisational inequalities of science in the women in science
literature with an appreciation of the rhetoric of value-free knowledge from the
critiques of science outlined in Chapter 3. I suggested that the way in which men in
science hold influence and control is intimately tied to their perpetuation of the 'myth
of objectivity'. I also argued that men's influence and control are tied to their
repetitive use of particular methodologies, which often tend to be reductionist.
Second, I provided a more flexible treatment of the concept of masculinity than the
feminist critique of science as masculine. I argued for the notion of masculinity as a
label, without losing an appreciation of its infusion through science. Moreover, I
suggested that the notion of science as a male domain allows for the existence of
different masculinities within science, which can change through time. I pointed out
that in the male domain of science masculine influences are likely to be perceived
differently by different groups concerned with gender and science, depending on their
priorities. Third, I highlighted the different layers of meaning behind, and associations
between, objectivity/subjectivity, reductionism/holism, and control of/respect for
nature. I challenged any simplistic association between gender and these features of
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science and provided an appreciation of the particularity of different contexts in
scientific practice. This also proved invaluable for theorising a 'best version' of a
feminist science.
Nevertheless, there are two ways in which this theory of science as a male
domain requires improvement. I did not adequately represent the complexity of the
relationship between gender identity, gender socialisation and the construction, or
rejection, of gender labels in science. This is, in part, a limitation of the research
design. However, the notion of a male domain is also simplistic at a conceptual level -
the interaction between gender labels on practice in science and gender labels on
practice outwith science remain unaddressed. Similarly, the different type of
interactions between individual male scientists and the 'masculine' culture of science
was largely unaccounted for (although I did acknowledge the possibility of
difference). These conceptual limitations are indications of the preliminary stage of the
theory that science is a male domain. This difficulty in comprehensively theorising the
links between gender, language and social practices, is faced by scholars throughout
the social sciences.
A second and related limitation in the notion of science as a male domain was
lack of detail about differences in scientific practice. In particular, I did not explore in
sufficient depth the relationship between gender and the differing practice of scientific
workers and the scientific elite, or the different approaches in pure and applied
science. More generally, the focus on (mainly) biological and physical research science
in UK and North American universities was limiting. Scientific practice in the private
sector in contrast to the public sector, and in new and emerging disciplines in contrast
to older more established disciplines, was not thoroughly explored in the thesis. A
partial picture of scientific practice was therefore provided. Differences in the 'micro
level' of scientific practice were also afforded limited consideration. Each research
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event in science is unique: the dynamics of communication in each research team will
be different as will the combination of research techniques and conceptual progress.
Despite these limitations I argued that the concept of science as a male domain
fulfills the criteria, raised in Chapter 1 and in more detail in Chapter 3, for 'strategic
theorising', theory to bring about change (Connell, 1983). I suggested four main
strategies.
1. I emphasised the organisation of science as a male domain.
2. I made the process of labelling science as masculine explicit.
3. I highlighted the way in which the myth of objectivity functions in securing male
domination.
4. I drew attention to the different contexts of scientific practice.
These strategies might be useful in uniting feminist critics and women scientists to
challenge the male domination of science as it incorporates themes familiar in both
their arguments in a productive way.
10.3 Feminising Science: a critique
My starting point for developing the 'best version' of a feminist science was a
commitment to practical change from within the existing institutions of science which
does not to forfeit radicalism in this process. I emphasised the importance of
generating theories about a feminist science that were based on a proper
understanding of scientific practice as it is currently, and as it might be in the process
of feminising science. I went on to review feminist epistemologies of science and
identified four main limitations: the tension between the individual and the community
in terms of who would practice a feminist science; the tension between objectivism
and relativism in terms of methodology; an insufficient consideration of organisational
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changes necessary in feminising science; and a lack of clarity about the relationship
between feminist scientists and the wider public.
I argue that the 'best version' of a feminist science which I suggested in
Chapter 9 does clarify the meaning and nature of a feminist science in these four main
areas, giving details about the criteria for feminist scientists; topics investigated and
methodologies adopted; organisational change and the relationship between science
and the wider society. I argued for the inclusion in the feminist science community of
people from a diversity of backgrounds, with a variety of interpretations of feminism,
but who shared a commitment to equality for women in and via science. I then
readdressed my earlier critique of the feminist epistemologies of science, which
treated the tension between objectivism and relativism as a problem, and argued
instead that this tension is a potential strength. In my view this is an important
conclusion, as although it does not provide a 'neat answer' to the question of feminist
methodology, I now view neat answers as a false goal. Instead, I argue that it is both
more realistic and more progressive to explore how the methodological practice of a
feminist science might be richer and more diverse This depends upon recognising the
tension between objectivism and relativism as productive.
The emphasis in this 'best version' of a feminist science on organisational
change was another important contribution to the theory of a feminist science. This
contrasts with the tendency in the majority of feminist epistemologies of science to
largely ignore questions of organisation, with the notable exceptions of Nelson and
Longino, as discussed in Chapter 4. In arguing that re-organisation is the 'lynch pin'
of feminising science I contributed some much needed pragmatism to the project of
feminising science. In a similar vein, I highlighted the interdependence of external and
internal change. Although many of the organisational and broader societal changes
that I suggested have proved to be, and are likely to continue to be, difficult to
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achieve, I prefer to view these as optimistic, rather than pessimistic, conclusions. For
me, emphasis on concrete changes is more attractive because it is more transparent
and therefore more achievable than the esoteric changes proposed in much of the
feminist epistemologies criticised in Chapter 4.
There are two main limitations in this 'best version' of a feminist science and
the suggested strategies by which it might be achieved. First, there was a lack of detail
in all of the proposals for change. Criticisms like those in section 10.2 can be applied
here. Both at the 'macro' and at the 'micro' level, the relationship between science
and the wider society was inadequately theorised. There was a lack of detail about the
relationship between the different scientific disciplines, and the potential for
'reverberation of change'. Similarly, the different ways in which feminist scientists
might develop links with the local community were not thoroughly considered.
Second, and more fundamentally, there is an ambiguity about the notion of a
feminist science that I do not feel I have adequately resolved in this thesis. Although I
argued that the titles 'feminist methodologies' or 'feminist topics' were inappropriate
I used the term feminist science, adopting Longino's formulation that a feminist
science is the science that feminists do, along with an outline of the four main aspects
of the practice of a feminist science which I envisaged. At the same time I also
emphasised the concept of feminising science to highlight the dynamic process of
changing science that is part of the feminist project. In one way these two terms are
not interchangeable - feminising science is the process of moving towards a feminist
science. Yet, in another way I have used these terms - feminist science and feminising
science - interchangeably when I argued that a feminist science is a dynamic process.
This slip seems to reflect a deeper tension between the goals of feminism as a dynamic
project dedicated to achieving equality, but also as an idealised vision of equality.
Does this signify a fundamental contradiction in feminism? I would tend to argue, as
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Harding (1986) has done, that, although this is clearly a contradiction, it is perhaps a
useful one . Although I am slightly uncomfortable with this type of argument as it
opens the way for contradictions which are flaws to be viewed as positive and
therefore not adequately resolved, I feel this is not the case here - it is important for
feminism to be ambivalent on this issue as feminist change must be both a practical
process and a vision of the future.
Despite these limitations I argue that an important strength of this version of a
feminist science was the avoidance of identifying a feminist science with a small group
of women practitioners who share a narrow set of views; with qualities associated
with femininity; or particular research topics and methodologies. This diversity in
terms of practitioners, methodologies and topics is a strength of the theory I
proposed, not a weakness. It will generate a science which is integral to, and therefore
potentially influential on, mainstream science; a science which is open to different
approaches and therefore more creative than orthodox science; and, perhaps most
importantly, a science which attracts, not turns away, scientists with similar fears and
concerns to feminists. Altogether I suggest that this is a more radical agenda than a
successor science project based on more restrictive definitions of practice, which risks
alienation of both female and male scientists and ultimately obscurity.
10.4 Autocritique
There are five main points to the shortcomings of the study.
First, the empirical research design could not meet all of the research
questions. I raised questions about language and context in addition to questions
about the relationship between gender socialisation, gender identity and the
construction of gender labels, which I could not answer via interviews with science
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students and feminist practitioners. The discourse of science - in terms of scientists'
speech and writings as well as accounts of their practice - was not evaluated. The
questions about male scientists' psychology, and how this interacted with the
masculine culture of science, could not be answered by interviewing feminist
scientists, nor did the interview schedule involve questions to male students about
their psychological state. I did not adequately consider context - for example, the
range of scientists I spoke to were working in a relatively limited set of fields.
A second point about the limitations of the empirical study in terms of further
analysis of the theory concerns the second and third aims of the study. Because there
are so few feminists in science, and no well defined community of feminist critics or
practitioners of scientists, many of the questions raised in Chapter 4, concerning a
feminist science, proved difficult to investigate empirically, and were therefore not
fully answered. Some interviewees relied heavily on the imagination, rather than first
hand experiences. This is an inherent flaw in any study that seeks to 'theorise the
future' based on the present.
Third, the data obtained from the interviews with science students proved
disappointing. My original intention, to use the data to criticise the feminist
epistemologies, and to compare students' views depending on whether they had
studied history and philosophy of science, betrays a naivete about the impact of such
teaching of students' views and about their thoughtfulness about feminism, gender
and science.
Fourth, my theoretical analysis would have benefited from a more thorough
treatment of the radical science and sociology of science literature. This was limited
because of the extent of the feminist material, and the lack of cross referencing in the
two literatures. I have the strong feeling that this work holds the key to a more
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rigorous understanding of the way in which the practice of science is gendered, and,
consequently, more powerful strategies for change.
A fifth limitation concerns the theme of linking theory and practice. I found
that my empirical investigation could not address all of the epistemological issues I
raised in Part 1. Although the empirical research was limited, as discussed above, I
sense that in some ways epistemological issues will always defy comprehensive
empirical investigation. It may be that theory and practice are linked and separate at
the same time. The link is based on the way in which our understanding of practice
and our application of practice are always based on some prior theory about the social
world, be that explicit or not. Epistemology teaches us that knowing is a social
process. Yet, in another way, theory and practice are distinct - no theory entirely
mirrors practice - all provide a partial and incomplete representation of practice
because practice is so complex. This type of argument is also relevant to the
discussion about the use of the terms feminising science and feminist science, as
discussed in section 10.3. Feminism can be thought of as a practical project of change
and a theory of an idealised practice. The way in which I have slipped between using
the terms feminising science and feminist science in this thesis shows the contradictory
relationship between theory and practice. I now argue that this contradiction is
inevitable, but more importantly, it is a useful tension in feminism which gives a
multifaceted approach to ending women's oppression. Thus, my original focus on
grounding feminist epistemologies, while still a valid goal, was never going to be
entirely achievable, because no theory is ever entirely grounded in practice. Moreover,
my criticism of feminist epistemologies now appears excessively harsh. There is
clearly a place for epistemology and idealised theories of a feminist science, which
serve, in the words of one ofmy interviewees, as 'mirrors for reflections'.
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This thesis was over-ambitious in all three aims. Not only did I seek to
provide a comprehensive theory of the relationship between science and gender, and a
feminist science, but also to ground that theory in an understanding of scientific
practice. The level of detail required to produce such a comprehensive theory proved
impossible to elicit because of the large feminist and related literatures, and the sheer
complexity of gender relations, feminism and scientific practice. Moreover, the
research design was limited to interviewing a relatively small number of students and
practitioners.
Despite these limitations I argue that it was important for me to be over-
ambitious in this thesis. My motivation to solve what I saw as an important problem
was the driving force behind the entire thesis. Although I raised more questions than I
provided answers to, this does not imply a fundamental flaw in either the research
aims or the research design. These questions remain to be answered, and in the next
section I propose some future research that might further explore the nature of
gender, feminism and science. It is also important to stress that, although investigating
the experiences and perspectives of feminist practitioners and students provided a
partial picture, it nevertheless provided a rich and diverse account of science. Feminist
practitioners' projections of a futuristic feminist science are grounded in an
understanding of the current practice of science, which affords them considerable
authenticity. This became the basis for some important conclusions concerning
feminist criticism and practice of science. There is a need for change to a science that
meets ordinary women's and men's needs, a science that is less restricted and more
open to new approaches, and a science that is practised by a diverse group of
scientists. The main conclusions of the thesis gave a preliminary insight into the
practical processes necessary to achieve some of these changes. I offered an
alternative to the psychological reductionism of theories on the masculinity of science
and the Utopian nature of feminist epistemologies of science. A more complex picture
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of the construction of masculinity in science was provided, in addition to a pragmatic
approach to change. This avoided the pitfalls of abstract theorising and generated
more realistic strategies for change.
The main conclusions of the thesis are also important steps towards bridging
the gap between feminist activists and theorists, women scientists and feminists. I
hope to have gone some way to uniting the three sets of feminist literature: on women
in science, the gendering of science, and feminist epistemologies. The theory I have
outlined, although basic, is strategically linked with practical activism for change. I
validate the demands of liberal feminist activists and women in science in arguing for a
less dismissive approach to their male colleagues and to reductionism and control- the
butt of much feminist criticism. I ask for more openness to the ideas of social
construction of science and gender on the part of women in science in return.
10.5 Future Research
I propose four main avenues of future research that would be useful in
generating a better understanding of how the practice of science is gendered, and
strategies for feminising science.
First, in my view a thorough consideration of the interaction between
language, masculinity and practice would make an important contribution to the
theory of gender and science. This would require detailed contents analysis of
scientific writings, formal speeches and ordinary conversation in different scientific
disciplines (obtained through observational research), and would be backed up with
interviews with scientists.
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Second, a detailed examination of the links between individual male scientists'
ego and the 'masculinity of science', which was not possible in my thesis, could
usefully explore the relationship between gender, identity and rhetoric. Whilst I have
rejected what I view as the over reliance on psychological explanations in the feminist
critiques of science and have taken an alternative approach, in an attempt to balance
the psychological interpretation, by highlighting other ways in which gender relations
operate in science, I do not entirely reject a role for psychology in explaining gender
relations in science. However, I argue that a major flaw in the psychological accounts
is their lack of empirical justification and tendency to produce grand claims about
male scientists' psychological needs. This could be usefully explored empirically, via
interviews with scientists, and be united with work on discourse suggested above,
along with the notion of the male domain of science which I have suggested, to move
towards a more detailed theory of gender relations and science.
Third, ethnographic study of the practice of science, would surely be most
useful for answering questions concerning the ways in which science is gendered in
practice, in particular whether women and men do science differently. My own feeling
is that a proper ethnography would be a powerful source of information. For example,
the detailed work of anthropologist Sharon Traweek (1988) provides a fascinating
account of the culture of high energy physics. This could be supplemented by work on
other scientific sub-communities, including feminist ones. Although time consuming
and expensive, ethnography would provide invaluable empirical material on women,
gender, feminism and science.
Fourth, there is a real need for a proper integration of mainstream sociology
of science studies and feminist studies. Much of the work in science studies involves
careful empirical investigation which could be a major contribution to understanding
the role of gender in scientific practice. Furthermore, the sociology of scientific
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knowledge could be a valuable resource. The relativistic position of the theorists in
this field, although frustrating for feminists, does not negate SSK scholar s' work,
which is again, full of empirical evidence. I am not suggesting that feminists simply,
'add gender and stir', merely that they treat this literature as a resource for more
rigorous theories. I would argue that the present use of psychoanalytic theories and
complex epistemologies in the feminist literature, seriously weakens feminists' analysis
of gender, feminism and science, which would be strengthened by a more thorough
look at social relations.
Ultimately these approaches, theoretical and empirical, could be linked, to
provide a more detailed understanding of gender and science and a stronger practical
framework for a feminist science.
10.6 Epilogue
Throughout the three and a half years it has taken me to complete this thesis,
my idea and attitudes to feminism, science and social research have altered in a
number of ways. My interpretation and appreciation of feminism have consolidated
around a firm belief in practical steps to achieve sexual equality. I have come to
realise that feminism need not involve rejection of 'masculinity', and that men can be
valuable allies in the fight for equality. Nevertheless, I have also become more tolerant
of idealistic and Utopian feminist theories as I see them as having a useful function in
helping feminists to think more deeply about their aims and objectives. My initial
reaction against the restrictive teaching practices of natural science, which led me to
leave the field in favour of the social sciences, has also been replaced by a more
mature and respectful attitude to the natural sciences. Speaking to feminist
practitioners as part of this research made me remember the immense enjoyment that
can be found in pursuing an answer to a physical problem. In a way I regret leaving
physics because of this enjoyment, and also because every women who leaves physics
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leaves behind an even smaller network of women physicists. But I am sure that my
disciplinary change was the right decision for me personally. Although I have found
working on this PhD immensely frustrating at times, I do not think I would ever have
completed it if I did not find social research extremely fulfilling and inherently
fascinating. I have learned the importance of constantly challenging the pre¬
suppositions and background beliefs that I have held when doing the research,
particularly beliefs about men and women, and masculinity and femininity. Thus the
importance of honest and self-reflexive theorising has become clear to me. At the
same time I have experienced the difficulty in being thoroughly reflexive. This has led
me to appreciate the goals and difficulties which feminists in the natural sciences and
the social sciences share, and therefore to doubly value the time I spent as part of this
research with feminists involved with the natural sciences. Although I recognise the
immense task ahead of feminists in all of the academic disciplines, and in the wider
community, I hope that the spirit of collaboration which is so important in the 'best
version' of a feminist science which I have suggested, continues to inform my own
and other feminists' future research.
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Appendix 1 Student Interview Schedule
Part A: Experience of Traditional Science
(1) Background in science.
(2) Reasons for studying/not studying philosophy of science course and assessment of
the course.
y
(3) Have you experienced or witnessed and androcentric or sexist bias in the practice
of science? Show interviewee List 1.
(4) Is there any difference in the way that males and females do science? Refer to List
2 and 3. Where a difference is identified ask for elaboration.
(5) If not already mentioned by interviewee, are there any males or females who do
not fit in with their generalisations?
(6) What might be the reason for any differences identified?
Part B: Opinions and Attitudes
(1) What qualities are important in science? Refer to List 4.
(2) Did HPS change attitude to science, particularly objectivity and fact in science?
(3) Can the scientific method eliminate bias if properly applied?
(4) Would more women in science encourage stricter attention to sexist bias?
(5) What is required to eliminate bias? A radical transformation, acceptance of
subjective nature of knowledge?
(6) Is science masculine?
(7) Is a feminine science more or less acceptable?
Part C: Feminist Theories of Science
(1) What is a feminist science? Is it feasible, desirable?
(2) If studies HPS criticism of feminist theories?
(3) Would a feminist science be more feminine?
a
(4) Is a feminist science possible without a feminist society?
(5) See description sheet
(i) What should be the role of bias in a feminist science? Can it be eliminated
or used 'properly'?
(ii) Problems with either approaches?
(iii) What does it mean for physics?
(6) Would a feminist science be better than science as it is now?
(7) Would women do science better under a feminist science?
(8) How should a feminist science be taught?
List 2: Practice of Science in the Laboratory
(1) Research Problem
(1) Is there a gender difference in problem definition or selection?
(ii) For example, is either sex more likely to:
* participate in military research?
*
propose hypotheses to explore problems of social concern?
* participate in work outwith traditional specialist boundaries?
* give more weight to gender in the research question?
(2) Method and Design
(i) Is there a sex difference in the methods and design of experiments?
(ii) For example, is either sex more likely to:
* adopt a holistic, interactive approach?
* include their own subjectivity in the research?
* adopt an interdisciplinary approach?
* include the personal experience of the subjects or objects of research?
b
(3) Observation
(i) Is there a difference in how men and women observe when performing and
experiment?
(ii) For example in:
* observing interactive relationships or relationships where one constituent
dominates over the other?
* spending more time observing?
(4) Conclusions
(i) Is there a difference in the conclusions men and women draw from the data?
(ii) For example in:
* use of gender neutral language in describing data and presenting theories?
* criticising their own observations?
* awareness of sexist biases that might permeate theories and conclusions?
(5) General Approach
(i) Are there any other, more general, differences in the way men and women do
science?
(ii) For example in:
* integrating their role as scientist with other aspects of their personal life, or
to think of their role as scientist as the most important aspect of their life?
* their preference for small-scale research with small pieces of equipment or
large scale research with large, sophisticated equipment?
* a preference for working in a group, or alone?
* creativity, inventiveness, intuition, accuracy, patience?
* engagement in social or political aspects of their work?
* empathy with other scientists and with their subjects?
c
* adoption of a holistic, interactive approach, involving their own subjectivity
or objectivity?
* confrontational interactions with other scientists?
* competitiveness, aggression, practicality?
* concern with controlling nature?
List 3: Learning and Knowing Science
(1) Is there any difference in the way that men or women think about science?
(2) For example in
* working with abstract theory or with practical examples?
* ability in the use of abstract thought, or practicality?
* use of machine metaphors or more natural ones?
* use ofmemory?
* creativity or inventiveness when solving problems?
* originality of thought?
* intuition?
* questioning of information?
* preference for working alone or in a group?
List 4: Qualities Important in Science
* Creativity * Inventiveness
* Intuition * Patience
* Accuracy * Theoretical
* Complex, interactive models
* Dominant constituent models
* Practical sense
* Ability to withstand adversity






* Ability to work alone
d
Ability to work in a group
Respect of nature's complexity
Concern with own career
Questioning
* Empathy
* Control of nature
* Engagement in social
and political issues
* awareness of bias
Appendix 2 Lists and References
List 1: Stages in the Practice of Science
Funding
(a) commissioning and Funding of Research
Research Methods




(f) method of data collection
(g) data used and ignored











* Ability to withstand adversity
* Inclusion of subjectivities and context
* Complex, interactive models
* Dominant constituent models
* Ability to work in a group
* Respect of nature's complexity









* Ability to work alone
* Empathy
* Control of nature




There are two main approaches to bias in feminist epistemology of science. The first
can be called feminist empiricism. This argues that feminists should aim to eliminate
bias through rigorous attention to the scientific method combined with a thorough
examination of all the biases that could be present in the research. Women should
become more involved in science to 'police' sexist bias.
The second, feminist standpoint theory, argues that to discuss bias in science in
misleading, as it implies there is such a thing as a neutral, unbiased position. This is
rejected on the grounds that all knowledge is grounded by the standpoint of the
knower, all knowledge is biased. Feminist scientists should do science from a
feminist perspective ie. with the explicit political aim of emancipating women. More
generally, sexist and other discriminatory biases should be revealed through a
thorough examination of all scientists' standpoints.
A key point about feminist standpoint theory is that it is argued that women's
position as the oppressed provides a better vision of reality than the dominant
group's vision which is partial, and distorted by their power and desire to maintain
that power. It is argued that women's principle role as caretaker in the home 'grounds'
their understanding in reality. This provides a better basis for science than 'abstract
masculinity'.
h
Reference Sheet for Student Interviews
Bias
Sexist Bias - eg. not funding research by women; an experimental hypothesis that
women are less intelligent than men; not publishing articles by women
Androcentric Bias - eg. not funding research that looked at the female experience;
experimental hypothesis that looks at the male experience and takes it to represent
the female experience; not publishing articles about women
Approach, Aims and Method
Objectivity - unbiased, impersonal, open-minded, detached approach.
Inclusion of own subjectivity/Self Reflexivity - a recognition of the inevitability of
one's own biases and prejudices entering the science one does and the consequent
commitment to investigate and give details of how this shapes one's approach and
results.
Empathy - involves a sense of respect, connectedness and sympathy with both
humans and mature which is carried through into one's work as a scientists; eg. this
might involve concern with the effects of one's work on the environment, a rejection
of laboratory experiments on animals, science which aims to liberate humans from
oppression.
Control of nature - science which aims to harness nature to serve man's needs; to
disempower nature where it threatens man's power eg control of disease, provision
of power sources, sophisticated shelter, communication etc. This can also imply
control of other groups associated with nature - women and black people eg socio-
biology (where it is argued that women's destiny is in their genes, for example, they
are genetically programmed to be home makers); population control.
Holistic, interactive method - to look at the whole complex web of relationships
between variables via non-interventionist observation eg. observation of chimpanzee
society in the field.
Reductionist, interventionist method - to isolate and study one variable whilst
holding the others constant, and to take an active role in setting up the experiment and
manipulating variables eg. laboratory experiments on chimpanzee sociability via
isolation of individuals compared with a control group of chimpanzees confined
together.
Models and Metaphors
Interactive models - a model based on how each constituent in a given system
interacts with the others eg. Barbara McClintock's theory of genetic transposition in
DNA where DNA is in a delicate interaction with the cellular environment and control
of cellular development resides in the complex interaction of the whole cellular
system.
Dominant constituent models - a model of constituents where one dominates in
relationships with the others and is taken to be the most important constituent eg.
Watson and Crick's 'master molecule' model of DNA where DNA encodes the vital
information of the cell and dominates cellular development and information flows one
way from DNA to RNA protein.
Machine metaphors - models based on machinery which are used to build theories
based on machine-like structure and individual parts combined together eg. the human
body has been modelled on a machine since the 18th century.
j
Natural metaphors - models based on nature; involving complexity; unpredictability;
interacting functions eg. chaos theory, 'organic' organisational structures.
k
Appendix 3 Student Talk
(1) Introduction
Thank those who have agreed to participate in interview.
Outline:
explain briefly what purpose of research is;
describe interview;
outline some issues and concepts that will be discussed;
details of follow-up.
(2) Purpose of Interview
My history - physics degree. Part of research at University of Edinburgh into gender
and science, and linking feminist theory about science with the practice of science.
Interested in scientists' and science students' experience of and attitudes to science and
feminism. Important aspect of the research that I am dealing with here is the role of
philosophy of science courses in shaping students' attitudes to science, particularly
feminist science. Look at male and female students in zoology and physics who have
studied philosophy of science and equal numbers of those who have not.
(3) Describe Interview
Interview about an hour long, tape recorded if permission given. Split into 2 parts:
experience and opinions and attitudes. Mixture of open-ended and more specific
questions - sometimes use lists or examples to help. Note that there is no right or
wrong answer - interested in everyone's' interpretation and opinion. I have no vested
interest in hearing a particular answer.
1
(4) Outline of Issues and Concepts
Before interview look at some of the main ideas in the feminist literature to set the
scene for some of the things will discuss and give an opportunity to ask questions
about what the interview will cover. Note these are an outline of some feminist ideas,
and not necessarily mine.
Deal first with more liberal feminist claims about science and then move on to
consider more radical claims.
Liberal Claims
Science is sexist
Science is androcentric (male-centred)
This kind of science is bad - can be corrected by stricter adherence to scientific
methods and more women into science to 'police' sexist bias. Use scientific arguments
to disprove sexist theories.
Examples:
Sexist bias in science might involve not funding research by women or a hypothetical
experiment that women are less intelligent than men; or not publishing articles by
women.
Androcentric bias might be not funding research about women or funding interest of
prime interest to men and not women (space research, military research); or not
publishing articles about women.
m
An example of feminist response to sexist theory is in feminist research into the
validity of theories that link sex difference in mathematical and visual spatial ability
with hormonal levels, Here feminists challenge the theory on the grounds that the
evidence used to justify it was not related to sex difference. Kimball claims that
although the major piece of evidence used - the more testosterone present the better
the males do in simple, repetitive tasks - 'does tell us something about the relationship
of hormones to certain kinds of cognition in males it tells us nothing about sex
difference, the differential strengths of the two hormones (oestrogen and androgen)
or the effect of oestrogen on female cognitive function' (Kimball, 1981). There is also
no definite evidence of a link between female oestrogen levels and cognition.
More Radical Claims
Science is sexist and androcentric but it is an inherent feature of science which can
only be challenged by radical reorganisation. Use ideas of Evelyn Fox Keller.
Normal science is masculine science. This involves objectivity, control of nature,
reductionism and an interventionist approach. Definitions:
objectivity - impersonal, detached, unbiased
control of nature - to harness man's needs; to disempower where man's needs are
threatened, nb use of word man deliberate.
reductionism - one variable is examined whilst the others are held constant,
interventionism - to actively intervene, to manipulate.
This is seen by Keller as a masculine endeavour because of the division between
emotional and intellectual labour.
n
Barbara McClintock example - a cytogeneticist who was marginalised in mid-career
but eventually recognised and awarded a Nobel prize. McClintock, Keller argues, had
a particular methodological approach, which was different from the prevailing one.
This involved an emphasis on intuition, connectedness and relatedness, in fact Keller
entitles her biography of McClintock A Feeling for the Organism. So, in contrast to
the masculine science that Keller outlines, McClintock's methods involve her own
subjectivity (thoughts and feelings) not objectivity; empathy with nature, not control;
and an emphasis on holism (the complex web of variables) rather than reductionism;
and a non-interventionist approach - 'letting the material speak'.
Keller uses these theories to explain the theory of DNA that McClintock developed
and to compare it with another masculine theory of 'Master Molecules' that Watson
and Crick developed. Here DNA is the master molecule, encoding the vital
information of the cell and dominating cellular development. In contrast,
McClintock's theory of genetic transposition offers a more holistic view,
characterising DNA in delicate interaction with the cellular environment, where




Hope to have a discussion session once everyone is interviewed (for about half an
hour). This is to see if ideas have changed and to see if they change when you have a
discussion. Again, there is no right or wrong answer.
Intend to send transcripts of interviews and receive feedback.
Set up interview times.
o
BACK UP EXAMPLES FOR STUDENT INTERVIEWS
(i) Biological Research on Sex Hormone Influence on Human Behaviour (from
Longino, 1989)
Consider pre-natal influence on 'gender role' behaviour; pre- and post-natal androgens
(male hormones) and female homosexuality; low androgen levels in male at puberty
and spatial abilities.
Criticised for the following:
(a) assumption that there is a linear relationship between data and theory, ie. a one¬
way causal relationship between hormones and later cognition and behaviour;
(b) androcentric bias in what counts as data (2 sexes and genders); description of
lesbianism and designation of 'appropriate' gender roles; and background assumptions
- male mathematical superiority;
(c) uses evidence from relationships in other mammals to support finding - ignores the
difference between species;
(d) 'indicates a willingness to look at human beings in a particular way - to see us as
produced by factors over which we have no control... prisoners of our psychology. In
the name of extending an explanatory model, human capacities for self-knowledge,
self-reflection, self-determination, are eliminated from any role in human action (at
least in behaviour studies)' (Longino, 1989, p52).
(ii) A Feminist Alternative might mean:
(a) a replacement of the linear models with one of greater complexity involving
physiological, environmental, historical and psychological factors;
P
(b) this would allow for interactions between these factors and with the central
processing unit (CPU) and allow for self- modification, self-representation; self-
organisation;
(c) this more complex model will show the relevance of the intentional states of the
£.
brain; it is based on an ideology of self-determination - a main tenant of feminist
research is the valorisation of the subjective (the personal is political). Feminists are
not waiting on the data to speak (avoiding the unconscious hangover of traditional
bias) but actively fashioning research which is consistent with their wider political
aims and commitments;
(d) note that complex models and not necessarily always better than linear ones; in
this case they are preferred for political reasons, not because they are an expression of
'women's' nature'.
Q
Appendix 4 Interview Script for Practitioners
1 Background
1.1 What are your research interests and what is your present position?
1.2 What is your scientific background? How did you get to where you are now?
1.3 How did you become interested in women and science or issues of gender and
science? Have your ideas about this changed as time has gone on? For example,
would you say you had become more or less radical?
2 Alternative Science
2.1 What would your 'ideal science' be? Would the culture of science, the methods,
the subject areas and/or the role of the scientist be different from what it is now?
2.2 How do you feel about extending your ideas of science from your own discipline
to the whole of science?
2.3 What are the main barriers to your ideal science?
3 Feminist Science
3.1 Do you consider yourself a feminist?What does that mean to you?
3.2 How do you take your feminism into your science?
3.3 What does a feminist science mean to you? Do you believe that a feminist science
is desirable? Is it possible?
r
3.4 Do you think that there is a point to trying to develop and outline of what a
feminist science might be?
4 Feminist Critique of Science
4.1 How masculine do you think orthodox science is? Are, for example, objectivity,
reductionism and specialisation, masculine? What would a feminine science be? Is it
desirable?
4.2 Do men and women do or know science differently? For example organisation of
laboratory, teaching, publishing? Do men and women look at different
problems/subjects in science; perform an experiment differently; get different results?
Are women more holistic and men more reductionist? If you think there's a difference
- why?
4.3 Do you think 4.1 and 4.2 are relevant questions when considering what a feminist
science would be?
5 Feminist Science Theories
5.1 How interested are you in the feminist theories about science? Do you think
they're relevant to science? Which theorie(s) do you prefer and why? Which theories
do you dislike and why?
5.2 What do you think of feminist theories eg. Sandra Harding's, Donna Haraway's
and Evelyn Fox Keller's work?
5.3 Do you think there's any particular aspect of any of the feminist theories that's
'doable' in science? Could you 'do' 'strong objectivity' (Sandra Harding) or 'situated
knowledge' (Donna Haraway)? Is there anything that's especially inapplicable?
s
5.4 Do you think there's a difference in theories that come from feminist scientists and
those that come from feminist philosophers?
5.6 Do you think feminist philosophers should be trying to speak to scientists, trying
to change science and make it more feminist? Or, does their work serve other
purposes?
t
